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Abstract 
This central question addressed by this thesis is how and to what extent firms in a 
mature industry can pursue a corporate growth strategy through sequential mergers and 
acquisitions of competitors by influencing the outcome of competition authority 
enquiries to their benefit. First, by either ensuring that mergers and acquisitions are not 
referred to the competition authorities at all or second, if they are referred, that they 
transact subsequently with minimal requirement for adverse remedies. 
The UK alcoholic beverages industry was examined in detail over the period 1969 - 
2006 during which time there were 40 significant mergers and acquisitions, 26 of which 
were proposed in the UK the remaining 14 being cross-border deals in the US and/or 
Europe. Each of these transactions produced a rich array of quantitative and qualitative 
data. Discriminant analysis, a technique that has not traditionally been used in 
competition policy issues was applied to this data. 
The findings of the discriminant analysis were then tested using two case studies that 
examined i. the emergence of Scottish & Newcastle, the smallest of the national brewers 
in 1969, as the largest UK brewer and one of the largest brewers in Europe and ii. the 
emergence of Diageo, formed by the merger of Grand Metropolitan and Guinness in 
1997 as the dominant global spirits producer with a wide portfolio of leading brands in 
Scotch whisky, gin, vodka and liqueurs. Both case studies combined a descriptive 
analysis of the long term impact of the anti-trust enquiries that shaped the two respective 
segments of the industry and short term event analysis surrounding the specific mergers 
that created the leading firm in each industry. The case studies suggest that these two 
firms did influence the competition policy process to their advantage and, moreover, that 
this was an essential and deliberate component of their corporate strategy. 
The analysis reveals that firms were able to maximise their chances of success in 
furthering their growth strategy through mergers and acquisitions by i merging with and 
or acquiring firms in markets where they had no previous dominant share, ii exploiting 
the political landscape, iii pursuing 'agreed' rather than 'hostile' bids and iv presenting 
'upfront' competition remedies before or during the referral process. 
Collectively, the analysis reveals that over a period of 35 years the UK alcoholic 
beverages industry was transformed from a fragmented national industry into one that is 
now dominated by two firms in their respective segments of international spirits and UK 
brewing. The success of Scottish & Newcastle and Diageo in achieving their merger and 
acquisition goals depended heavily on their ability to repeatedly and successfully 
interact with competition authorities. At the same time their major UK competitors, 
Allied Domecq, Bass and Whitbread were less successful at the key stages in their 
history in pursuing mergers and acquisitions. This led, within a matter of years to all 
those firms either exiting the alcoholic beverages industry completely or being 
subsumed into other firms. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Merger and acquisition activity is an integral part of the growth and development 
process of most industries whereby weaker and inefficient firms are subsumed into 
larger more successful firms. The acquirers gain by growing far more quickly than could 
have been achieved by new product development and advertising and promotion of 
existing products. In the case of the UK alcoholic beverages industry, with long- 
established brand names supported by years of advertising, merger and acquisition 
activity has been the only realistic mechanism by which larger firms have been able to 
develop and extend their brand portfolios over the last three decades. 
Acquisitive growth reaches a natural tipping point. At some stage a growth strategy 
based on mergers and acquisitions will be constrained by competition policy. This is 
especially true for firms operating in a single domestic market, where there may be a 
market share cap, or target minimum number of competitors that competition authorities 
impose. In such circumstances firms have tended to adapt their merger and acquisition 
strategies to include related - or unrelated in the case of conglomerate - target firms and 
sectors. Alternatively, firms have sought to extend their strategy into new geographies, 
10 
but this eventually leads to more complex interactions with competition authorities in 
multiple jurisdictions, often simultaneously. 
1.1. Research objective 
This central question addressed by this thesis is how and to what extent firms in a 
mature industry can successfully pursue a corporate growth strategy through sequential 
mergers and acquisition with competitor firms by influencing the outcome of 
competition authority enquiries to their benefit. 
The UK alcoholic beverages industry has been chosen as the subject of this study 
because of its rich history of competition authority investigations over an extended 
period. Moreover, the world's largest spirits firm (Diageo) and a major international 
brewer of beer (Scottish & Newcastle) both originated from what were essentially 
medium-sized UK regional brewery businesses in 1969; the year that coincided with the 
first full anti-trust investigation into the UK brewing industry [Beer: A Report on the 
Supply of Beer, 1969]. Both grew into major international businesses in a matter of three 
decades. This phenomenal growth, in what for all intents and purposes is a mature 
industry, has been achieved in both cases as a result of an extensive and sustained period 
of merger and acquisition activity. On a more practical level, as the industry is a large 
employer and source of tax revenue, many of its mergers have been considered in great 
detail by a variety of competition authorities across a number of jurisdictions. 
II 
Consequently, a significant amount of industry data and official documentation is 
readily available in the public domain. 
This research also draws on the author's own unique experience working for large 
investment banks in the City of London as an equity analyst in the alcoholic beverages 
sector during the 1990s. Case study analysis can therefore be supplemented by 
contemporaneous notes and commentary written by the author at the time; she was 
present at all public meetings of the firms and their major international competitors in 
the period 1992 - 1999. In addition, she also held many one-on-one meetings with both 
board, divisional and in-field managers during this period. This experience that spans 
one of the most significant periods of merger and acquisition activity for the major UK 
alcoholic beverages firms has given the author access to a body of information, insights 
and opinions that would not normally be available in academic research. 
Ovec the period of inyestigation, which covers the years 1969 - 2006, there have been 
many mergers and acquisitions involving the UK alcoholic beverage industry. Two 
firms, Grand Met (one party to the merger that created Diageo) and Scottish & 
Newcastle placed a heavy reliance on mergers and acquisitions and have had more 
frequent interactions with the competition authorities than any other firms in the 
industry. It is their success in gaining either early approval for their proposed mergers 
and acquisitions (that is without referral to the competition authorities) or being able to 
complete those transactions with only modest remedies (that is with minimal 
intervention by the competition authorities after a referral) that has had the greatest 
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impact on the structure of the UK alcoholic beverages sector, not least in cur-tailing the 
subsequent strategic choices of their competitors. 
A summary of the key mergers that have shaped Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle and 
their rationale is set out in Table 1.1 below. A further full summary of all mergers and 
acquisitions in the UK alcoholic beverages industry in the period 1969 - 2006, including 
those involving Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle's major UK competitors is set out in 
Chapter 4. 
Table 1.1. The merger history of Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle 
Year Acquiror Target Merger Rationale Outcome 
1971 Grand Met Truman Entry into UK brewing and pub retailing Transacted 
1972 Grand Met Wratney Mann IDV Extend brewing brands and pub presence in Southern region Transacted 
1984 Scottish & Newcastle JW Cameron Extend pub portfolio into adjoining North East region Referred then abandoned 
1985 Guinness Arthur Bell Entry into Scotch whisky industry Transacted 
1985 Scottish & Newcastle Matthew Brown Extend geographic and brand portfolio into North West region Referred then transacted 
1986 Guinness Distillers Extend Scotch presence internationally and access to maturing whiskies Referred then transacted 
1986 Scottish & Newcastle Home Brewery Extend geographic and brand portfolio into East Midlands region Transacted 
1987 Grand Met (Spirits) Heublein US expansion and control of brands already distributed in the UK Transacted 
1988 Grand Met (Spirqs) Uv)) Irish Distillers Control of Irish whiskey industry and distribution in Ireland Referred then blocked 
1988 Elders IXL Scottish & Newcastle Rationalisation of'sleepy' UK brewing and platform for European expansion of Fosters Referred then blocked 
1990 Elders IXL (Courage) Grand Met (Brewing) Brewing-for-pubs' swap to improve operating efficiencies post 'Beer Orders' Referred then transacted 
1992 Grand Met (IOV) Cinzano Control of joint venture, ownership of brand and distribution in Italy Transacted 
1993 S&N (Retail) Grand Met Retail Establish distribution platform for beer brands in South Transacted 
1995 Scottish & Newcastle Courage Leadership in UK brewing by extending geographic coverage to South Transacted 
1997 Grand Met Guinness Create global distribution network supporting wide portfolio of leading brands Referred USiEC then transacted 
1999 S& IN (Retail) Greenalls Retail Extend pub presence in North West region Transacted 
2000 Scotfish & Newcastle Danone Brewing International growth and control of Kronenbourg already distributed in the UK Transacted 
2001 Diageo Seagram Spirits Addition of in-fill brands to give 25% share of US market Referred US then transacted 
2002 Scottish & Newcastle HaMwall Access to emerging beer markets of former Russian Federation via Finnish jv owner Transacted 
2003 Scottish & Newcastle Centralcer Access to another emerging beer mark et in lbena Transacted 
2003 Scottish & Newcastle HIP Bulmer Distribution nd leading UK cider brand Transacted 
1.2. Research questions 
This thesis proposes and tests a new theory of strategic interaction between otherwise 
competing firms in an industry in which they seek to maximise jointly their brand 
portfolio growth objectives by co-operating with each other to influence the outcome of 
competition authority enquiries. The explicit aim of the proposed cooperative strategy is 
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for both the acquiring firm(s) and the target finn to maximise the probability that 
multiple mergers will be allowed to complete without referral to the competition 
authorities and/or if they are referred minimise the impact of any remedies that may be 
proposed in the form of disposals of assets. 
The theory is formulated from a case study analysis of the major firms in the UK 
brewing and spirits industries in which two dominant firms, Diageo and Scottish & 
Newcastle appear to have executed successfully this strategy since 1969 and today are 
ranked as leading global alcoholic beverages firms, despite the relatively small size of 
the UK as an alcoholic beverages market. The proposed theory is tested with a novel 
application of discriminant analysis, a statistical method which is particularly well suited 
to the interrogation of both quantitative and 'softer' qualitative data that is typically 
generated by case study research. 
Both firms have deliberately instigated a series of mergers with and acquisition of other 
firms rather than relying on product innovation and organic growth. Indeed, given the 
mature nature of beer and spirits they appear to have had little option other than to 
pursue a strategy of growth through merger and acquisition of competitors. With their 
increasing scale, repeated successful interactions with the LJK, EC and to some extent 
US competition authorities have been necessary to achieve their growth objectives. In 
stark contrast other firms in the same industry that failed in their interactions with either 
each other (Allied Domecq) and/or with the competition authorities (Bass and 
Whitbread) have exited the alcoholic beverages industry. 
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Given the deliberate and repeated nature of the growth process adopted by Diageo and 
Scottish & Newcastle and how their apparent success with the regulatory process 
appears to have influenced directly the exit of their major UK competitors it is possible 
to conclude that both firms have been able to adopt a successful strategy for managing 
interactions with the competition authorities. This thesis examines three questions: 
i. What economic, political, and social factors should merging firms exploit to 
minimise the probability of a referral to, and minimise the impact of any 
remedies imposed by, the competition authorities? 
ii. How should bidder and target firms in a merger organise themselves in 
presenting their case to the competition authorities? 
How should competition authorities respond to growing evidence of competitor 
firms co-operating with each other before and during a merger enquiry in the 
process of gaining clearance? 
1.3. Research methodology 
Given the longevity and scale of the UK alcoholic beverages industry and its major 
firms it possible to observe a significant number of mergers and acquisitions, often 
involving the same small group of firms, and the outcomes of their interactions with the 
competition authorities over an extended period. Each competition inquiry brings 
together industry, market and firm quantitative data, questionnaire information and the 
views, mainly qualitative, of suppliers, competitors and customers. This presents an 
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opportunity to construct a more complex and dynamic model of merger policy than 
could be achieved from either purely qualitative or purely quantitative (econometric) 
analysis. 
The research presented in this thesis therefore adopts a two stage approach utilizing two 
different research techniques, neither of which has been used widely before in 
examining the operation of competition policy. 
In the first stage, a multivariate statistical technique called 'Discriminant Analysis' is 
applied to a database of quantitative and qualitative factors that has been constructed 
from a detailed textual analysis of public and the author's own documents and numerical 
datasets pertaining to all the major mergers and acquisitions in the LTK alcoholic 
beverages firms over the period 1969 - 2006. The objective is to identify a small subset 
of critical factors that determine the likelihood of success or failure in a firm interaction 
with the competition authorities once a merger or acquisition has been proposed. 
The second stage of the analysis involves an in-depth case study of the two largest and 
most successful firms in the UK alcoholic beverages industry, Scottish & Newcastle and 
Diageo. The objective is to examine how each of these firms addressed and exploited 
the critical success factors identified in the discriminant analysis when interacting with 
the competition authorities and to what extent that allowed them to dominate and create 
value in their chosen sectors. The discriminant analysis and case study techniques are 
discussed in more detail below. 
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1.3.1. Discriminant analysis 
Discriminant analysis is a multivariate statistical technique that is similar superficially to 
Regression Analysis; it is concerned with identifying statistically significant 
relationships between a set of independent (explanatory) variables and a dependent 
categorical variable. It has been chosen in this case because it is ideally suited to 
handling mixed datasets of qualitative and quantitative independent variables and, 
specifically, identifying which of those variables are most significant in discriminating 
between two alternative binary outcomes in the dependent variable. In the case of 
mergers and acquisitions analysis, presented here, the dependent variable consists of a 
series of observed outcomes from the interactions of firms in the UK alcoholic 
beverages industry with the competition authorities. The key question is what factors led 
to particular mergers and acquisitions being Referred or Not Referred to the competition 
authorities. A secondary question also addressed is what factors, following a referral, led 
to the merger or acquisition eventually being Transacted (that is completed 
successfully) or Not Transacted (that is being dropped or blocked completely). 
Only some mergers and acquisitions are referred to the competition authorities. Not all 
referred bids are blocked and not all cleared bids then lead to completed mergers. Firms 
have pointed to lengthy investigations effectively derailing the merger process. 
Consequently there are bids that lapse even though they have regulatory clearance. 
Other bids succeed following a referral because they are cleared with or without the 
need for structural and/or behavioural remedies. Logically, a firm that has had repeated 
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success in having its deals passed by the competition authorities over an extended period 
is likely to be one that has addressed successfully the factors that influence the outcome 
of competition authority enquiries. Discovering which, if any, of the independent 
variable(s) in the assembled dataset is most strongly associated with successful 
transaction either in ensuring a proposed merger or acquisition is Not Referred or, if it is 
referred, leads to it eventually being Transacted is the essential purpose and output of 
the discriminant analysis. This informs directly the case studies of individual firms 
carried out in the second stage of the research. However, a crucial issue in carrying out 
discriminant analysis is identifying a priori a broad but relevant set of potential 
independent variables. 
1.3.2. Potential factors that influence competition authority enquiries 
Three broad groups of factors have been identified that might be expected to yield a 
subset of variables that are significant in determining whether a proposed merger or 
acquisition is referred to the competition authorities and, if it is referred, whether it is 
likely to be cleared subsequently or subjected to minimal remedies. 
Dominance 
Over the period of this study the legal frameworks for investigating mergers have 
changed several times. In addition, the availability of data and advent of computer 
processing has allowed ever more sophisticated economic analysis of mergers and their 
18 
likely outcomes to be employed in enquiries. Notwithstanding the progress of both the 
law and economics differences remain in defining and addressing dominance and the 
potential for the abuse of market power both within an industry, over time, and across 
various jurisdictions. 
Defining and establishing the 'relevant market' in merger enquiries has been the subject 
of much academic and practitioner man-hours. In the early UK beer inquiries, 
definitions were wide; total share of beer production or sales. As consumption patterns 
changed splitting the market into on-trade and off-trade sales volume seemed logical 
progression, as did a distinction between traditional ale and lager consumption. By 
2000, and the Interbrew/Bass Brewers proposed merger, Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices 
(HHI) were calculated for television regions, distinguishing on a sub-category of sub- 
category basis; premium and standard lager, and national and international brands. 
While the haggling continued on the correct market definition, no enquiry deemed it 
necessary to consider the impact on beer prices - to brewers - of an industry with excess 
capacity both at home and on its European door-step with plants a long way from 
minimum efficient scale, and where supplier-buyer bargaining power had moved 
decisively downstream; the pattern of retail prices no longer can be viewed as a proxy 
for wholesale prices with the dismantling of the UK's traditional vertically integrated 
structure. 
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An added layer of complexity has accompanied recent spirits acquisitions, which by the 
nature of the products and portfolios being merged have required simultaneous 
investigation by the US and EC. The much heralded 'success' of the co-ordinated 
investigation of Diageo and Pernod Ricard's joint acquisition of Seagram's spirits assets 
has to be viewed against the backdrop of a completely different understanding of what 
constitutes the spirits industry and how it operates. Aside from definitional aspects of 
'relevant market' in an industry with very distinct categories, the US does not recognise 
'portfolio effects' at all, whilst the EC does - or at least did under Messrs Van Miert and 
Monti - but does not appear to be able to assess or quantify them. 
In the midst of this dichotomy, it can be concluded that while there are specific and 
narrowly defined 'relevant markets', whether through product and geography, the 
overall market shares of broad categories remain important within the context of 
distribution. Both broad and narrow definitions need to be considered in the analysis. 
Political and structural 
Until the Enterprise Act 2002, the UK Competition Commission (CC) had to consider 
mergers not only with respect to their likely impact on prices and consumer choice but 
also with reference to wider public interest issues, for example, the impact on 
employment and support of regional businesses. In one specific case in the 1980s its 
predecessor, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was also charged with 
the task of investigating a merger on the basis of the prospective leverage of the acquirer 
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and how this might be expected to impact the brewing industry. This opened the door 
for political interference at all levels. 
'The Beerage' was generally perceived as pro-Conservative, and this was supported by 
donations to the party. The extent to which the industry worked together as a powerful 
lobbying force was illustrated by the degree to which it was successful in mitigating 
partly the disruptive impact of the second major anti-trust investigation into the brewing 
industry by the MMC in 1989. Even after the MMC had published its findings [The 
Supply of Beer: A Report on the Supply of Beer for Retail Sale in the United Kingdom 
into the Beer Market] known as the 'Beer Orders' the industry was able to force a partial 
climb-down by the then Conservative government. However, by the 1990s the 
industry's political influence was waning. Those firms that had previously contributed to 
the Conservative party ceased to do so. Moreover, 1997 saw a transfer of power to the 
New Labour government. Despite intense lobbying for a re-appraisal of the 'Beer 
Orders' it took ten years to persuade government to carry out a review [The Supply of 
Beer: A Report on the Review of the Beer Orders by the Former Director General of 
Fair Trading, 2000]. 
Internationally the political environment is more difficult to assess and firms have not 
been obliged to disclose payments to either political parties or lobby groups. The major 
drinks (and food) firms are known to be aggressive sponsors of lobbyist in Washington. 
The US spirits industry, structurally still heavily influenced by Prohibition, offers 
several avenues for political interaction, not least at State level, with several states still 
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responsible for distribution and retailing of liquor. It is difficult to assess whether 
politics has had any bearing on European alcoholic beverages industry merger cases 
although the 1988 hostile approach by a Grand Metropolitan/Guinness/Allied-Lyons 
consortium was discussed in the Irish parliament a matter of days before the EC blocked 
the deal. Irish Distillers had lobbied hard aided by the 'Keep the Spirit Irish' campaign. 
Many researchers have identified 'waves' of merger and acquisition activity. Hoping to 
gain clearance for a deal during a more active M&A environment must balance two 
competing forces; on the one hand, a potentially more sympathetic environment for 
corporate activity, but on the other hand very busy authorities with a backlog of deals to 
investigate. Firms and advisors have commented that long delays can destroy much of 
the 'value' associated with acquisitions. Two aspects could be interesting in this regard. 
It is possible that the referral process can be speeded up or even prevented if firms show 
the willingness to compromise, by way of upfront remedies, in the first instance. In 
addition, there is likely to be a learning process for a new investigator or decision maker 
at the competition authority; how long such a key person has been in post might play a 
part in outcomes. 
Finally deal structure is likely to be important. If the bid is hostile the target firm is 
motivated to call on all parties to thwart the deal. One key defence mechanism is to 
lobby the competition authorities to refer the bid for close scrutiny. It is notable that 
both of Elders IXL's bids for UK firms that were hostile were referred, while the 
counter bid from Scottish & Newcastle that was agreed some years later was not. As 
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time has moved on hostile bids have become rare, in particular in this industry. In their 
place has been an array of agreed bids, increasingly with complex joint venture 
arrangements. Latterly these have also involved joint acquisitions of a target with a pre- 
agreed split of assets that seem to have gained early regulatory clearance. The 
acquisition of Seagram's spirits operation by a joint venture of Diageo and Pemod 
Ricard, the first of its kind as an acquisition vehicle to gain regulatory approval, was 
copied in structure by Pernod Ricard and Fortune Brands in their 2005 acquisition of 
Allied Domecq, and seems likely to continue as the structure of choice in subsequent 
cross-border drinks deals. 
lp; nnn, -; nl 
Authorities everywhere are prepared increasingly to do their own analysis, and construct 
their own data sets from questionnaires and other sources rather than relying on that 
provided by firms or the wider industry. As the market has become more international, 
so has the scope of the analysis, such that in the investigation of Interbrew/Bass 
Brewers, for example, the CC decided for itself what it considered to be the 'right' price 
to pay for Bass Brewers given comparable deals in Europe and what this would infer for 
future pricing of beer based on estimated efficiency savings; a somewhat contentious 
finding. 
As a general observation, firms have tended to err on the side of caution in estimating 
the efficiency gains they expect to make as a result of a merger. This is perhaps 
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understandable in light of the public interest issue of job losses, including the desire to 
allay fears within the merging organisations. But on several occasions, and most notably 
that of Interbrew, relatively small projected efficiency gains coupled with a perceptively 
high acquisition price have led the CC to conclude that exercising market power is the 
ultimate objective. By contrast the early UK brewing amalgamation of Grand 
Met/Courage was significantly more aggressive on cost cutting. Grand Met carried the 
aggression forward in the projected cost savings from both the Diageo merger in 1997 
and the Seagram acquisition in 2000. In both cases the savings were made downstream 
in distribution and marketing where there appears to be less of a public interest debate 
surrounding the redundancy in contrast to the emotive and emotional appeals that have 
accompanied the potential closure of factories and plant in brewery mergers. 
In the 1985 Elders IXL hostile bid for Allied-Lyons, the deal was referred as a result of 
the leveraged nature of the bid and concerns that it could destabilise the domestically 
important brewing industry if allowed to proceed. At the time - 1985 - when there was 
an economic and stock market boom, the use of debt and mezzanine finance was not 
uncommon, particularly in the US. However, by 1989, when Elders IXL bid for Scottish 
& Newcastle, the bid was blocked by the MMC. It is possible that the aggressive 
financial and balance sheet management of Elders played as much a part in this outcome 
as the competitive aspects of the bid. 1989 corresponded with the aftermath of the stock 
market crash and interest rates rising to 15%. 
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There is sufficient data and infonnation to consider whether the operating ratios of both 
the bidder and target firms have an impact on referral. In addition, the financial leverage 
of a deal, modelled through the gearing of the bidding firm might also be significant. 
1.3.3. Case study methodology 
The US National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) identified a significant gap in 
the literature and our understanding of mergers and acquisitions and sought to address 
this by funding in-depth case studies of specific industries that were presented in 
Mergers and Productivity [2000]. This compendium of US industry case studies, 
conducted by and commented on by a series of eminent US academics was edited by 
Professor Steven Kaplan of the University of Chicago who concluded that: 
"Large sample studies - whether accounting- based or stock-based - cannot Possibly 
capture the richness of the economic effects of mergers. And, with somefrequency, those 
large sample measures will not even capture the direction of the economic effect..... In 
sum, the voluminous economics, finance and strategy literatures on takeovers during the 
past twenty years offer little insight to practitioners or academics on what managers do 
to influence whether mergers succeed orfaiP) 
Kaplan and his colleagues argued that merger and acquisition activity was associated 
with either technological or regulatory shocks, and that a merger's success or failure was 
dependent on a thorough understanding of the target, including its corporate culture. 
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However, other academics concluded that the case studies did not generate substantial 
insights into exactly how mergers and acquisitions created value, and consequently 
assessed the Kaplan work as largely failing to deliver its objectives of filling the gap in 
the literature. 
The research presented in this thesis builds on the methodology of Kaplan by carrying 
out in-depth case study investigations of the merger and acquisition strategy of both 
Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle. However, it aims to make the case study more robust 
and thereby address the criticisms made against Kaplan by focussing on how the firms 
exploited the specific success factors identified in the discriminant analysis when 
dealing with competition authorities. Ultimately, the aim of the case studies is to 
understand how each individual firm maximised the probability of success in their 
proposed mergers and acquisitions and how this led ultimately or otherwise to the 
creation of value. 
What is clear is that both firms have created 'dominance' in their chosen segment of the 
UK alcoholic beverages industry by successive mergers and acquisitions and that the 
majority of their major UK competitors exited those sectors in a matter of a few years 
after Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle had established their respective positions. 
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1.3.4. Research Agenda 
This research seeks to contribute in three ways: 
Methodology and dataset 
Academics from finance, strategy and industrial economics have pointed to the need for 
more in-depth industry studies into the motives and outcomes from merger and 
acquisition strategy. By utilising a mix of qualitative and quantitative data collected for 
one industry - alcoholic beverages - and one set of firms - the major UK brewing and 
spirits firms - this thesis offers insight into the firm and industry-level consequences of 
sequential mergers and acquisitions that have created leading international portfolios for 
two firms, using a combination of detailed case study and discriminant analysis. 
CoEporate stratM 
While there is much literature investigating the role of mergers and acquisitions in 
achieving a finn's growth objective there has to date been little, if any, analysis of the 
impact of competition policy on a firm's merger and acquisition strategy. Specifically, 
how acquiring firms work with their targets, or otherwise, and increasingly how they 
work with a partner that is for all intents and purposes a competitor to achieve the 
desired outcome of little or no regulatory impact from their proposed mergers. 
Moreover, there does not appear to have been a consideration of the impact on value 
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creation of sequential mergers and acquisitions in building portfolios of brands and 
geographies. 
Competition policy 
Regulators have to assess mergers within every industrial sector. While the same 
industry and its firms Present mergers to the authorities, new personnel are involved. 
Moreover, mergers require clearance in different jurisdictions, often at the same time, as 
has been the case for the recent spirits industry mergers. This thesis has collated 
information from all mergers and acquisitions over a thirty year time period, whether 
investigated in the UK, Europe or the US, and established the significant factors that led 
to referral or clearance in a discriminant analysis model. The variables include not only 
the routine dominance and financial ratio variables but other factors such as political 
party donations and the type of bid structure that was used. 
1.4. Thesis Organisation 
The remainder of this thesis is organised under the following chapter headings: 
2. Alcoholic beverages industry structure and dynamics 
This includes a general introduction to the production processes and marketing and 
distribution of beer and spirits. The structure of the UK brewing and spirits industry is 
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then described, together with details of consumption trends. Finally there is a section on 
anti-trust investigations that have addressed the structure of the beer industry and its 
impact on consumers. 
3. Literature review 
This is divided into four separate sets of literature. The legal framework of competition 
and anti-trust policy and how it has changed over time is discussed for the UK, 
European Union and the US, together with relevant law literature. The general economic 
principles that have shaped competition policy are then outlined, together with 
consideration of the quantitative and econometric techniques that have been influential 
in furthering policy, insofar as specific literature relates to consumer product mergers 
and the importance of 'portfolio effects'. The strategy literature pertaining to the two 
paradigms, 'Structure-Conduct-Performance' and the 'Resource-based view of the firm' 
are explained, and the role of government and politics in the development of corporate 
strategy has also been included. Finally, the impact of mergers and acquisitions on firm 
performance has been addressed by way of established academic finance literature. 
4. Discriminant analysis 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis of a dataset that contains both 
qualitative and quantitative factors drawn from the 35 year history of mergers and 
acquisitions of the UK major alcoholic beverages firms. A discriminant analysis was 
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performed that separated merger cases into 'Referred' and 'Not Referred from a set of 
variables constructed from a total of 40 cases that spanned UK, European and US deals. 
The result of the subdivision of the dataset into 'UK Only' and 'Non-UK' cases is also 
presented. 
5. Case study of Scottish & Newcastle 
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the growth by acquisition of Scottish & 
Newcastle into the largest LTK and second largest European brewer. The significance of 
the acquisition of Courage in 1995, and how this led ultimately to the exit from brewing 
of Bass and Whitbread is discussed. The impact of the Courage acquisition and 
subsequent acquisitions in Europe is addressed with reference to divisional and group 
operating and cash performance of the firm and its major UK brewing competitors. 
6. Case study of Diageo 
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the growth by acquisition of Diageo into the 
largest spirits producer in the world. The significance of the merger of Grand 
Metropolitan and Guinness in 1997 to form Diageo, and how this led ultimately to the 
exit from global spirits of Seagram and Allied Domecq is discussed. The impact of the 
formation of Diageo and the subsequent group restructuring and acquisition of the larger 
share of the spirits assets of Seagram is addressed with reference to divisional and group 
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operating and cash performance of the firm compared to its major UK competitor Allied 
Domecq. 
7. Conclusions 
A summary of the research findings and contribution in the fields of methodology, 
corporate strategy and competition policy is given. Further research avenues are 
identified including the need for similar validating analysis to be carried out in other 
industries. 
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Chapter 2. Alcoholic beverages industry structure and 
dynamics 
Two UK firms, Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle, transformed themselves from 
vertically integrated UK brewing, pub retailing and leisure conglomerates to 
multinational consumer goods operators in a little over three decades. This was achieved 
through successive rounds of mergers and acquisitions in both the domestic market and 
latterly through cross-border deals. At the same time, Allied Domecq, Bass and 
Whitbread, their major domestic competitors have seen their original alcoholic 
beverages operations subsumed in whole or part into the businesses of other domestic or 
overseas firms. 
This chapter outlines the changing face of alcohol consumption and pub retailing in the 
UK market that provided the backdrop to the structure and ownership of the industry. It 
considers not only consumption and production dynamics but also highlights the impact 
of regulation. Two major anti-trust inquiries into the supply of beer had a significant 
impact on market structure and firm strategy that has been manifest in a succession of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
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2.1. UK brewing industry 
2.1.1 Brewing production processes 
Beer originated in Ancient Egypt and is produced in nearly every country. Whilst there 
are differences in taste and style, the quality of beer around the world is fairly uniform. 
The basic ingredients of beer are cereals, usually malted barley, hops, yeast and water. 
The starch content of the cereal is converted to sugar with the subsequent extraction of 
the sugar solution, or 'wort', then boiled with hops and fermented by the addition of the 
yeast. Once cooled, yeast is added which begins the fermentation process during which 
sugar is turned into alcohol and carbon dioxide; it is this process that mainly determines 
the taste and type of the beer. Most brewers retain their own exclusive supply of yeast 
that is collected following each brew, dried down and then reused. 
In traditional UK 'ale' breweries, fermentation tends to take place as a 'batch' process 
from a relatively small scale plant. Here the active yeast forms a thick foamy layer on 
the surface of the beer, so called 'top fermenting'. The process takes around five days to 
complete and occurs at 15 - 25 'C. Once the beer has fermented it still has to mature. 
Depending on the type of beer, the maturation or 'secondary fermentation' phase can 
take between one week and several months. Cask-conditioned, 'real ale' is matured in 
wooden barrels ('casks') where the remaining yeast continues to work on the 'wort' and 
more hops and liquid sugar is added. 
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In contrast, European-style 'lager' breweries use what could be classed loosely as a 
'continuous' industrial process. After the 'wort' has been boiled with hops and cooled, 
'bottom-fermenting' yeast is added which settles to the bottom of the fermenting vessel. 
Fermentation takes between six and 10 days and takes place at temperatures of 8-I O'C. 
The secondary fermentation takes place in special conditioning tanks at around 0 'C, and 
lasts for a further four or five weeks. The product is then filtered and pasteurised 
(heated) to kill and remove any remaining yeast. It is essentially an inert product after 
that point so does not require the same careful handling as traditional ales that are 'live' 
products with the cask still containing some yeast. 
Many of the larger UK brewers also produce hybrid 'nitro-keg' ale (such as Caffrey's 
and John Smith's Smooth) that has many of the characteristics of lager in that it is a 
filtered, inert product finished and transported in steel or aluminium casks that are 
pressurised with nitrogen gas before they are delivered to the retail outlet. Like lager 
they are typically served to the customer at around 5 'C in contrast to traditional ales that 
are served at a temperature of around 12 - 14 T. Younger consumers are thought to find 
these products less 'challenging' than traditional cask-conditioned varieties. 
A commonly held view in the brewing industry is that minimum efficient scale for lager 
production given current brewing technology is approximately seven million hectolitres 
(7mhl). Anheuser-Busch, the world's largest and most efficient brewer has 12 plants that 
produce approximately I 17mhl, the largest of which accounts for around 12mhl. To put 
the UK into context, lager consumption is currently estimated at 38mhl per annum. At 
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present the largest lager brewery in the UK is 5mhl with the major UK brewers 
operating several sub-3mhl lager plants. Although cross-border comparisons are 
distorted by different accounting treatments, plant size explains largely why Anheuser- 
Busch has operating statistics up to twice the size of the largest UK brewers. 
Establishing capacity utilisation and excess capacity for ale breweries is considerably 
more complicated given the 'batch' process and the variable use of two or three shift 
patterns. Interbrew, in its evidence to the CC (Interbrew SA and Bass Plc, 2001) 
estimated that the regional brewers held collectively 5mhl of excess capacity. 
Notwithstanding the fact that many ale breweries have closed since the 'Beer Orders' as 
a result of mergers and sale for alternative use, Figure 2.1. shows they have not 
disappeared as quickly as the tail off in demand for ale. 
Table 2.1. Number of UK brewery companies and breweries 
Year Brewery companies Number of breweries 
1970 96 177 
1980 81 142 
1990 65 99 
1995 64 93 
2000 51 69 
2002 48 63 
2003 49 62 
2004 46 60 
Source: British Beer & Pub Association, HM Customs & Excise 
Mainland Europe is also afflicted with excess capacity and inefficient plant, in particular 
in southern Germany, Spain and central Europe, primarily in the Czech Republic. 
Interbrew estimated that there was 3 Omhl of excess capacity in Western Europe in 200 1. 
The largest and most efficient European breweries are operated by Heineken and 
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Kronenbourg (now owned by Scottish & Newcastle) near Rotterdam and Strasbourg, 
respectively, both sited strategically for export to other countries in either mainland 
Europe or further a field. 
Imported beer into the UK remained at a benign level of around 5% until the 1990s. 
Over half of that figure was accounted for by exports of Guinness and other Irish ales 
from the Irish Republic. However, as Table 2.2 shows the level of imports started to rise 
sharply in the late 1980s and imports are now thought to represent close to 15% of total 
consumption, if cross-Channel shopping is included. Ireland remains the most important 
source of imports followed by Germany, the Netherlands, and France. 
Table 2.2. Imported beer by country of origin 
Country ('000s b1s) 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
France 8 1 57 437 448 390 355 336 
Germany 44 389 775 658 736 1071 910 838 
Ireland 1268 1053 1369 1082 679 1359 1327 1315 
the Nethedands 43 42 544 512 505 425 487 677 
All Europe 1719 1543 2911 3139 2858 3782 3698 3984 
All Imports 1723 1576 3096 3329 3052 3973 3949 4287 
UK Production 34360 39614 37751 33777 34708 34628 35448 35109 
UK Exports 409 459 992 2228 1952 2525 2142 2665 
UK Consumption 35674 40731 40297 35867 35564 35748 36226 35860 
Imports % Consumption 4.8 3.9 7.7 9.3 8.6 11.1 10.9 12.0 
Source: British Beer & Pub Association 
2.1.2. Beer marketing and distribution 
Traditionally UK ate was not transported far after it had been produced because brewers 
owned chains of retail outlets (public houses or 'pubs') in the vicinity of the brewery 
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and finished ale was delivered in cask by the brewery's dray horses. With the emergence 
of lager as the preferred form of beer (along with the now fashionable 'nitro-keg') and 
the increasing use of bottles and cans it became possible for brewers to not only supply 
their own estate but also the pubs of others and the growing off-trade of supermarkets 
and off licences. Whilst independent wholesalers have always been a feature of the 
distribution mechanism they historically operated on the slimmest of margins. Few still 
remain in an industry that is now dominated by vertically integrated brewer/wholesalers 
and independent national pub chains ('PubCos') that perform secondary distribution to 
the tenant landlords ('tenants') that rent their pubs. 
Brand support through direct advertising has until recently not been a feature of the UK 
or European brewing industry. Brands were local and volume driven as a function of a 
4property tie' that is the brewer owns the pub outlet (UK, Germany) or through a 'loan 
tie' that is the brewer grants subsidised business loans to an independent pub outlet in 
lieu of exclusive beer supply (most of mainland Europe). In contrast, the US brewers, 
and in particular Anheuser Busch that developed a national and international presence as 
pure brewers have always relied on extensive marketing programmes. They have tended 
to spend at levels similar to that of Diageo - mid teens percentages of gross revenues. In 
contrast UK brewers, with the exception of Guinness, spent low single digit percentages, 
often as low as I- 2% in direct beer brand support. 
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2.1.3. UK beer consumption 
Since peaking in the late 1970s at 69.4mhl, UK annual consumption of beer trended 
down during the 1980s and 1990s, as shown in Table 2.3 and now stands at less than 
60mhl. Since 1960 there has been a marked change in the mix of consumption. In 1966, 
traditional ales (bitter, mild and strong) dominated with 90% market share. Stout 
accounted for 7% of the total with lager taking less than 4% of consumption (mainly due 
to lager's 12% share of the Scottish beer market). In 2002, lager accounted for 67.6% of 
total beer consumption, around 37% of this described as 'premium' lager. 
Table 2.3. UK beer consumption 
Year Hectolitres (m) Barrels (m) 
1899 60.7 37.1 
1904 58.0 35.4 
1909 56.1 34.3 
1914 56.9 34.8 
1919 57.4 35.0 
1924 43.8 26.7 
1929 41.0 25.1 
1934 34.1 20.9 
1939 41.5 25.4 
1944 51.3 31.3 
1949 43.4 26.5 
1954 39.2 23.9 
1959 42.7 26.1 
1964 48.3 29.5 
1969 53.9 32.9 
1974 65.3 39.9 
1979 69.4 42.4 
1984 62.4 38.1 
1989 65.3 39.9 
1994 60.6 37.0 
1999 58.9 36.0 
2000 57.0 34.8 
2001 58.2 35.6 
2002 59.4 36.3 
2003 60.3 36.8 
2004 59.2 36.2 
Source: British Beer & Pub Association 
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Traditionally pub estates were operated and managed as an extension of the brewery to 
move as much volume in as tight a geographic area as possible. The emphasis was not 
on the retail environment and quality of service. During the 1970s pub-goers started to 
become more demanding. With international travel consumers experienced eating-out 
and caf6-style bars and expected similar service and offerings in the UK. The demise of 
the British manufacturing base, as seen in the falling consumption of beer, precipitated 
eventually a change in the role of pubs in society. Many smaller outlets could not 
survive in the new environment of declining beer consumption and were of insufficient 
size and poorly sited geographically to make the grade as prime leisure-retailing outlets. 
They were closed or sold for conversion to residential property. What was left was 
either repositioned or reformatted to cater for the increased demand for quality leisure 
facilities, eating-out, budget hotel accommodation and childcare amenities. 
Table 2.4 shows that since the late 1960s there has also been a distinct shift in 
consumption from the 'on-trade' (primarily pubs and clubs) to the 'off-trade' (off 
license and supermarkets). 
Table 2.4. UK beer sales analysed between 'on' and 'off' trade 
Year 'Off Trade 
1972 9.6 
1977 10.8 
1982 13.5 
1987 17.8 
1992 22.4 
1997 28.7 
2002 36.7 
2004 40.0 
Source: British Beer & Pub Association 
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This has accelerated since the mid-1980s and has been attributed to the growing 
importance of home entertainment, although the gap between the equivalent price of a 
pint in the on and off trade has undoubtedly played a part. The supermarket groups have 
been taking an increasing share of beer sales. They are particularly adept at exploiting 
suppliers in industries with excess capacity, and where marketing and branding 
strategies are underdeveloped. Whilst own label beer has remained relatively small by 
comparison, in particular, to other alcoholic beverages segments, the supermarket 
groups have been able to command the highest level of discounts often coupled to 
brewer-funded so called 'below-the-line' marketing that is designed to increase volume. 
A common example of such marketing initiatives is 'buy one get one free' (bogoo. 
Discounts to large free trade customers such as working men's clubs, national cinema 
chains, and the former British Rail had long been a feature of the UK beer market, and 
were discussed in some detail in the 1969 Beer inquiry, twenty years before the 'Beer 
Orders'. The aftermath of the 'Beer Orders' corresponded to a sharp downturn in the 
UK economy and the levels of discounts from wholesale list prices and their availability 
started to widen significantly. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1., a combination of these consumption and production trends 
has underpinned a dramatic negative pricing environment for wholesale beer supplies 
during the 1990s, captured only to a degree by official statistics that use list rather than 
clean selling prices. This contrasts with a real upwards trend in pub beer prices over the 
same period, only some of which can be explained by increases in excise duty. 
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Figure 2.1. Price Trends between 'on' and 'off' trade 
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2.2. Spirits industry 
2.2.1. Spirits production processes 
Unlike beer, where the production process is relatively straightforward and where 
maturation is completed within a matter of weeks, the production and maturation of 
spirits, in particular, brown spirits, takes much longer and is far more complex. 
Moreover, some types of spirits are protected in terms of their origin and maturation 
process by trade laws. For example, for a product to be labelled 'Scotch' it must contain 
grain and/or malt spirit produced in distilleries in Scotland, and have been matured for at 
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least three years. Bourbon must have been produced and distilled in Kentucky from rye 
spirit that has been matured in new oak casks. Similar rules and regulations govern the 
production of Cognac and Tequila. Alcoholic spirit is the end product of the distillation 
(heating and condensation) of fermented fruit or cereals with water. The distillate is 
matured in bulk and/or blended with other alcohols or flavourings before bottling. 
Spirits are usually grouped into two broad categories - brown or white - that reflect 
post-distillation maturation processes. White spirits such as vodka, gin and white rum 
are either bottled immediately after distillation (vodka) or following the addition of 
flavourings such as juniper (gin). Distillation is usually in large multi-purpose 
continuous flow distilleries that are non-specific that is they produce a 'neutral' spirit 
that can be made into vodka, gin or rum. Their production is relatively straightforward 
and is consequently, ubiquitous. The original and subsequently added ingredients 
determine the category. 
Brown spirits tend to be matured for a minimum fixed term period in 'natural' 
containers, such as oak barrels, the maturation process being responsible for the 
colouring and flavouring. The differences between the various categories, whisk(e)y, 
brandy and dark rum reflect the original ingredients, malted barley, eau de vie (grape) 
and sugar, and the types of barrels used in maturation, new oak (Bourbon) or re-used 
oak and sherry barrels. Since production and maturation is more complex, greater skill 
and know-how is required to make brown spirits. Moreover, many categories are 
protected by law and have their own equivalent of 'Appellation Torigine controlee' 
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status that provides effective barriers to supply-side substitution. This applies to Scotch, 
Cognac, and Bourbon. Of the white spirits categories Tequila now has a similar status, 
in addition to London gin. 
Considering in more detail the production of the most important international spirit, 
Scotch, there are two types of whisky, malt and grain, produced from different raw 
materials and production processes. Malt whisky is made from malted barley, water and 
yeast by distilling twice in copper stills. This is a batch process from small-scale 
production assets. Grain whisky is made from malted and unmalted barley and other 
cereals, water and yeast in a 'Coffey' still. Distillation is a continuous process and the 
plant is large scale. This has had a bearing on the structure and ownership of not only 
distilleries but also brands of Scotch whisky. 
With the exception of William Grant and Robertson & Baxter the owners of grain 
distilleries are the large multinational drinks firms, Diageo, Allied Domecq and Kyndall 
(formerly part of Jim Beam Brands). Diageo's leading position is entirely attributable to 
the former Distillers Group, bought by Guinness in 1986. Until 1885, Distillers 
Company Ltd, the forerunner of Distillers Group, was a monopoly supplier of grain 
spirit to blenders and other distillers. Smaller blenders consequently established the 
North British Distillery as a trade cooperative, with shareholders including IDV (J&B 
Rare), Seagram (Chivas Regal), William Lawson (part of the Bacardi group), Robertson 
& Baxter/Highland Distillers (The Famous Grouse) and Glenmorangie. William Grant 
and Whyte & Mackay established their own grain distilleries in the 1990s. North British 
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was subsequently renamed Lothian Distillers and is now owned and controlled by 
Robertson & Baxter. At grass roots level the firms trade regularly with each other 
through whisky swap arrangements; only Diageo is fully self-sufficient with respect to 
filling its blends, although it sells excess whisky to the industry, often under long-term 
supply agreements. 
Single malt whisky until recently remained an insignificant category in its own right 
with the output from malt distilleries serving to feed the blenders requirements for major 
Scotch brands such as Bell's, Johnnie Walker, and Ballantine's. These brands usually 
contain 30 or 40 different whiskies split roughly 60: 40 grain to malt. The grain spirit 
adds little to the flavour of the blend, acting merely as a 'base'. Beyond the three year 
minimum maturation period gain spirit improves little for the extra years in barrel. This 
is in contrast to malt whisky; single malts are rarely released at less than 10 years (for 
the UK market) and most frequently at 12 years. Leading blends typically contain 
whisky that is a minimum of six years old; with the exception of Bell's (eight years old) 
there is no specific age statement. 
2.2.2. Spirits marketing and distribution 
The major spirits firms rely heavily on the international reach of their leading brands 
and spend many millions of pounds on integrated marketing campaigns, aligned to 
heavy distribution infrastructure capability, such as dedicated sales teams. 
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In many countries there are advertising restrictions on alcoholic beverages, in particular, 
spirits. In the US and UK until recently the industry itself had imposed an advertising 
restriction on broadcast media. In such cases firms have to be more creative in their 
brand support, relying more on bar promotions and tastings, in addition to 'below-the- 
line' volume building support, such as couponing and multi-buy promotions. In total 
firms tend to spend of the order of 15% of gross revenues on all marketing initiatives. In 
the case of Diageo this is over fIbn per annum. Consistent and successful marketing of 
key brands is a major source of competitive advantage in an industry that is 
characterised by the longevity of its leading brands. 
Within Europe, the major spirits firms spent most of the 1980s and 1990s buying up 
independent distributors so that most are now vertically integrated, using wholly owned 
subsidiaries to effect exclusive distribution of their products at national level. Integration 
into distribution allows the firms to control fully the marketing and positioning of their 
brands in all parts of the market and allow the rapid dissemination of demand 
characteristics such that shipments and depletions are balanced (this reduces working 
capital and the need for 'destocking', historically a common ailment in the industry). 
There are some countries in Europe where the state does not allow independent firms to 
conduct their own distribution, preferring to keep the state's role in alcoholic beverages 
distribution and retailing central. This is the case, for example in most of Scandinavia. It 
is also a feature of the US, where there are two types of regulatory control, Open States 
and Control States. Open States form the bulk of the US market for alcohol consumption 
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because of the size of California and Florida. Firms are allowed to sell spirits, wines and 
beer directly to independent distributors in what is known as the 'three tier distribution 
system'. There are super-distributors that span various states and they have tended to 
represent more than one spirits firm with competing brands. In Control States spirits 
firms have to sell their brands directly to the state that might be responsible for both 
wholesaling and retailing of alcohol, in much the same way as in Scandinavia. Beer is 
distributed on an Open State basis and wine varies, although it is not necessarily the case 
that a Control State for spirits purposes is also Control for wine. 
Distribution in Asia/Pacific, Latin America and Eastern Europe is complex and 
idiosyncratic, frequently with multi-layer distribution systems involving one or more 
state enterprises. Although generally the attitude towards alcohol is less puritanical than 
in the US, domestic interests tend to be afforded some protection through the excise tax 
system (that may also incorporate bonded warehousing provisions). 
2.2.3. Spirits consumption 
Branded spirits represent a very small fraction of the total consumption of spirits 
globally, with extensive pockets of locally-produced spirits in most of Asia, the former 
Eastern Bloc and Latin America. 
As summarised in Tables 2.5 and 2.6., total consumption of spirits globally is of the 
order of 2bn cases (9 litres) per annum. However, consumption of 'international' style 
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spirits amounts to 200m cases (excluding vodka in the former Soviet republics, and 
'new world' rum). Scotch, the largest international category accounts for approximately 
70m cases, with international grade vodka a close second. 
Table 2.5. Global market share of major spirits categories 
Category (m litres) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % World 
Whiskey 1664 1679 1712 1781 1857 9.8 
Brandy/Cognac 1025 1013 1019 1025 1035 5,5 
White spirits 3951 3987 4325 4220 4181 22.0 
Rum 1234 1235 1143 1215 1234 6.5 
Tequila/Mezcai 170 187 212 203 201 1.1 
Liqueurs 785 787 756 776 791 4.2 
Other 11954 10814 10457 9965 9689 51.0 
Total 20782 19702 19625 19185 18988 100.0 
Category (US$ m) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % World 
Whiskey 51102 47441 49156 48863 48495 24.3 
Brandy/Cognac 20082 18338 18344 17607 17662 8.8 
White spirits 43064 39840 41615 40877 42556 21.3 
Rum 15104 14163 14337 14555 14896 7.5 
Tequila/Mezcal 5309 5478 6198 6128 6543 3.3 
Liqueurs 18331 18133 18055 17269 17531 8.8 
Other 66149 58093 57851 55134 52134 26.1 
Total 219139 201486 205556 200432 199868 100.0 
Source: Euromonitor 
Scotch whisky is the most international of the spirits categories and has consequently 
been the bedrock for the expansion of the UK drinks companies into overseas markets, 
as shown in Figure 2.2. With large and well-established brands (as shown in Table 2.7), 
the category underpins the distribution of other brands and categories such as gin and 
vodka. It is the UK's third largest export earner with annual revenues in 2001 of close to 
f2.3bn. 
As per capita incomes rise in developing markets above $1000 per annum, international 
spirits start to become affordable. There is a body of evidence that shows that 
international spirits displace rapidly consumption of local spirits by up to 30 - 40% if 
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import restrictions, including differential excise taxes, are removed. Whilst this 
undoubtedly reflects aspirational consumption in many emerging markets, there is a 
quality issue underpinning the switch, in contrast to the beer market. 
Table 2.6. Major spirits markets 
_Country 
(m litres) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % World 
China 7329 6120 5252 4721 4261 22.4 
Russia 2281 2345 2552 2451 2413 12.7 
Brazil 1398 1453 1503 1545 1533 8.1 
us 1217 1230 1260 1293 1310 6.9 
South Korea 915 921 1068 937 1040 5.5 
Thailand 807 1 775 873 947 972 5.1 
Japan 909 893 904 919 929 4.9 
India 410 446 496 567 650 3.4 
Phlippines 470 476 485 492 499 2.6 
Ukraine 343 353 440 457 479 2.5 
Germany 504 494 476 467 447 2.4 
France 457 445 434 440 445 2.3 
Mexico 279 302 320 315 317 1.7 
Poland 380 342 330 308 297 1.6 
Spain 282 284 285 284 285 1.5 
Others 2809 2822 2948 3042 3112 16.4 
Total 20787 19702 19625 19185 18988 100.0 
Country (US$m) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % World 
_ us 31068 31923 33680 35051 35875 18 
Japan 21967 19587 22269 23469 20863 10 
Russia 16757 13678 15988 16245 17299 9 
China 25114 20492 17603 15874 14646 7 
France 16061 15613 14777 12154 12693 6 
South Korea 9972 6146 8911 9553 9711 5 
UK 10920 10516 10433 9880 9511 5 
Brazil 8627 8852 7217 8278 7288 4 
Mexico 5224 5267 5676 5647 6153 3 
Poland 5661 5568 5410 5471 6131 3 
Spain 5279 5603 5616 4740 5080 3 
Germany 6862 6747 6264 5007 4984 2 
India 3042 2984 3305 3762 4334 2 
Canada 3983 3775 3856 3944 3944 2 
Thailand 4160 2958 3548 3659 3351 2 
Others 44454 41777 41003 37697 38004 19 
Total 219151 201486 205556 200431 199867 100 
Source. Euromonitor 
Scotch and Cognac have tended to dominate international spirits growth. These 
categories through age and quality statements appeal initially to business people and 
more affluent consumers (who, by definition, tend to be older). As the market develops 
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further, and assuming that import restrictions are partially or fully lifted, consumers are 
attracted to other spirits categories, in particular, vodka and liqueurs. 
Figure 2.2. Major scotch markets by volume in 2001 
France 
14% Rest of World 
26% 
Spain 
II A 12% 
UK 
Rest of Europe 
------ ..... ----- ....... 10% 14% ---- .... 
Venezuela 
4% 
South Korea Japan 10% 
4% 6% 
Source: Scotch Whisky Association 
Table 2.7. Estimate of sales volumes of major Scotch brands 
Brand Owner Volume (millions of cases) 
Johnnie Walker Red & Black Diageo 13.7 
J&B Rare Diageo 5.9 
Ballantine's Allied Domecq 5.3 
Chivas Regal Pemod Ricard 3.9 
Grant's William Grant 3.8 
Dewar's Bacardi/Martini 3.1 
Bell's Diageo 2.7 
The Famous Grouse Robertson & Baxter 2.2 
Cutty Sark Berry Brothers & Rudd 1.9 
Source: Industry estimates 
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2.3. Industry structure 
Diageo (formed from the 1997 merger of Grand Metropolitan and Guinness), and 
Scottish & Newcastle have a joint heritage in what is known as 'The Beerage', the 
family-owned collection of regional brewers that amalgamated into national brewer- 
retailers through acquisition in the post-World War II era. 
2.3.1. Evolution of the UK brewing industry 
At the time of the publication of 'Beer: A Report on the Supply of Beer' [ 1969], the first 
MMC investigation into the UK brewing industry, there were seven major brewers that 
accounted for 73% of total UK beer production; Bass Charrington, Allied Breweries, 
Whitbread, Watney Mann, Scottish & Newcastle, Courage Barclay & Simonds, 
collectively known as the 'Big 6' and Arthur Guinness. 
After further mergers in the early 1970s that expanded the geographic scope of Courage, 
and saw the entry of hotel and property conglomerate Grand Metropolitan to 'The 
Beerage', the rest of the 1970s was characterised by relative merger inactivity, with 
brewers being content to rationalise and develop their estates through the Brewers 
Society-sponsored swap system that came into operation in the aftermath of the 1969 
investigation that had prompted an interim review of the licensing system. 
Merger and acquisition activity returned with a vengeance in the 1980s in line with the 
more general Cmerger wave' that was evident in both the US and UK economies. 
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Moreover, in the years running up to 'The Supply of Beer: A Report on the Supply of 
Beer for Retail Sale in the United Kingdom' [19891 the second anti-trust investigation 
by the MMC that culminated in what is referred to as the 'Beer Orders', the industry 
was struggling to cope with overcapacity and falling plant efficiencies in the face of 
declining beer consumption and pub going. In addition, profit margins were also under 
pressure from the emergence of the large supermarket groups as key buyers in the take- 
home or 'off trade'. 
A string of mergers and acquisitions during the 1990s followed on from the upheaval 
created by the 'Beer Orders' and by 2001, of the original six national brewer-retailers, 
only Scottish & Newcastle remained as a dedicated, UK-owned brewer, incorporating 
the former Courage and Grand Metropolitan brewing businesses. Carlsberg was in full 
control of the former Allied Breweries, and the bulk of Bass and Whitbread's brewing 
operations had passed to Belgium-based Interbrew. While some smaller regional 
brewers remain, two of the larger regional brewers, Greene King and Wolverhampton & 
Dudley have gradually absorbed many of the independent firms that existed at the time 
of the 'Beer Orders'. Figure 2.3 shows the trail of mergers and acquisitions that led to 
the formation of the major UK brewers today. 
The UK brewers had always sought a foothold in the international brewing trade, and 
with Scotland's status as a major exporter of spirits, a wider involvement in an 
increasingly global spirits market also seemed a natural progression. Allied Breweries 
had been in the forefront of international expansion. At the time of the 1969 enquiry it 
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was the second largest brewer in the Netherlands with a 20% market share. It had also 
founded the Skol consortium that brewed Skol lager in 16 countries. Others had 
followed suit with Watney Mann owning two Belgian brewers. Whitbread had entered a 
partnership with Heineken to buy breweries in South Africa. Courage similarly had 
entered into a joint venture with another Dutch brewer, Amstel (now part of Heineken) 
to further the ambitions of both companies outside their home markets. Bass had formed 
links with a French brewer to create a platform for brewing Bass brands for French 
consumption. These arrangements were in addition to the already substantial overseas 
presence of Guinness. 
2.3.2. The emergence of the UK spirits industry as an international force 
The brewers started to develop wines and spirits businesses following the ending of 
supply restrictions after World War II. While this initially went no further than bulk 
buying and bottling for resale under private label within their tied estates, it extended 
quickly to acquisitions of wine shippers and off licence chains. Allied Breweries bought 
Grant's of St. James and Victoria Wine and Whitbread purchased Stowells of Chelsea 
and Threshers. However, 1968 established 'The Beerage' as a major spirits producer 
and brand owner. Watney Mann acquired a 38% shareholding in International Distillers 
& Vintners (IDV), owner of J&B Rare, Gilbey's, Smirnoff and Hennessy. Allied 
Breweries acquired Showerings, Vine Products and Whiteway's, at the time, the largest 
wines and spirits business in Europe and owner of Babycham, Gaymer's, Harvey's 
Bristol Cream and Brit-vic. 
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By the mid 1980s the brewers were ready to make major spirits acquisitions that would 
ultimately transform them into global leaders in alcoholic beverages as illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. Guinness's 1985 acquisition of Arthur Bell, was followed a year later by an 
audacious move on the jewel in the Scotch crown, the Distillers Group, owner of 
Johnnie Walker and Gordon's. Grand Met and Allied-Lyons (the re-named Allied 
Breweries following the acquisition of food producer J Lyons) similarly expanded their 
spirits presence through North American deals, Heublein (Smirnoff, and a strategic 
alliance with Jose Cuervo) and Hiram Walker (Ballantine's, Canadian Club, Courvoisier 
and Kahlua) respectively. 
The 1997 merger of Grand Metropolitan and Guinness to form Diageo was the natural 
move to create a global giant with a portfolio and distribution capability that would be 
difficult to emulate. With the add-on brands from the 2000 joint acquisition with Pernod 
Ricard of Seagram's spirits operation, the Diageo portfolio comprises the market leader 
in every segment and category except white rum. The combination of these two deals 
prompted the final capitulation of Allied Domecq from all aspects of alcohol production. 
2.4 Anti-trust investigations in UK alcoholic beverages industry 
It is important to consider the impact of the general regulatory environment within 
which the alcoholic beverages firms have operated historically. Changes in regulatory 
attitudes shape both the structure of the market and how firms adapt to change. 
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This industry has been the subject of two major anti-trust investigations into UK 
brewing and pub retailing, in 1969 and 1989. 
2.4.1. Anti-trust investigations in the brewing industry 
The 1969 investigation 
On 2 August 1966 the MMC was instructed to conduct a detailed investigation into the 
supply of beer in the UK for retail sale in licensed premises. Table 2.8 summarises the 
industry structure at the time. 
Table 2.8. The principal UK brewers in 1967 
Company Production m b1s Share UK production 
Bass Charrington 5.64 18.1 
Bass 3.05 9.8 
Char7ington 2.59 8.3 
Allied Breweries 4.83 15.5 
Whitbread 3.46 11.1 
Watney Mann 2.94 9.4 
Scottish & Newcastle 2.51 8.0 
Courage Barclay & Simonds 1.78 5.7 
Arthur Guinness 1.53 4.9 
Total 'Big 7' 22.69 72.7 
Next 11 brewers 4.46 14.3 
Final 93 brewers 4.06 13.0 
Total 31.20 100.0 
Source: A Report on the Supply of Beer, HMSO, 1969 
The report was published on 24 April 1969, and was an extensive document prepared by 
an eight-man committee that had engaged in substantial data gathering, site visits and 
consultation with the brewing and licensed trade. 
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The brewing and pub trade had been regulated since the passing of the Finance Act 1880 
that required anyone producing beer for resale to obtain an excise licence. As an 
industry it was deemed important to the UK not least for the benefits to The Exchequer 
from excise taxes, but because the UK was at the time the world's third largest national 
beer market or seventh largest on a per capita consumption basis. In 1984, it accounted 
for flbn in VAT, fl. 8bn in excise duty, employing 300,000 people, and accounting for 
4% of total consumer expenditure. 
In the period 1881 to 1967 the number of excise licences contracted sharply from 
approximately 17,000 to 240, with the largest seven brewers responsible for 70 of the 
total, representing 73% of production (68% if Guinness is excluded). These firms form 
the basis of the UK brewing operations of today's UK brewing industry. 
In 1967 the market shares of the seven reflected their regional strengths with only a 
handful of what would constitute 'national' brands, such as Guinness, bottled Bass and 
Worthington. This was the period prior to the emergence of lager as an important beer 
category in England and Wales, with imported beer (excluding stout exported from the 
Irish Republic) accounting for less than 1% of total consumption. Regional taste 
preferences coupled with the difficulties in transporting draught ales had limited the 
scope for the development of national brands. In total there were around 3,000 different 
brands. 
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During the 1960s complaints began to surface about anti-competitive behaviour in the 
brewing industry due to powerful market positions of the seven large brewers. With the 
exception of Guinness these firms had vertically integrated businesses that encompassed 
brewing, wholesaling and retailing. 66% of beer sold went through tied estates with the 
free trade supplied increasingly by the 'Big 6'. They offered wider portfolios of brands 
as a result of 'factoring' that is supplying other brewers' brands from reciprocal or 
straight buying-in arrangements. A gap in wholesale pricing and choice of brands was 
already apparent in favour of the larger free trade customers. Generally, the larger 
brewers charged their own tenants a considerable (up to 17%) premium over prices 
charged to free trade accounts for factored non-reciprocal brands such as draught or 
bottled Guinness. 
The MMC compiled its own data base of retail prices across a range of products and 
across the country, using information supplied by the brewer-retailers and their tenants. 
It concluded that prices in Scotland were generally the same as those in England and 
Wales, but that in Nor-them Ireland prices were higher. Interestingly, both Scotland and 
Northern Ireland always were (and have remained) largely free-trade areas with only 
limited tied outlets. Both Northern Ireland and Scotland were virtual duopoly markets 
for Guinness and Bass, and Bass and Scottish & Newcastle respectively. 
In its conclusions the MMC highlighted the anti-competitive nature of UK licensing law 
that limited new entry to the pub trade and protected individually and collectively 
licensed retail outlets. Whilst all operators of licences were afforded such protection, the 
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brewers as producers and wholesalers of beer and other alcoholic beverages were given 
a wider protection albeit tempered by competition from the free trade, the independent 
club trade and the off trade. Overall, however, the MMC considered that pubs, clubs and 
off-licences were in different 'relevant markets' and that the free trade tended to 
"compete defensively ftom positions of relative weakness". Geographically competition 
was greater in urban areas, where several brewers tended to own pubs in close proximity 
to each other, with notable exceptions such as Bristol and Birmingham. Competition 
was less intense or non-existent in thinly populated (country) areas. 
As technological changes in brewing prompted process efficiencies, in addition to a 
consumption trend towards lager it became possible to transport beer over a wider area. 
Greater brewery capacity fuelled the need for larger tied estates. Given licensing 
restrictions, this could only be met by acquiring smaller brewers, keeping their estates 
and closing their less efficient brewing capacity. As a result of this brewing-led, as 
opposed to a retail-led strategy, the larger brewers had amassed what the MMC 
described as a 'haphazard' geographic mix of outlets. Moreover, the MMC found that 
consumer choice and expectations were curtailed by the brewers that were not driven by 
maximising retailing profits in their own right. Overall, the MMC found that few 
positive advantages stemmed from this structure, apart from a general contribution to 
overall standards in pub amenities and the preservation of some isolated pubs that might 
not have survived except in brewer ownership. 
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To remedy the identified adverse public interest issues, the MMC considered the full 
dis-aggregation of brewing and retailing assets, the abolition of the tie and two lesser 
remedies associated with ending the tie on non-beer supplies, or the prohibition of 'wet 
rent' (in favour of 100% fixed rents) arrangements in tied outlets. However, it concluded 
that none of these remedies was a practicable alternative in the context of the restrictive 
licensing laws that prevailed and would provide a greater advantage over the 
disadvantages of the current system. In effect, the only way to solve the adverse effects 
of the tie was to open up the licensing system, including relaxing opening hours and the 
types of operators that could gain full on-licences. 
The 1989 anti-trust investigation into the brewing industry (the 'Beer Orders') 
A 1977 Price Commission report 'Beer Prices and Margins (Report No 3 1; summarised 
in the appendix to the MMC report into the merger of Scottish & Newcastle and 
Matthew Brown in 1985), pointed to the adverse effect of a combination of high 
concentration and vertical integration in the brewing industry, reinforced by restrictive 
licensing laws, on prices of beer in public houses. It laid the blame at the door of the 
brewers' pricing decisions in their managed houses that accounted for around 25% of 
their total estates (although a much larger percentage of sales). Subsequently the 
brewers co-operated in a Brewers Society sponsored programme of pub swaps to reduce 
the concentration of ownership by any one brewer to a maximum of 50% of the pubs in 
certain areas. The definition of 'area', however, was somewhat opaque and open to 
interpretation. 
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By the early 1980s the brewing industry in aggregate had reduced its share of full on- 
licences from 78% in 1967 to 60%. However, in the six year period 1977 - 1983, 
following the publication of the Price Commission Report, pub prices of draught bitter 
(net of excise duty and VAT) continued to rise considerably ahead of the increase in the 
Retail Price Index. 
On 4 August 1986 the OFT referred to the MMC the matter of the existence or possible 
existence of a monopoly situation in the supply of beer within the UK for retail sale in 
pubs. This followed the emergence of increasingly larger acquisitions of UK brewers 
from existing and overseas brewers (Elders IXL) and ahead of the establishing of the 
single European market in 1992. 
Whilst referring to the significant changes in UK beer consumption - the 'on-to-off 
trade' and 'ale-to-lager' switch - the MMC characterised the UK beer market as one 
with strong regional tastes and preferences that naturally supported a wide variety of 
ales, with the pub remaining 'central' to the nation's beer drinking habits. 
Notwithstanding the recommendations of the first full-scale investigation 20 years 
earlier, licensing laws had not been relaxed with respect to full on-licences. 
Consequently although the numbers of restricted on-licences, club licences and off 
licences had all grown significantly, pub licences had increased by no more than 7%. 
The brewers still owned the lion's share of these licences albeit there had been a natural 
reduction as smaller non-viable outlets were sold or closed. Consequently, as Table 2.9 
shows, the national brewers had retained or increased their share of beer sales relative to 
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their position in the 1960s. Collectively, the 'Big 6' national brewers accounted for 75% 
of beer production in 1985 compared to 68% in 1967. 
Table 2.9. The principal UK brewers in 1985 
Company Production m bis Share UK production Share UK sales 
Bass 8.37 22.9 21.7 
Allied-Lyons 4.68 12.8 13.1 
Whitbread 4.02 11.0 11.3 
Scottish & Newcastle 3.89 10.6 10.1 
Grand Met (Watney Mann) 3.21 8.8 12.0 
Courage 3.17 8.7 9.0 
Total 'Big 6' 27.33 74.8 77.2 
3 Brewers Without Tied Estates 3.14 8.6 3.1 
11 Regionals 4,02 11.0 12.5 
41 Local Brewers 2.12 5.8 7.4 
Total 36.61 100.0 100.0 
Source: The Supply of Beer, HMSO, 1989 
The MMC issued its provisional findings in December 1987 -and argued that a complex 
monopoly existed in the UK beer market. The Brewers Society issued a response on 
behalf of the industry and its members in which it refuted these claims forcefully. The 
MMC commented "we were struck by the vigour and thoroughness of ne Brewers 
Society response to the many questions we asked and the points we put back to it..... the 
Society isformidably effective in championing its members' interests" [MMC, 1989]. It 
pointed to the wide choice for consumers from both other types of drinking 
establishment, and other sources of leisure and entertainment. Moreover, it drew on the 
findings of the European Commission in Regulation 1984/83 in granting 'Block 
Exemption' status to the UK's vertically integrated structure until 1997. Some of its 
other arguments were, perhaps, weaker in particular that the brewing industry had an 
'excellent record of product innovation and amenity improvement' and that vertical 
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integration had permitted brewers to achieve beneficial cost improvement throughout 
the supply chain. 
The MMC restated its provisional findings of a complex monopoly that restricted 
competition at all levels of the industry. Specifically, ownership of managed and 
tenanted assets precluded freedom of supply, and loan tying in the free trade had a 
similar effect. In aggregate this led to wholesale prices that were higher than would 
otherwise be the case, and that this in turn led to higher retail beer prices. The structure 
further precluded the operation of an effective independent wholesale trade that might 
be expected to restrain wholesale prices. High wholesale prices supported by loan-tying 
(as opposed to discount from list price in the alternative) had additional adverse effects 
in that they prevented the development of an independent retail sector. In summary, 
brewers with tied estates had been able to frustrate the growth of brewers without tied 
estates, independent wholesalers, manufacturers of the other normally tied drinks, cider 
and soft drinks, and independent retail chains. 
Mindful of the arguments from various quarters of the industry the MMC compromised 
in deciding to leave the tie in place but to limit to 2000 the number of on-licences (pubs, 
hotels and any other type of on-licensed premise) that could be operated by any brewer. 
At that time no regional brewer, including Scottish & Newcastle, had an estate of more 
than 2,000 pubs. The estimated 22,000 pubs surplus - roughly 30% of such premises in 
England & Wales - would have to be divested within three years. The MMC did not 
believe that the UK property or capital market would have "any difficulty in absorbing 
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the change". In addition, the complete abolition of loan tying was recommended in order 
to make the free trade genuinely 'free' and encourage the development of a viable 
independent wholesale sector. 
While leaving the property tie in place its scope would be reduced to allow tenants the 
opportunity to buy a brand of draught beer outside the tie, that is a 'guest beer', and to 
have complete freedom to choose its own supplier of non-alcohol and low-alcohol beers, 
wine, spirit, cider, soft drinks and mineral water. Brewers would be forced to publish 
their wholesale price lists, setting out discounts that were generally available. 
Independent wholesalers would be allowed to collect beer direct from a brewery or 
brewer-operated depot at a price below delivered prices. Finally, tenancies of all on- 
licensed premises would be brought within the provisions of the Lan4lord and Tenant 
Act 1954 Part Il. 
With the exception of one dissenting opinion, who thought that the order to divest 
22,000 pubs was draconian, the MMC thought these remedies would increase 
competition in brewing, wholesaling and retailing, encourage new entry, reduce prices 
and widen choice for consumers while still preserving the unique regional heritage of 
the industry. In the absence of change, it believed it was "inevitable that a very small 
number of brewers will increasingly dominate the supply of beer in the UIC' 
Following intense lobbying from all quarters of the brewing industry in the aftermath of 
the publication of the 'Beer Orders', Lord Young, the Secretary of State for Trade and 
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Industry while welcoming the thrust of the proposed changes, paved the way for a 
partial climb-down. On 31 October 1989, the new Secretary of State (Nicholas Ridley) 
announced that the 'draconian' condition on divestment of all estates above the 2,000 
limit would be amended to half of the excess over 2,000 by I November 1992. 
2000 review of the Beer Orders 
The 1989 'Beer Orders' was designed to remove once and for all the stranglehold over 
the UK brewing industry that the major brewers had held for over a century by forcing 
them to free up a significant part of the pub market. Its timing coincided with the 
adverse shift in popularity and usage of pubs, and the majors were already in the process 
of reducing the vertical tie by divesting underperforming outlets. 
The 'Beer Orders' forced a reappraisal of the vertically integrated structure of the 
industry. With imposed licence limits, pub retailers had to choose carefully which assets 
they retained, which were converted and which were sold. Unsurprisingly, huge swathes 
of tenanted and smaller outlets were sold or released from tie and the outcome is shown 
in Table 2.10. By this stage the eating-out market had grown and developed sufficiently 
to support 'branded' pub retailing. This shifted the emphasis to operating larger 
managed sites. 
0 
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Table 2.10. Pub ownership by brewers 
Year 
Brewers Pub Cos UK Full Licence % Brewers % Pub Cos 
Managed Tenanted Total Managýd Tenanted Total Total 
1967 13829 44696 58525 75001 70.0 0,0 
1971 13900 40800 54700 73116 748 00 
i9ei 
1990 
13800 
13800 
34700 
29700 
48500 
43500 
77230 
32890 
62a 8 
52aS 
10 
0.0 
1991 11600 17900 29500 3200 9500 12700 83699 35ý2 15.2 
1992 11100 14600 25700 3300 12600 15900 83400 30's 19,1 
1993 11800 14400 26200 2200 12600 14800 84087 31.2 178 
1994 11900 14100 26000 2300 124CO 14700 84845 30ý6 173 
1995 9800 12400 22200 4800 14000 18800 84784 262 22.2 
1996 10400 i 1900 22300 4500 14000 18500 86273 258 21.4 
1997 10400 11500 21900 4600 14300 18900 87751 250 21,5 
1998 10200 9500 19700 4900 16800 21700 37435 22.5 24A 
19,99 11300 1 9100 20400 3700 18000 21700 ST31 4 23.4 24ag 
2000 5300 5900 11200 9100 21300 30400- 87249 128 348 
2001 4400 5700 10100 8300 23300 31600 87884 11.5 36,0 
2G02 4GOO 5800 9800 7700 23800 31500 59361 ii+O 353 
2003 2500 5800 8300 8800 23700 32500 91114 U 35 7 
2004 2700 8200_ agOo al)(30 1 23700 31 7GO M49 q. a 35.0 
Source: British Beer & Pub Association 
As the major brewers divested large blocks of tenanted pubs they were quickly snapped 
up by newly formed pub companies known as 'Pubcos' that were essentially property 
finance vehicles. During the 1990s the Pubcos were aggressive purchasers of pub assets 
that were recycled during brewery mergers but increasingly from their own 
amalgamation. Their position was underpinned by the increased ability to achieve 
significant discounts for beer supplies, and reduced financing costs from the 
combination of lower interest rates and a new market for 'securitisation' of asset-backed 
cash tlow businesses. 
Consequently the pub market has reconsolidated in the hands of a few companies; not 
brewers but special purpose property and finance operations. Conversely, with the 
exception of one or two of these groups, landlord tenants had seen none of the benefits 
of lower wholesale prices, the quality of their assets has remained relatively poor, and 
although more choice was available, retail prices continued to rise ahead of inflation. 
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In December 2000 the Office of Fair Trading published a review of the 'Beer Orders' 
(The Supply of Beer: A Report on the Review of the Beer Orders by the Former DGF7). 
He recommended that the Supply of Beer (Tied Estate) Order (TEO) and its 1997 
amendment (AO) that capped pub ownership at 2,000 outlets and introduced the 'guest 
beer' provision be revoked in entirety, and that Article 3 of the Supply of Beer (Loan 
Ties, Licensed Premises and Wholesale Prices) Order (LTO) that dealt with restrictions 
on pub use following a divestment from a brewing estate also be revoked. He 
recommended, however, that the parts of the LTO that dealt specifically with loan tie 
agreements, the publication of wholesale list prices and refusal to supply beer 
(envisaged as likely to encourage the growth of independent wholesalers in the 1989 
MMC report) remained in the interests of competition. 
Pressure had been building in the brewing industry for a review of the 'Beer Orders' 
since shortly after the November 1992 deadline for compliance on pub numbers, but the 
government had refused. By 2000, several transactions had resulted in only one of the 
'Big 6' remaining in brewing, Scottish & Newcastle. Simultaneously, pub ownership 
had shifted almost entirely out of the hands of the original large brewer-retailers. Whilst 
consumers had seen a considerable increase in choice in terms of both type of pub outlet 
and what was sold in individual pubs, an anticipated competitive pricing environment 
had failed largely to develop. The DGFT was satisfied that price was less of an issue 
now for consumers given that the quality of the pub offering had improved considerably 
as a result of capital spending. Moreover, with demarcation lines increasingly blurred 
67 
between caf6s, bars, clubs, pubs and other leisure establishments, there was generally 
more competition for the consumer's money. 
2.4.2. Investigations in the spirits industry 
To date there has been no full-scale anti-trust investigation into the sPirits industry in the 
UK, US or Europe. There may be several reasons for this. One is that there is no 
apparent conflict with the consumer as a result of property (UK, Germany) or loan-tying 
(most of Europe) that is a feature of beer production and distribution. In addition, 
differential excise tax systems in most markets have forced higher retail prices for spirits 
compared to other alcoholic beverages categories, as shown in Table 2.11. 
Table 2.11. Excise duty rates in the European Union 
Country Beer p per pint Wine p per 756 Spirits E per 70d 
Austria 9.4 0.0 1.9 
Belgium 8.1 24.5 3.2 
Cyprus 9.4 0.0 1.2 
Czech 3.8 0.0 1.7 
Denmark 13.4 42.8 3.9 
Estonia 7.3 34.5 1.9 
Finland 38.3 110.1 5.5 
France 5.1 1.8 2.8 
Germany 3.7 0.0 2.5 
Greece 5.3 0.0 2.1 
Hungary 8.1 1ý7 1.5 
Ireland 39.1 141.8 7.6 
Italy 9.3 0.0 1.5 
Latvia 3.4 22.4 1.5 
Lithuania 4.0 22.6 1.8 
Luxembourg 3.7 0.0 2.0 
Malta 3.5 0.0 4.5 
Netheriands 9.9 30.7 3.4 
Poland 8.1 17.6 2.2 
Portugal 6.2 0.0 1.8 
Slovakia 0.0 1.3 19.0 
Slovenia 0,0 1.4 20.0 
Spain 3.6 0.0 1.5 
Sweden 31.8 126.2 10.7 
UK 36.7 125.8 5.5 
Source: British Beer & Pub Association 
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Moreover, the pricing structure in spirits is somewhat more complex than in beer, with 
age statements and quality being a major factor in consumption, and with supply and 
demand frequently imbalanced. This has a knock-on effect on prices, both up and down, 
that can last for several years. 
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Chapter 3. Literature review 
The first section of this chapter contains a brief summary of the major legal principles 
that govern anti-trust policy and how the law has changed to incorporate the latest 
thinking in industrial economics. The main focus is on the US as it was the first nation 
to formalise a structured response to firm dominance and the exploitation of market 
power. The background to the development of the European Union's legal framework 
and that of the UK is also considered. 
The second section discusses the economic analysis that accompanies an anti-trust or 
merger investigation. Specific reference is made to academic studies of the economics 
of highly differentiated product mergers, with some notable econometric analysis of the 
UK brewing industry. 
The third section focuses on the firm. Mergers and acquisitions represent a major, if not 
the most important aspect of many firms' strategies for growth. The corporate strategy 
literature is a starting point for this review. However, merger and acquisition analysis 
goes beyond a core strategy debate, incorporating aspects of political science as well as 
accounting and finance. 
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The final section deals with the research literature on discriminant analysis and case 
study method. Both are techniques that have been widely used in other fields but rarely 
in competition policy analysis which has tended to be dominated by standard 
equilibrium economic and econometric approaches. 
It is at the interface of these diverse bodies of literature that this thesis makes its 
contribution; given the legal and economic framework how firms have managed 
interaction with the competition authorities as part of their strategy for growth by 
merger and acquisition. 
3.1. The law of anti-trust 
3.1.1. The US anti-trust and mergers framework 
The relevant law 
The origins of US anti-trust and merger policy date back to the passing of the Sherman 
Act in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Clayton Acts of 1914. The 
acts have been amended over time to incorporate new developments and best practice. 
In particular the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 authorised the FTC to prevent certain 
specified practices involving discriminatory pricing and product promotion. The Hart- 
Scott-Rodino Anti-trust Improvements Act of 1976 amended the Clayton Act by 
requiring firms to file pre-merger notifications with the FTC and Anti-trust Division of 
the Department of Justice (DoJ). More recently, the International Anti-trust Enforcement 
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Assistance Act of 1994 authorised the FTC and DoJ to enter selectively into mutual 
assistance agreements with foreign anti-trust authorities. The latest legal principles are 
outlined in "A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative and Law 
Enforcement, 4uthority", [2002]. 
In a detailed review of the origins of US anti-trust law and enforcement, Winerman 
[2003] discusses how competition policy moved to centre stage in the US following a 
period of unprecedented corporate consolidation between 1898 and 1902. Opposition to 
the concentration of economic power in large corporations and in groups of related firms 
led Congress to pass the Sherman Act to allow the elimination of such practice at the 
interstate level. By 1890 Standard Oil had built an unassailable position in petroleum 
refining and similar trusts controlled whisky, sugar and tobacco. The act authorised, the 
federal government to institute proceedings against trusts in order to dissolve them 
although this power was blocked by the Supreme Court until the 1904 dissolution of the 
Northern Securities Company. The highest profile actions brought under the Act remain 
the 1911 cases that dissolved Standard Oil and the American Tobacco Company. 
The 1914 Clayton and FTC Acts were enacted to clarify and supplement the Sher-man 
Act. The Clayton Act prohibited exclusive sales contracts, local price cutting to freeze 
out competitors, rebates and inter-corporate stock holdings (excluding trade unions and 
agricultural co-operatives). The 1936 Robinson-Patman Act enhanced the Clayton Act 
by forbidding price discrimination where the effect would be to 'lessen competition' or 
4create a monopoly'. Sometimes referred to as the "Anti -Chain- Store Act", it was 
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directed at protecting independent retailers from chain store competition. The Act was 
also influential in protecting independent wholesalers from the threat of chain store 
buying power. 
The anti-trust and merger process 
The purpose of merger regulation is to prevent anti-competitive mergers whilst seeking 
not to deter pro-competitive or competitively neutral mergers. In 1968 the DoJ 
introduced Merger Guidelines to inform business of the analysis it applied to mergers 
under federal anti-trust law. In its own words, these guidelines '! fell into disuse ... as 
they were eclipsed by developments in legal and economic thinking about mergers". In 
1982 substantially revised Merger Guidelines were introduced, with the FTC releasing 
simultaneously its Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers that referred specifically 
to the DoFs guidelines. In 1984 amended Merger Guidelines were released that "refined 
and clarified the analyticalftamework of the 1982 Merger Guidelines". 
In 1992, the DoJ and FTC issued jointly new 'Horizontal Merger Guidelines' revising 
the two agencies thinking on horizontal mergers (the pre-existing guidelines still deal 
with non-horizontal or vertical mergers). The 1992 modifications that remain in place 
today were designed to explain clearly how mergers may lead to adverse competitive 
effects and how particular market factors relate to the analysis of those effects. A second 
main revision sharpened the distinction between the treatments of various types of 
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supply responses and articulated the framework for analysing the timeliness, likelihood 
and sufficiency of market entry. 
Whilst the regulatory authorities have attempted progressively to create a systematic and 
consistent basis for the analysis of all mergers through the standards of the Guidelines, 
in keeping with latest economic thinking and methodology, their aim is to act 
"reasonably and flexibly to the particular facts and circumstances of each proposed 
merger". 
Firms must pre-notify the FTC of their intention to merge. The FTC then conducts a 
five-stage process designed to answer the fundamental question of whether the merger is 
likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise before deciding on 
whether to challenge the merger. The process is as follows: 
i. An assessment of whether the merger would significantly increase concentration and 
result in a concentrated market, property defined and measured; 
ii. An assessment of whether the merger, in light of concentration and other factors that 
characterise the market, raises concerns about potential adverse competitive effects; 
iii. An assessment of whether entry would be timely, likely and sufficient either to deter 
or to counteract the competitive effects of concern; 
iv. An assessment of any efficiency gains that reasonably cannot be achieved by the 
parties through other means; and 
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V. An assessment of whether, but for the merger, either party to the transaction would 
be likely to fail, causing its assets to exit the market 
Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution factors. Supply substitution is 
considered further down the chain in addressing concentration and market power. The 
FTC delineates the relevant market by what is referred to as the 'SSNIP' or 
'Hypothetical Monopolist Test', specified as follows: 
4a product or group ofproducts and a geographic area in which it is produced or sold 
such that a hypothetical profit-maximisingfirm, not subject to price regulation, that was 
the only present andfuture producer or seller of those products in that area likely would 
impose at least a "small but significant and nontransitory " increase in price, assuming 
the terms ofsale of all other products are held constant. ' 
The FTC assesses whether in response to a price increase a reduction in the sales of the 
product are large enough such that a hypothetical monopolist would not find it profitable 
to impose such an increase in price of typically 5%. In such a case the FTC adds to the 
product group the product that is the next-best substitute for the merging firm's product 
in considering the boundaries of the relevant market. 
Having defined the relevant market, the FTC then considers the scope of the market in 
terms of concentration and market shares. Market participants can include firms that are 
not currently producing in either the relevant product or geographic market, but which I 
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would be likely to do so in the event of a 'small but significant non-transitory' increase 
in price. Such 'uncommitted' entrants must face minimal or non-existent (sunk) entry 
and exit costs and could enter the relevant market rapidly (typically within one year). 
They may currently be producing a different product but one that would rank as an 
acceptable substitute in the event of a lasting increase in price of the merging firms 
product(s). Consequently, in calculating market shares, an element of spare capacity that 
could influence the relevant market is included. 
Market concentration is calculated by reference to the Herfindahl -Hirschman Index 
(HHI) that is derived from summing the squares of the individual market shares of all 
participants in the relevant market (that is 3 02 +2 02+102+102+102+102 +5 
2 
+5 
2= 1750). 
This therefore gives proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger 
firms; the underlying premise is that this approximates their relative importance in 
competitive interactions. As discussed later, this has been challenged by leading 
academic econometricians in particular with regard to branded goods industries where 
the merging firms own portfolios of differentiated products. 
In looking at the competitive state of the relevant market before and after merger, the 
FTC considers three broad regions of concentration. A market with an HHI of below 
1000 is 'unconcentrated'; an HHI between 1000 and 1800 is 'moderately concentrated' 
and an HHI in excess of 1800 is 'highly concentrated'. If the post-merger HHI is in the 
moderately concentrated range and rises by less than 100 points as a result of the 
merger, the merger is usually cleared with no further analysis. In the event the HHI rises 
76 
by more than 100 points, there are potentially significant competitive concerns that may 
require further investigation to establish for example, whether there is the potential for 
csignificant lessening of competition' through either tacit or express collusion within the 
industry. For a highly concentrated market where the post merger HHI is raised by less 
than 50 points, the merger is usually cleared with no further analysis. Where the post- 
merger HHI exceeds 1900 and is raised by more than 100 points, however, a fuller 
investigation is usually undertaken. 
In 2006, the DoJ and FTC published jointly "Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines" that followed as a direct consequence of a series of workshops with leading 
antitrust practitioners and economists that sought to educate the business community 
thoroughly with the analytical frameworks used by the authorities. While the agencies 
concluded that there was no reason to revamp the Guidelines, it thought it necessary to 
describe in detail, and with reference to previous US cases, exactly what type of analysis 
it conducted in order to aid 'transparency'. 
3.1.2. The European Union anti-trust and mergers framework 
The relevant law 
In the aftermath of World War 11, France and Germany were keen to rebuild Western 
Europe through a process of what Cini and McGowan [1998] describe as 
'institutionalised co-operation'. This led to The Schumann Plan, a framework within 
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which both countries pooled their coal and steel resources, handing over control of those 
resources to a supranational authority. The ECSC Treaty of 1951 brought Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg into this supranational mechanism. 
During the 1950s attempts were made to extend the ECSC to other nation states as well 
as other sectors of the economy. Eventually, after much debate the EEC Treaty, known 
as 'The Treaty of Rome' was signed by major Western EuroPean nations in 1957. Its 
aim was to create a common market that would free up trade between the participating 
countries while sustaining post-War reconstruction and political reconciliation. The UK 
and Ireland ratified the Treaty of Rome in 1973. 
From the outset the Treaty of Rome contained anti-trust legislation that applied across 
the EEC. Article 81 (formerly known as Article 85), was concerned with restrictive 
practices. Article 82 (formerly known as Article 86) contained the EEC's abuse of 
dominance (monopoly) policy. 
Article 81 (1) provides that certain actions are prohibited as being incompatible with the 
common market. Namely, all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their objective or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market. In practice this usually entails 
price fixing, adoption of quotas, sharing of markets or territories, and rigging markets. 
Article 81(l) extends to both horizontal and vertical agreements. It applies to parent 
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companies, including those based outside the Community, for the behaviour of their 
subsidiaries operating within the EU, since the undertaking as a whole is active there. 
Concerted practices that lead to anti -competitive prices through co-ordination or 
collusion are also covered by Article 81 (1). 
There are conditions under which agreements are exempted from the general prohibition 
of Article 81(l). Such 'block exemption' regulations are covered by Article 81(3) and 
include certain categories of vertical agreement. There are horizontal agreements that 
also possess a block exemption, such as technology transfer and research and 
development agreements. Other agreements not covered by a block exemption can be 
granted an individual exemption if their restrictive effect on competition is 
counterbalanced by contribution to 'general welfare' (improved production or technical 
or economic progress). In addition there are de minimis agreements, or agreements of 
minor importance that are granted exemption because they are incapable of affecting 
competition in the common market while encouraging co-operation between small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
Article 81(3) is of particular relevance to the UK brewing industry whose contracts were 
granted 'block exemption' status on I July 1983 under Regulation 1984/83 (exclusive 
purchasing). Regulation 1984/83 was due to expire on 31 December 1997, but was 
extended to 31 December 1999. The provision is now covered by UK domestic anti-trust 
law in so far as there remain brewer tied estates above the de minimis threshold. It was 
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considered justified to apply special rules to beer supply agreements since exclusive 
purchasing obligations usually entail advantages for the supplier as well as the reseller. 
Formerly known as Article 86, Article 82 is concerned with an 'abuse of a position of 
dominance' in a relevant market by one or more undertakings. There are no exceptions 
or block exemptions under this regulation. It is under Article 82 that merger regulations, 
discussed below, are judged, with regard to creating or strengthening a dominant 
position, either solely or collectively. 
According to Fox [2002] it is clear from the wording of Article 82 that it is intended to 
regulate the conduct of dominant firms and to prevent them from using their power 
inappropriately, not merely to prevent them from expanding or protecting their power. 
Consequently, in EU law, exclusionary contracts and practices represent an abuse of 
dominance. This is in contrast to the legal base in the US. In this sense, the difference of 
focal point creates the potential to produce two different outcomes from the US and EC 
when investigating an abuse of dominance case. 
The Treaty of Rome did not provide for advance vetting of mergers by the Community 
authorities. The gap was filled initially by European Court of Justice case law. It was not 
until 1989 that Merger Regulation 4064/89 was adopted. It stipulated that a 
(concentration' with a Community dimension that created or strengthened a dominant 
position as a result of which effective competition was significantly impeded was 
incompatible with the common market. Since March 1998 such concentrations with a 
Community dimension are defined as those where either: 
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i. the combined aggregate world-wide turnover of all undertakings concerned 
exceeds $5bn and the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two 
of those undertakings is more than E250m; or 
ii. the combined aggregate world-wide turnover of all undertakings concerned 
exceeds $2.5bn and in each of at least three Member States the combined aggregate 
turnover of all those undertakings is more than $100m (with two in aggregate 
accounting for at least $25m) 
For deals involving smaller concentrations or where each of the undertakings concerned 
achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one 
and the same Member State, jurisdiction for the merger falls on the competition 
authorities in the domestic market on the basis of its own legislation. Consequently, the 
majority of the mergers of UK brewing/retailing fell naturally for investigation by the 
UK authorities. [Although in the case of Interbrew/Bass Brewers, as discussed below, 
Interbrew notified the EC and sought investigation under EC merger control 
notwithstanding a clearly UK/UK merger] 
The anti-trust and merger process 
Since the publication of Regulation 4064/89 the EC has issued a series of notices 
designed to exPlain to firms the circumstances in which a merger would trigger 
competition concerns. Perhaps the most significant of these was Commission Notice 
97/C 372/03 the purpose of which was to set out the EC's guidance for the definition of 
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the relevant product and geographic market for anti-trust purposes. It is this definition 
that makes it possible inter alia to calculate market shares that would convey 
meaningful information regarding market power for the purposes of assessing 
dominance or for the purposes of applying Article 8 1. 
With regard to products: 
'A relevant product market comprises all those products andlor services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use' 
With regard to geography: 
'The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand ofproducts and services, in which the 
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished 
ftom neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciable 
different in those areas' 
In defining the relevant market, the EC assesses the impact of three restraining factors 
on pricing power: demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential 
competition. Demand substitutability seeks to define the boundaries of the product or 
geographic market by establishing inter alia the impact of a small (5 - 10%) but 
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a 
permanent relative increase in price on consumer switching behaviour. By a process of 
trial and error the market is bounded by an area that includes all close substitutes that 
serve to deter such pricing decisions. Once that boundary is crossed, a company would 
find it profitable to enact a small but permanent relative price increase. 
Supply substitutability focuses on whether other manufacturers not obviously competing 
currently in the defined market could switch their productive capacity towards the 
market in the event that the incumbent(s) firm can establish a small but permanent 
increase in relative price. If such manufacturers' switching costs are relatively low 
and/or riskless, their capacity and products are included in the definition of the market 
for merger purposes. Potential competition through new entry is not taken into account 
when defining markets. 
In June 2000, the EC launched a major review of the Merger Regulation, issuing a 
Green Paper, followed by a period of public debate. Particular problems encountered 
during the first ten years of the EC merger regulation process were addressed. In 
particular, Mr Mario Monti, European Competition Commissioner wanted to reflect on 
"how effective a legal instrument the substantive test has been in tackling the 
competition problems which concentrations can give rise to" [2002]. 
On I May 2004 Regulation 139/04 was introduced, replacing existing Regulation 
4064/89. Most notable was the removal of the 'dominance' test that had transferred in 
wording, if not application, from the provisions for monopolisation in Article 82. In its 
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place is a 'significantly impede effective competition' test, similar, albeit not exactly the 
same wording as the US and UK 'significant lessening of competition' test. According 
to Mr Monti, the call for change was most lauded by law firms and academics who 
regarded the SLC wording as "better suited to the kind of micro-economic analysis 
required in merger cases". 
Vickers [2004] explains that the problem with the 'dominance' test was that numerous 
mergers could jeopardise competition without crossing the threshold of dominant market 
power as traditionally understood. In response, the EC established a 'collective 
dominance' test. While in principle this made sense, in practice, referring specifically to 
the Airtours case, establishing collective dominance is not an easy task, particularly 
where the case rests on non-coordinated industry effects that are likely to create an 
anticompetitive environment on a post-merger basis. 
In practice, those who were opposed to change, largely industry respondents, feared that 
a change to SLC would have given the Commission "too broad a margin of discretion 
(resulting in)... an unacceptably interventionist merger control policy". Perhaps 
motivated to change towards 'significant lessening of competition' as a result of high 
profile challenges to the EC's analysis at the Court of First Instance (Airtours, Tetra 
Laval and GE/Honeywell), the new regulation has adopted a half-way house through the 
c significantly impede effective competition' test. In addition, the Merger Task Force has 
been dissolved as a separate entity within the EC, and a Chief Competition Economist 
84 
post created, to "ensure a more central role for economic analysis" (Vickers [2004]). 
The development of EU merger policy is summarised in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Milestones in EU merger policy 
Year Act 
1962 Articles 85 (81) and 86 (82) established 
1990 European Union Merger Regulation (ECMR) introduced 
1992 NestI6 / Perrier: First successful 'collective dominance' case 
1998 European Court of Justice upholds 'collective dominance'under ECIVIR 
1998 New directive on what constitutes 'community dimension' in merger cases 
2001 Green Paper on modifying ECMR 
2002 Publication of ECIVIR reform proposals 
2004 New ECIVIR introduced 
Source: Vickers [20041 
3.1.3. The UK anti-trust and mergers framework 
The relevant law 
A consistent approach to anti-trust and merger policy in the UK has been a post-World 
War 11 phenomenon, with 'independence' only being achieved with the recent passing 
of the Enterprise Act 2002 (cf. in the US the 1914 Clayton Act created an independent 
regulator to administer antitrust policy). According to Wilks [1999], in the early post 
War years, UK policy makers looked consistently at developments in the US but did not 
like what they saw, believing it to be 'anti' everything. The efficiency defence, always 
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incorporated into UK decisions was only introduced into US policy as a result of the 
increasing influence of the Chicago School in the late 1970s. The development of UK 
competition policy prior to 1997 is summarised in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. UK competition policy legislation prior to 1997 
Year Act 
1948 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (inquiry & Control) Act 
1953 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act 
1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1964 Resale Prices Act 
1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act 
1968 Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1973 Fair Trading Act 
1976 Resale Prices Act, Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1977 Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1980 Competition Act 
1984 Telecommunications Act 
1985 Transport Act 
1986 Airports Act, Financial Services Act, Gas Act 
1989 Companies Act, Water Act, Electricity Act 
1990 Broadcasting Act 
1991 Water Industry Act 
1993 Railways Act 
1994 Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 
2000 Transport Act and Financial Services and Market Act and a new Postal Services Act 
Source: Wilks [1999]. 
The Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT) known with his staff collectively as the Zý 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) was established by the Fair Trading Act 1973. The Act 
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governed merger control and inquiries into scale and complex monopolies. The 
Competition Act 1998 reduced the scope of the Fair Trading Act 1973 by establishing a 
proh ib ition -based system of competition law for anti -competitive and abusive practices. 
The Competition Commission (CC) was established by the Competition Act 1998 to 
replace the former Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). The Enterprise Act 
2002 introduced a new regime for the assessment of mergers and markets in the UK. 
The 'public interest test' was replaced by tests focused specifically on competition 
issues. 
In Wilks' view UK competition policy developed "incrementally and piecemeal as a 
product of consensus building by a powerful civil service, heavily influenced by business 
lobbying, increasingly responding to developments in economic thought, and operating 
under a benign and exceptional mantle ofpolitical bi-partisanship". Until the Enterprise 
Act it could be concluded that competition was not the dominant concern in competition 
policy, with other objectives taking on degrees of importance depending on the political 
landscape. 
During the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher new legislation was 
introduced rapidly to privatise and deregulate various industries and markets. Since the 
election of the Blair Labour government in 1997 several changes in competition policy 
and practice have been introduced, mirroring other changes in macroeconomic policy, 
notably the establishing of an independent Bank of England. The Competition Act 1998 Z: ) 
created an independent CC, albeit wholly funded by the Department of Trade and 
87 
Industry, with the Secretary of State being responsible for making member 
appointments, and with the option to declare any industry a 'special' case for more 
direct intervention. The 2001 Competition White Paper set out the government's vision 
for the CC as a world class competition authority. This led to the passing of the 
Enterprise Act 2002. 
The anti-trust and merger process 
The role of the CC is to conduct in-depth inquiries into mergers, markets and the 
regulation of the major regulated industries. Its aim is to "make markets work for 
consumers" by allowing them to benefit from lower prices, a wider choice of products, 
more innovation and higher quality products and services. 
Every inquiry is a result of a reference by another authority, usually the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT), or a sector regulator. The CC has no power to instigate its own inquiries, 
there being a voluntary notification mechanism, in contrast to both the US and EU. 
Under the Enterprise Act, the CC is no longer charged with the task of considering 
mergers in light of the 'public interest' issue. The criteria for blocking or clearing a 
merger are based solely on competition issues. 
Moreover, the CC now has powers in relation to remedies that supersede previous 
recommendation-only status. It is at the remedy stage that the former 'public interest' 
issue effectively comes into play: "when making its decisions on remedial action, the 
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Commission must have regard to the need to achieve as comprehensive a solution as is 
reasonable and practicable ... .... (have regard to) ..... any relevant customer 
benefits 
arising ftom the merger. If the benefits are significant the Commission may decide to 
take lesser action, or even no action". 
In conducting a market abuse or merger inquiry the type of analysis carried out, and the 
economic basis for conducting the analysis is similar to that performed in both the US 
and EU. However, the test of market power is similar to that used in the US, namely, 
would a merger be expected to result in a 'substantial lessening of competition' within 
the relevant market. The tools used to define and measure the relevant market and the 
use of econometric studies is similar to that used in the US. 
In contrast to the US, the UK regulatory bodies, the CC and OFT are administrative 
only, although their decisions are subject to an appeal procedure through the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). The functions of the CAT include the following: 
i. To hear appeals on the merits in respect of decisions made under the Competition 
Act 1998 by the OFT and the regulators in the telecommunications, electricity, gas, 
water, railways and air traffic services sectors. 
ii. To hear actions for damages and other monetary claims under the Competition Act 
1998 
To review decisions made by the Secretary of State, OFT and CC in respect of 
merger and market references or possible references under the Enterprise Act 2002. 
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iv. To hear appeals in respect of decisions made by the OFT under the EC 
Competition Law (Articles 84 and 85) Enforcement Regulations 2001 (as 
amended). 
In relation to reviews, the CAT applies the same principles as would be applied by a 
court on an application for a judicial review. In reviewing the relevant decisions the 
CAT may dismiss the application, or quash the whole or part of the relevant decision 
and where it quashes the whole or part of that decision it may refer the matter back to 
the original decision maker with a direction to reconsider and make a new decision in 
accordance with the ruling of the CAT. In common with civil law, a CAT decision can 
be appealed to the Court of Appeal but only on a point of law, or in penalty cases as to 
the amount of any penalty. 
3.2. The economics of anti-trust 
As quickly as laws and regulations governing the anti-trust and merger process have 
been introduced, 'progress' in economic thinking and the use of econometric techniques 
have called for boundaries to be pushed further. With a rich tradition of anti-trust 
analysis, and a burgeoning academic community, US economists have led the way in 
shaping such policy. There is a general and almost unchallenged agreement that US anti- 
trust and merger policy, with its supporting use of economics is the system that all other 
jurisdictions should aspire to. The UK through the Enterprise Act, and more recently the 
European Commission through the new merger regulation have formalised imported US 
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terminology and methodology for assessing relevant markets and the estimation of 
market power in anti-trust and merger cases. 
Recently, criticisms have emerged from within the ranks of the US regulators 
themselves, not just with regard to the level of sophistication of the economics used in 
anti-trust and merger cases but with the increasingly abstract nature of the econometric 
analysis presented by opposing parties. Muris [2000] prior to his appointment to the 
helm of the FTC offered a suitably scathing attack on both the legal mechanism and the 
economic basis of monopolisation cases, pointing to "the weak empirical foundation of 
much of modern economic theory". Pointing to the future, Muris concluded "given our 
ignorance about the sources of a firm's success, they (monopolisation cases) must 
necessarily be wide-ranging in questioning whether the conduct at issue in fact created, 
enhanced or preserved monopoly, whether efficiency justifications explain such 
behaviour and all other relevant issues". 
Scheffman and Coleman [2003], Director and Deputy Director respectively of the 
Bureau of Economics at the FTC, comment that econometrics is only one of many forms 
of quantitative analysis that are useful in anti-trust cases. The key decision makers at the 
FTC and DoJ and their associated legal staff are generally not economists or 
econometric ians - If they cannot see a sufficient 
link between the economic analysis and 
the facts of the case, they are not likely to give the analysis much weight. Referring 
specifically to a reliance on scanner (or panel) data - used frequently in consumer 
product anti-trust and merger analysis - Scheffman and Coleman recognise what many 
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academic economists have failed to acknowledge in their analysis; it is a poor estimate 
of achieved price because it does not adjust for retrospective discounts and slotting fees, 
cons. equently, "estimates of elasticities from scanner data were inconclusive on whether 
two products were close competitors, yet an analysis of manufacturer trade promotions 
showed that one product targeted another in its trade promotions which provided one 
basisfor a conclusion that the two products were close competitors". 
Perhaps one reason for the need for more detailed and watertight quantitative analysis is 
to overcome the historic reliance on political interference, or 'public interest' that has 
gone hand-in-hand with the evolution of competition policy. Fox [2002] sheds light on 
the impact of 'politics' in the US anti-trust system. In her view, the Chicago School that 
had been influential in reversing the interventionist approach of the US authorities prior 
to 1980, made way for a more heavy-handed approach at the FTC, in particular during 
the Clinton presidency. Until the arrival of Mr Monti, the previous European 
Commissioner, the EC was seen as open to significant influence from the direct 
intervention of Member States. Mr Monti was credited by Neven and R611er [2002] for 
his "independence andfor protecting his stafffrom political influence". Indeed when Mr 
Monti called for comments from interested parties as part of the consultation process 
ahead of introducing the new merger regulation, political interference was a criticism 
that was not levelled at the EC. It remains to be seen whether the UK's newly 
independent CC under the auspices of the Enterprise Act proves to be as genuinely 
apolitical as expected. 
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In the following sections, a brief account of the relevant industrial organisation literature 
and econometric analysis is discussed, with a specific focus on the academic thinking in 
consumer goods industries within which this thesis is based. 
3.2.1. Market definition and market power 
It is a requirement in competition analysis that the starting point in the investigation is to 
define the relevant market that the alleged abuse of market power (monopolisation 
cases) or the potential for 'significant lessening of competition' or its equivalent 
formulation (merger cases) takes place in. According to Massey [2000], market 
definition has long been a thorny issue in competition law analysis, and this continues to 
be the case. As the authors of the OFT's specially commissioned report on the use of 
quantitative techniques in competition analysis [1999] explain "the correct definition of 
the relevant antitrust market is an important feature of an accurate competition 
analysis. A too narrowly defined market can lead to unnecessary competition 
concerns .... a too widely 
defined market may disguise real competition problems. " 
However some regulators, for example, the DoFs Werden [1992] have downplayed the 
significance of market definition, referring to it as a "means to an end rather than an 
end in itseýf' 
Due to its early adoption of anti-trust regulations, the US has been the testing ground for 
new and emerging economic theories and econometric analysis to assist in market 
investigations. In the 1950s, the accepted methodology in defining markets was based 
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on cross-price elasticity analysis. However, this forrn of analysis fell into disrepute as a 
result of what became known as the 'cellophane trap', coined from the finding in the Du 
Pont section 2 Sherman Act monopolisation case of 1957 that all packaging materials 
were substitutes for cellophane at prevailing market prices. Of course what the analysis 
failed to show was that prices of cellophane were already at the monopoly level, at 
which point other packaging materials and the option to not package at all represent 
adequate substitution possibilities. 
Following the discrediting of cross-price elasticity analysis as the method of choice in 
defining a market, many other methodologies were presented to fill the vacuum. None 
has become integrated into a conventional anti-trust framework. Surprising, some 40 
years down the road, the adoption of the 1992 merger guidelines in the US has reinstated 
cross-price elasticity in market definition. To accommodate the pitfalls of the 
4cellophane trap', however, the guidelines start at the smallest possible definition of a 
market - for example, deluxe blended Scotch whisky that is 12 years old - and require 
that current prices are competitive. It is immediately obvious why Massey claims market 
definition remains a 'thorny issue'. As Werden [1992] explains, parties to a merger 
almost invariably argue that the relevant market is so large that post-merger market 
shares will remain small. On the other hand, regulators are incentivised through the 
guidelines to start at the other extreme. In reality, Werden suggests that a more fruitful 
approach for firms in many cases is to argue, with supporting evidence, why the 
merging firms' products are not in the same market. 
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The OFT's report [ 19991 identified a range of situations where quantitative analysis in 
anti-trust could be valuable: market definition, market structure issues, pricing issues, 
behavioural issues, vertical issues (including contracting), merger issues, and potential 
entry and competitive expansion. However, the authors of the report warn that even if it 
is relatively unproblematic to define the market, in the later analysis, interpreting market 
share and implying its impact on market power is not a straightforward task, as 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Table 3.3 summarises the types of econometric and other quantitative tests that have 
been applied to anti-trust and merger cases to help in market definition and the 
identification of abuse of market power, drawn from the report. 
3.2.2. The economics of consumer product markets 
In his capacity as the Director, Bureau of Economics at the FTC, Baker [1997] made a 
key speech that discussed the nature of anti-trust issues in highly differentiated product 
markets. In his view: "In the differentiated product settings, anti-trust has had trouble 
isolating anti-competitive harm and devising a pro-competitive remedy within the 
conventional rule-of-reason, market definition paradigm". Along the same vein, 
Rubinfeld [2000] questions the role in general of econometric methods in highly 
differentiated goods mergers. 
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Table 3.3. Econometric and quantitative tests applied to merger cases 
Technique Description I Applications 
Statistical Tests of Prices 
Cross-sectional Hypothesis testing to establish if two sets of 
MMC compared prices of paired samples of 
price test prices are uniform 
CDs and cars across various countries, 
including US 
Hedonic price Regression-based analysis that purges prices Comparison of the price of like cars (same 
analysis of the effect of quality differences features) across the EU 
Statistical technique to measure the degree 
Stigler and Sherwin [1985] test whether 
Price correlation of interdependence between two variables 
Chicago, Detroit and New Orleans are in the 
same market for wholesale petrol 
Speed of 
Estimation of linear relationship between Horowitz [1981] used the technique to 
adjustment current 
and past price differences to establish 
' ' 
establish if two geographic markets constitute 
mean reversion following a shock an anti-trust market 
Granger causality 
Similar to speed of adjustment test but seeks Slade [1986] used causality tests to determine 
to establish causation from one price series that US West Coast and South East petrol test to another or mutual determination markets are distinct from North East 
Error Correction Model that tests whether To allow estimation of equilibrium relationships 
series of prices exhibit stable long-run where non-stationary time series present. 
Co-integration relationships. Engle and Granger [1987] MMC: investigation of soluble coffee in UK 
analysis showed that integrated series whose retail market regarding adjustment of price of 
relationship can be expressed as an ECM are soluble coffee to changes in the price of coffee 
co-integrated beans 
Demand analysis 
Firm's residual demand is that part of total MMC investigation into National Express and 
Residual demand demand not met 
by other firms in industry. Its Midland Main Line merger. Extensive use of 
analysis 
elasticity (derived from Instrumental Variable own and cross-price elasticity analysis of rail 
or reduced form regression equation) infers and coach use. 
whether firm could achieve a SSNIP 
Necessary complement to residual demand Harris and Simons [1989] developed its use in 
Critical loss analysis 
analysis. Estimate by simulation the 'critical' merger analysis. If actual loss is less than 
loss in sales that would render unprofitable a critical loss, price increase is profitable, and 
unilateral price increase. potentially anti-competitive. 
Establish the sensitivity of imports to 
General anti-trust application but not used due 
Import penetration domestic prices through elasticity measures 
to 'simultaneity bias' that is it is difficult to 
test 
and regression analysis 
distinguish between demand and supply of the 
imported good 
Where raw data is not available or is Engelhard/Floridin gel clay merger in the US. incomplete seek to obtain information DoJ expert witness interviewed customers of 
Survey techniques forma Ily/inform ally from surveys and both companies to elicit whether they would 
questionnaires as a basis for statistical switch for a 5% or 10% price increase. 
analysis 
Models of competition 
Based on Structure-Conduct-Performance Frequently used by VIIVIC. For example, the 
paradigm and Lerner Index of monopoly SCI/Plantsbrook funeral services merger 
Price-concentration power 
that implies higher concentration is utilised multiple regression analysis to explain 
studies 
associated with higher prices/profits in the differences in prices by differences in six 
relevant market. Degree of concentration is chosen vaýables. IVIIVIC disputed parties 
used as the proxy for market structure; k-firm findings, but could not present an alternative 
ratio or HHI model from the dataset 
Empirical observation of whether there is To detect bid rigging to stop/prevent 
Bidding studies systematic bias in bidding prices over time anticompetitive behaviour of a cartel of 
between cartel and non-cartel firms bidders. 
Diversion ratio techniques based on Have been used in several high profile US 
Differentiated independence of Irrelevant Alternatives consumer goods merger cases and are 
product analysis Assumption or Estimation of Demand System discussed in detail below 
using econometric model, AIDS 
Source: "Quantitative Techniques in Competition Analysis", Economic research Paper 17, OFT [ 1999] 
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As a starting point Baker acknowledges that differentiation, while benefiting consumers 
in the context of offering superior choices can facilitate the exercise of market power. 
What makes analysis of these industries- particularly difficult is that a relatively small 
number of large firms that invest heavily in selling and marketing their products, but 
which appear to sustain relatively high margins could be interpreted as an industry 
realizing a return from high risk, high fixed cost investments, or one that has been 
successful in erecting entry barriers to protect supernormal returns. Where the 
authorities have the most difficulty is in instances where there are no gaps in the chain 
of substitutes, in economic terms, where the product-characteristic space is crowded or 
even overlapping. Rightly, he points out that in these instances the anti-trust concern is 
more likely to centre on the effect on prices among the merging firms own products, 
rather than in the wider market per se. In this sense the standard anti-trust analysis of 
defining a relevant market and then computing market shares should be abandoned in 
favour of asking the question: "If competition between products of the merged firm 
declines and one product price rises, where do buyers go? " 
Although the merger guidelines have placed cross-price elasticity at the cornerstone of 
identifying the relevant market, the technique and its interpretation are not without 
criticism. For example, Massey [2000] questions how high the cross-price elasticity 
measure must be for two products to be considered substitutes that are part of the same 
relevant market. Even assuming this question can be answered, problems occur further 
down the line in the analysis. Pinkse and Slade [2003] point out that many economists 
believe that concentration indices such as the HHI are poor indicators of market power 
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in industries characterised by differentiated products. Recent analysis by Walsh and 
Whelan [2002] of the carbonated soft drinks market suggests firm size is attributed to 
the degree to which firms own a portfolio of brands across segments of the market and 
not as a result of performance within segments. 
OFT [1999] identifies two quantitative techniques to assist in merger cases involving 
differentiated products. Diversion Analysis is a simulation technique that uses the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption (IIAA). The fundamental 
assumption in IIAA is that the cross-price elasticity between one product and all others 
is identical. Using an econometric model known as a multinomial logit demand model, 
the demand for the given product can be estimated. In the case of a merger, this model is 
used to assess the quantity of the product that is lost to a close substitute product if its 
price is increased. The diversion ratio is calculated numerically as the cross-price 
elasticity of the two products divided by the own-price elasticity of demand for the first 
product. The diversion ratio can also be expressed in terms of market shares due to the 
properties of the logit model. It is then used to estimate the post merger price increase 
using the assumption that the elasticity of demand is constant pre and post merger: 
Post-merger price increase = (mark-up x DR) / (I - markup - DR) 
Diversion Analysis has been criticised frequently in the literature. Hausman, Leonard 
and Zona [1994] warn against the use of the IIAA assumption that underpins this and 
related analyses. The assumption that if a single product is eliminated from the choice 
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set consumers will distribute themselves among the remaining products proportionate to 
their market shares is a feature that has been "tested and rejected numerous times in the 
discrete choice literature". Moreover, these authors claim that the IIAA assumption that 
the cross-price elasticity between one product and all others is identical is unlikely to 
hold very often and is counterintuitive. 
Hausman et al describe a set of demand models for consumer goods industries using 
scanner data. Specifically these authors developed a multi-level demand system that 
modelled the US beer market. Utilising what is called a 'Gorman's multi-stage 
budgeting' approach, a three stage demand system is built. Starting at the bottom level, 
estimates of cross-price 'effects' among brands in a given segment using the Almost 
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer [1980] dre 
calculated. These are then fed into the second stage model that estimates total demand 
by segment, which in turn feeds into the top level that estimates overall demand for 
beer. At this stage the model has been fully estimated and it can be manipulated to turn 
the brand cross-price 'effects' into unconditional elasticities. 
Bottom level demand specification has the advantage of not imposing restrictions on 
competition among brands within a given segment. The authors suggest that competition 
among differentiated products is typically highest among brands within a given segment. 
They use their model to simulate the effect on prices of a merger between what they 
consider to be competing brands, for example, the two premium beer brands Coors and 
Labatts under various scenarios, including fixed or falling marginal cost assumptions, 
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and looking at the constraining influence on price of other brands in the same or related 
beer segments. The results show that even with no efficiency gains the estimated price 
increases would be quite small because Coors' price is constrained much more by 
Budweiser and Miller while Labatts' price is constrained more by Molsons. When 
modest efficiency gains are included due to hypothetical decreases in marginal costs, 
predicted post-merger prices decrease. When beers from other segments are included in 
the model, such as popular beers and light beers, the results also show significant 
constraining influences on post-merger price increases. 
In the same vein Pinkse and Slade [2004] have built even more sophisticated demand 
models that have applications for anti-trust and merger analysis. Their work looked at 
the UK brewing industry in the mid-1990s, in the immediate aftermath of the 1995 
acquisition of Courage by Scottish & Newcastle, to model the potential impact on beer 
prices of the proposed, but blocked merger that would have created Bass Carlsberg- 
Tetley. Their model was an extension of Hausman in that it had a continuous choice 
specification that allowed the estimation of cross-price elasticities as a function of a 
number of distance measures between brands in pro duct-characteristi c space. 
The conclusions of Pinkse and Slade's UK brewing industry study was that the Scottish 
& Newcastle/Courage merger had little effect on prices, but that the proposed merger of 
Bass and Carlsberg-Tetley would have resulted in retail price increases of 3%, a figure 
that they considered significant and a justifiable reason for blocking the proposed 
merger. This was attributed to the non-overlapping nature of the former two businesses 
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in terms of both geography and brand portfolio. On a conventional measure of 
concentration in the regions studied, Scottish Courage accounted for 37% market share 
compared to a combined Bass/CT market share of 34%; the Scottish Courage merger 
should be more (not less) anti -competitive - the opposite of what they found. Their 
conclusions of anti-competitive behaviour rest heavily on the identity and product mix 
of each merging partner at the local level. 
There are 'common sense' non-econometric reasons for apparent spurious answers to 
anti-trust and merger problems and examples from the alcoholic beverages industry 
illustrate why. As a starting point, using raw price data from panel or scanner studies is 
likely to over-estimate systematically the true retail price of consumer goods as 
discussed previously by Scheffman and Coleman [2003]. These prices fail to account for 
the 'normal' practice of slotting fees and retrospective discounts, one of a range of 
complicating factors that governs the relationship between manufacturers and retailers. 
Moreover, with many long-term and exclusive contacts between brewers and pub 
retailers that frequently have to be honoured on a change of ownership, it is unclear that 
what is purported to be modelled is a true reflection of consumer - as opposed to 
customer - demand and price sensitivity. Dobson [2002], 
in an analysis of Interbrew's 
proposed acquisition of Bass Brewers pointed specifically to the failure of 'normal 
models' to take account of the significant and growing buying power of the PubCos and 
other retail groups, for example, the supermarket chains. The divergence between 
wholesale and retail pub prices of beer have been described in detail in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. 
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The use of economic 'games' that simulate the impact of prices in the event of a merger 
is also a hotly debated topic. Typically the simulated game is a Nash-Bertrand 
equilibrium model, one of several 'one-shot' games. Werden [2004] explains that critics 
of these models - used widely in anti-trust analysis - point to the real world fact that 
competitors in an industry play repeated games. Where repeated games have been 
introduced, in Werden's view they are "even more abstract and artificial than one-shot 
games" given that they tend to involve infinite repetition of the same one-shot game, 
without allowing for communication or learning, key factors in normal industrial 
development. 
On the basis of his work as the economics expert witness in the Post/Nabisco Cereal 
merger, Rubinfeld [2000] confirms the practical issues in dealing with the price and 
volume evidence. Purchasing (scanner) data tends to estimate household, rather than 
individual spending patterns, which may consequently be overstated. In addition 
households often buy cereals, for example, in large volumes to take account of 
promotional offers, such as 'buy one get one free', generally referred to as 'multi-buy' 
deals. Further problems occur in the modelling stage, in particular with regard to 
demand models based on multi-stage budgeting decisions. The decision to include a 
product or group of products in one segment rather than another can affect substantially 
the conclusion reached with regard to the relevant market for anti-trust purposes. The 
I 
restriction tends to make products in the same segment much closer substitutes than is 
really the case, whereas products categorised as in different segments are 
mathematically seen as insignificant substitutes. Rubinfeld concludes that the 
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econometric evidence must be used in conjunction with quantitative and qualitative 
marketing evidence. 
One of the more fundamental criticisms expressed by various economists (Baker, 
Hausman et al, Pinkse and Slade) is that the guidelines and standard anti-trust analysis is 
a poor predictor of market power for merging firms that own an array of brands that are 
relatively close substitutes. However, it is rare to find reference to the impact of the 
portfolio itself, and its supporting distribution network (in the context of vertical 
restraint) in the literature. 
Recently, in a specially commissioned work by the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry, the concept of 'portfolio effects' was introduced. The report's author, Nalebuff 
[2003] sets the scene for a new generation of complex econometric models that are 
likely to be presented to the regulatory authorities as expert evidence in anti-trust cases. 
With reference to the analysis of ski resorts he discusses competitive advantage when 
bundling can be used to increase the value of a firm's offering relative to that of a rival, 
a topic that he claims has not been addressed in the literature. In his view, "when rivals 
cannot duplicate this strategy the result is a sustained competitive advantage and 
possibly a dominant or leading market position". 
The problem with the standard anti-trust analysis is that it relies on price as a proxy for 
the exercise of market power, not volume per se, and it generally attributes limited cost 
savings to the combination of portfolios of highly differentiated products, as explained 
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by Baker [ 1997]. Certainly the US authorities appear to be lagging considerably in their 
knowledge or acceptance of 'portfolio effects'. Nalebuff [2004] attributes this to "the 
Chicago School (has) largely succeeded in discrediting the idea of leveraging monopoly 
power". 
The European Commission, in contrast, has recognised that for example, in the case of 
the 1997 merger of Grand Metropolitan and Guinness, the supplier of a broad range of 
spirits to its customers would be stronger than a supplier of a single spirit since it would 
account for a greater proportion of a customer's business. A broader (across, not 
necessarily within) portfolio provides economies of scale and scope in sales and 
marketing activity and strengthens the threat of the refusal to supply. 
3.2.3. Discussion of economics and law 
Over the period of the literature review the legal frameworks for anti-trust and merger 
analysis have changed several times within the various jurisdictions. In common with 
other industries, the major UK alcoholic beverages firms have increasingly been 
conducting mergers outside their UK base, and have consequently been exposed to the 
legal networks of either the US, EC or both simultaneously. 
Greater co-operation between the US, viewed by itself and others as the founding father 
of anti-trust analysis, and other jurisdictions was both inevitable and desirable with the 
growth in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. According to Charles A James [2001], 
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assistant Attorney General in the anti-trust division of the US DoJ, the Competition Law 
and Policy Committee of the Organisation for Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
has worked for the past 30 or more years to build a consensus among its members with 
regard to policy and its implementation. Although regimes have moved closer together, 
sharing information and adopting each others policies where possible, there have been 
differences in approach. The US had remained critical of the EC for what it viewed as 
placing more emphasis on the welfare of competitors than consumers in competition 
analysis. 
This debate was spurred by the acrimony that followed the EC decision to block General 
Electric's proposed acquisition of Honeywell, even though the US authorities had 
cleared the deal. The EC decision was influenced heavily by the possibility of adverse 
'portfolio effects' in such conglomerate mergers. As discussed previously, when 
viewing alcoholic beverages industry mergers the EC has utilised a similar analysis. 
Indeed the UK-commissioned work by Professor Nalebuff was motivated by the 
possible existence of 'portfolio effects'. For the US, in Attorney James' words "so- 
called ýpoqfolio effects' or 'range effects' as it has recently been employed is neither 
soundly grounded in economic theory nor supported by empirical evidence". 
The EC, having relied on 'portfolio effects' theory in several high profile mergers, but 
without producing a new economics paradigm or econometric tool to identify and 
quantify them has, it seems, been forced to abandon this analysis, at least in the near 
term. An appeal by GE to the European Court of First Instance (CFI), whilst, being 
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denied an annulment of the merger prohibition, succeeded in relegating the EC analysis 
of 'Portfolio effects' to the back burner. The CH considered that the EC analysis was 
erroneous in that it had not established with high probability that such effects would 
occur as a result of the merger. This decision followed on from similar findings in 
another high profile appeal to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), that of Tetra 
Laval/Sidel earlier in 2005. In the view of some in the legal profession this development 
has effectively closed the gap in antitrust merger analysis and policy between the US 
and EC. 
Whilst the EC might be guilty of not establishing a sufficient economic foundation for 
the identification and quantification of 'portfolio effects', the fact remains that building 
a leading portfolio of seemingly unrelated brands is the core objective of much merger 
and acquisition strategy in consumer-related industries, if not in may others. The merger 
strategies of many leading consumer goods firms such as those in the alcoholic 
beverages industry are underpinned by the concept of 'portfolio effects'. Moreover, it is 
not the case that the economic principles that underpin US anti-trust and merger policy 
is not without high-level criticism, as discussed above. Problems accrue at several stages 
in the analysis; there is a heavy reliance on scanner data, relevant market definitions can 
place brands arbitrarily into categories that may not exist in practice, and the models of 
competition do not account for both the existence of long-term supply contracts, 
buyer/supplier relative bargaining and the fact that competitors play repeated games 
from which they learn and adapt their strategies to not just the market place but also the 
regulatory environment within which they operate. 
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3.3. The firm and its strategy for growth 
The previous sections defined the competition policy framework within which markets 
and firms are obliged to operate. This section considers the corporate strategy literature 
and what it says about firms' ability to create and maintain competitive advantage in the 
markets within which they operate. Mergers and acquisitions are a key feature of growth 
for firms. Given that a firm's strategy is constrained by anti-trust policy, it would be 
logical to expect firms to incorporate and adapt to the legal framework and supporting 
economic analysis to remain successful. As Figure 3.1., from McGee, Thomas and 
Wilson [2005], illustrates, it is implicit in the strategy literature to recognise the 
importance of the interaction between corporate strategy and the external environment, 
including government-related interaction. 
In the following sections the two classic paradigms of strategy literature are discussed, 
the traditional Structure- C onduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm that traces its origins to 
industrial economics, and the Resource-Based-View (RBV) of the firm, that became a 
popular area for academic strategy in the 1980s. The academic literature, in so far as it 
exists that links firm strategy to the external environment, both political and the stock 
market is reviewed. Finally the implementation of a merger strategy that is 'doing the 
deal' is considered, drawing on a rich - and controversial - body of Finance literature 
that assesses the impact of a merger strategy on a firm's long-term returns. 
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Figure 3.1. Basic dynamics of strategy 
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3.3.1. The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm in strategy 
The obvious starting point for a review of the academic strategy literature that might be 
expected to encompass merger and acquisition strategy is the classic SCP paradigm. 
This was imported from industrial organisation economics, and has been the framework 
for the industrial analysis that accompanies most anti-trust investigations. It formed the 
dominant thinking in 1980s strategy research until it was eclipsed by the RBV of the 
firm as the mainstream strategy thinking of the 1990s. 
Rumelt, Schendel and Teece [19911, suggest that prior to the 1970s, academic strategy 
research consisted largely of case study analysis of actual situations with generalisations 
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sought through induction. During the 1970s a new deductive style emerged, utilizing 
econometric statistical methods, such as multivariate techniques, and the principles of 
economics. arvard Business School, through Caves and Porter [1977] and later Porter 
[1980] was influential in leading and developing the new framework, with other 
contributors including Schendel [1978] whose empirical work in the US brewing 
industry led to the concept of 'strategic groups'. 
The starting point for the 1970s strategy thinking was the early work of Bain [1959]. In 
essence Bain carried the SCP paradigm from industrial economics into the new 
discipline of corporate strategy. Whilst Porter [1980] is often credited with the seminal 
work in the field, through the '5 Forces' framework it was Bain who identified that four 
primary characteristics of market structure, that is, the degree of differentiation, the 
condition of entry, and the degree of seller and buyer concentration "are the aspects of 
market organization that most clearly and systematically influence market conduct and 
performance throughout all industries". The incidence of product differentiation was the 
key fundamental determinant of structure, and consequently conduct and performance. 
The closeness of substitutes, demand characteristics of the product and the preferences 
of consumers and customers linked directly to the condition of entry. 
Recognising the importance but also limitations of Bain, Caves and Porter [1977] 
broadened the SCP framework to accommodate 'barriers to mobility', the forerunner of 
the strategic group literature. This was seen as an SCP-based explanation to the question 
of 'persistent profit'. Barriers to mobility, later incorporated into the 'strategic group' 
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analysis were an attempt to explain why some firms in an industry sustained apparently 
superior returns and why new entry did not erode their competitive positioning in the 
manner in which economic theory suggested. 
In one of the early empirical studies that established industry subgroups, Schendel and 
Patton [1978] developed a 'simultaneous equation model of corporate strategy' from 
studies of the US brewing industry over the period 1952 - 1971. Their aim was to 
examine the many competing goals that occupy management, in particular, the trade-off 
between growth and profitability. They outlined three fundamental aspects of any 
purposive organisation; its goals, the means or resource allocations possible and the 
environmental constraints within which the firm must operate. Goals are a system of 
multiple explanatory equations that capture more adequately a firm's behaviour than the 
one single goal of profit maximization projected by economists. Means can be split into 
two camps that are under management control: strategic variables, such as resource 
allocation and operating variables. Finally, environmental constraints are factors that 
management cannot control directly even though its decisions may influence them, such 
as the nature of the industry to which the firm belongs, and the political and economic 
climate that is shared by all firms and industries. 
In the analysis, Schendel and Patton divided the brewing firms into hypothesized 
homogeneous subgroups based on firm size and geographic scope; national, large 
regional and small regional. Their regression analysis vindicated the separation, with 
starkly different results to the aggregated industry trends in the market share and 
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profitability maxim. National firms were shown to be successful in gaining dominance 
by presenting a quality product that was marketed intensely and supported by strong 
distribution. Although profitability was affected by the pursuit of market share gains, 
this was a short-run effect; over time the national players gained competitively from the 
circularity and positive feedback of marketing supremacy, and the ability to invest in a 
multiple plant capacity to push down costs and optimise distribution capability. The 
major losers in the strategic battle were the large regional brewers that were too large to 
not follow the profit/market share trade-off of the nationals, but which were unable to 
match their marketing budgets and thus could not sustain a costly market share battle. 
The small regional brewers suffered from similar adverse effects. 
In extending this work and the earlier work of Porter, McGee and Thomas [1986] 
conclude that 'strategic groups' offer an explanation for persistent intra-industry 
differences in profit rates, and as such "contribute to our understanding of oligopolistic 
interdependence and may enrich the SCP paradigm of industrial organization theory" 
The nature of such interdependence and firm rivalry is illuminated by the pattern of 
group membership and how this changes over time. Interestingly, these authors also see 
cstrategic groups' as adding to the RBV literature through a link back to the early work 
of Penrose [1959] and her theories for the growth of the firm, and to Rumelt [1991] who 
identifies 'isolating mechanisms' as a general term to explain the concept of mobility 
barriers as a unique characteristic of a firm. 
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3.3.2. The Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm 
The question of whether performance is industry or firm-specific has taxed the minds of 
many leading strategy scholars for several decades. As early as the late 1960s, empirical 
observations questioned whether there was a causal relationship between size and 
profitability. However, it was not until the 1980s that researchers started to investigate 
apparent intra-industry heterogeneity in performance. In contrast to the work emanating 
from Harvard, Rumelt et al [ 199 1] and other 'Chicago School' academics saw industry 
structure as reflecting efficiency outcomes rather than market power. These authors 
concluded that there were firm-specific effects that were more significant in explaining 
performance. 
This 'resource-based view' (RBV) forms an alternative paradigm within the strategy 
literature whose objective is to provide the answer to the 'problem of persistent profit'. 
Central to the SCP orthodoxy is that supernormal or excess profits are eliminated by 
other firms in the industry or new entrants, assuming no anti-trust barriers exist. In real 
world examples, even relaxing some of the constraints of SCP to allow for scale 
economies, first mover advantages and barriers to mobility residual unexplainable profit 
can still remain. RBV proponents describe this as supernormal returns derived from 
unique resource combinations within a firm. The identification and management of these 
unique resources create sustainable competitive advantage that is difficult to replicate. 
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Whilst the origins of RBV are credited frequently to the workings of Penrose [1959], it 
found its place in strategy as the alternative paradigm in the 1990s, under the auspices of 
Prahalad and Hamel [1990]. However, the theories of authors such and Alchian [1950], 
Ansoff [1972], Nelson and Winter [1982], and Nelson [1991] have contributed to the 
intellectual base. These authors, in general, conceive the organisation as a dynamic 
entity that responds to signals from the external environment and adapting in much the 
same way as a biological entity in a Darwinian sense. 
Alchian [1950] called for "a modification of economic analysis to incorporate 
incomplete information and uncertain foresight". He proffered that there is a distribution 
of outcomes that are uncertain. The best a firm can do is to opt for an action with a 
preferred outcome distribution and hope it will be successful. With regard to the living 
world, Alchian recognises that there are difficulties in distinguishing between 
'adaptation' and 'adoption'; survivors may appear to be those that have adapted 
themselves to the environment, whereas in reality the environment may have adopted 
them. If the latter is true, success may be a function of luck rather than predicted 
behaviour. 
Ansoff [1972] sees the firm as a "dynamic open system in constant two-way interaction 
with the environment". The art of strategic management is to establish and maintain a set 
of relationships that enable a firm to pursue its objectives that are consistent with its 
organisational capabilities. These in turn are determined by the characteristics of the 
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individuals within it. To survive and succeed all organisations need to adapt to the 
environment and to operate within it. 
Nelson and Winter's book "An Evolutionary neory of Economic Change" [1982] in 
discussing competition from an evolutionary economics standpoint draws heavily on the 
work of 1930s Austrian (and later Harvard) economist, Schumpeter. Nelson and Winter 
describe Schumpeterian competition as producing winners and losers in a process of 
continuing disequilibrium, in contrast to the equilibrium, profit maximization 
fundamentals of industrial organisation and SCP. Through a process of 'natural 
selection' winners emerge, and growth and success tends to breed further growth and 
success, leading ultimately to a concentrated industry structure. Nelson [1991] sees the 
world as too complicated for an ex-ante decision of the 'best' strategy (profit 
maximization). In his view firms in an industry choose from many potential strategies, 
creating a diversity of outcomes. It is the organisational differences that become 
institutional ised subsequently as core 'dynamic capabilities', in particular those that lead 
to differences in the ability to generate and gain from innovation, that are the source of 
durable competitive advantage. 
The quantitative 'evidence' that set out the case for RBV - or certainly against SCP - 
was presented in a re-working of Schmalensee's 1985 analysis "Do Markets Differ 
Much". Rumelt [ 199 1] credits the "innovative and technically sophisticated' findings of 
that report, but extends the original one-year data analysis to a four-year period. In 
addition he adds variables that relate to overall business cycle effects and stable and 
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transient industry and business unit effects. Rumelt's 'variance components estimation' 
model implies that business units differ from one another within industries significantly 
more than industries differ from one another. He concludes "the most important 
impediments to the equilibration of long term rates of return are not associated with 
industry but with the unique endowments, positions, and strategies of individual 
businesses". 
In a break with 1980s thinking on refocusing and restructuring, Prahalad and Hamel 
[1990] gave credence to a new type of diversification strategy, one that was based on 
core competencies. For example, in the case of Honda, its core competence in engines 
and power trains were seen as giving it a distinct advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn 
mower and generator businesses. Many of the 'best in class' examples were Japanese 
companies, while US management, including that of GE "often lacks the vision to build 
(competencies) and the administrative means for assembling resources spread across 
multiple businesses". 
These authors predicted that the 1990s' manager would be 'judged on the ability to 
identify, cultivate and exploit core competencies that make growth possible", while at 
the same time recognizing that little would be gained from 'political or macroeconomic 
relief. They describe a core competence as one that: 
i. Provides potential access to a wide variety of markets; 
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ii. Makes a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end 
product, and 
iii. Should be difficult for competitors to imitate. 
Identifying these unique resources and combining or exploiting them to create a 
sustainable competitive advantage is not as simple as it might sound. As Mintzberg 
[1997] explains, the great challenge for managers is "knowing the organisation's 
capabilities well enough to think deeply enough about its strategic direction". In earlier 
work, based on extensive case study analysis across several sectors of the economy 
Mintzberg [1985] identified two broad categories of strategic management styles, 
deliberate and emergent. A perfectly deliberate strategy would only occur in an 
environment that was totally predictable, benign or under the control of the firm, 
whereas a purely emergent strategy would only occur when an environment imposed 
directly a pattern of actions on a firm. 
In reality, strategies needed to employ aspects of both to be capable of learning as well 
as providing a sense of direction for the organisation and its employees. This would 
seem to be arguing, although not expressed as such, for the simultaneous adoption of 
SCP and RBV in some form of integrated group strategy. This would offer an advantage 
in anti-trust analysis of drawing on the SCP literature that has informed the economic 
analysis of the policy framework but considering the firm's position, expressed through 
RBV of a core competence that is the ability to interact with external constituencies such 
as government and the political process. 
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3.3.3. Linking the two paradigms to the external environment 
During the 1990s, a somewhat unsatisfactory compromise has been reached between the 
two research approaches to strategy: it depends on the industry, the particular 
performance measure used at a point in time and whether the analysis is considering the 
market leader, a failed firm or one in the second tier of performers. This is borne out of 
the fact that each of the two paradigms has pitfalls. SCP, starting with a toP-down 
approach from the external environment within which a firm operates does not appear 
flexible enough, even allowing for 'mobility barriers' or 'strategic groups' to explain 
persistent profit. Starting at the other extreme and building up, through an RBV 
approach is likely to be attributing only transitory success to a firm that could have been 
achieved by other means; the Japanese industrial 'miracle' of the 1980s, and some high 
profile specific case studies, such as Enron and Shell illustrate the point. 
Two basic problems remain for strategic analysis - and indeed for anti-trust - what is 
performance (and over what time scale is it measured) and what is an industry? This 
becomes an even greater challenge when looked at in an international and cross-border 
setting. Academic work on 'strategic groups' has helped to refine definitions of an 
industry notwithstanding its failure to capture the dynamic aspects of strategy. But the 
issue of performance and returns to firms and industries remains thorny. Not only does 
iprofit' mean different things to different parties, but finding firms that operate 
consistently as 'profit maximisers' has proved to be a fruitless task, largely because it 
ignores the agency costs associated with managing corporations. In the view of Rumelt, 
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Schendel and Teece [1991], whilst economics is important, it is equally important to 
recognise that most business strategies also contain implicit hypotheses regarding 
organisational behaviour and political motivation, while relying on judgments about the 
perceptions, feelings and beliefs of customers, suppliers, employees and competitors. 
In an article on 'sustainable advantage', Ghernawat [1986] was one of the first 
researchers to look in the middle ground between the two paradigms, laying the 
foundation within a classic strategy framework for a more structured and integrated 
social science response to business and competitive advantage. Ghemawat argued that 
since competitors were capable of securing the details of new product introductions 
within a year of their development, and because processes were even harder to protect 
that new product information, there were only three ways to sustain a competitive 
advantage; size and scale, access such as tying up raw materials (by, for example, 
backward integration) and by freezing out competitors by, for example, exploiting anti- 
trust and patent laws and other government-sponsored intervention in markets. "The 
lesson strategically is that a company that is on the right side of public policy can 
exploit its position to build sustainability against companies that are not". 
Developing his analysis in an attempt to bridge the gap between the two schools, Porter 
[1991] redefines strategy as the act of aligning a company and its environment. With 
both subject to change, the "task of strategy is to maintain a dynamic not static 
balance 
... ... need a theory of strategy that 
links environmental circumstances andfirm 
behaviour to market outcomes". Having abandoned the cross-sectional econometric 
118 
studies of the 1970s that underpinned 'Competitive Strategy' [1980] Porter has taken a 
longitudinal case study approach to cope with both industry and firm-level effects. In its 
broadest sense, a firm's success is a function of both the attractiveness of an industry 
(SCP, and the '5 Forces' framework) and a firm's relative position within that industry 
(RBV). In Porter's view the firm's relative position is a function of 'initial conditions', 
such as pre-existing reputations and skills and 'managerial choices' that have led to the 
assembly or creation of particular skills and resources. Porter's case study analysis seeks 
to establish why particular firms were able to get into advantaged positions and sustain, 
or fail to sustain them. Given his acknowledgement that "Ae final influence on the 
environmentfor competitive advantage is government" it is within this context that the 
exploration of growth by mergers and acquisition would sit naturally. 
Watkins [2003] considers few businesses are good at integrating government relations 
and business strategy. Referring specifically to Microsoft, he points to the role of 
customer and competitor complaints in the DoJ decision to file an anti-trust lawsuit that 
led to a record settlement. Watkins concludes that efforts to influence government - 
which clearly can be successful - "are often aform of business competition in disguise". 
With the increasingly tight barriers provided by the regulatory and anti-trust authorities, 
the mechanism for exogenous change must be a key aspect of firm strategy. Shaffer and 
Hillman [2000] assert that the responsiveness to public policy issues is of increasing 
importance to the strategy of firms and their performance. In his earlier work, Shaffer 
[1995] suggests that given the effect government can have on firm-level profitability, 
firms with superior capabilities for adapting to "regulatory dictates" may attain a 
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position of competitive advantage over their rivals. However, the process need not be 
passive, with firms seeking to gain advantage by influencing the legislative and 
regulatory process instead of going head-to-head in the product market. Shaffer 
concludes that this proposition needed further conceptual development and empirical 
support. 
Baron [1995,1997] considers that strategy formulation and implementation must look 
both inside the firm, with regard to its distinctive competencies, as well as outward to 
the environment in which the firm operates. In Baron's view, for a business strategy to 
be effective all internal and external interactions must be tailored and integrated. A firm 
must recognise that non-market issues, such as government intervention, can have a 
controlling impact on its opportunities. As such, non-market strategies can be used more 
broadly to structure the rules of market competition either by the firm, or collectively by 
the industry. He considers that competitive analysis and strategy formulation often takes 
the non-market environment as fixed and then conducts a Porter-style analysis from that 
fixed perspective. 
It is unclear whether Baron's insights for successful strategy have ever been put to the 
test empirically. However, his expectation that where non-market assets and 
competencies are unique or difficult to replicate they will render a firm a non-market 
advantage, with the potential for knock-on effects on market positioning should be 
testable in the context of a successful merger and acquisition strategy. 
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3.3.4. Merger strategy and implementation 
Even assuming that a firm's merger and acquisition strategy has incorporated 
successfully the key external interaction with the competition policy framework it must 
also meet with approval from the other key extemal force, the stockmarket. Many 
mergers have been thwarted by 'share price effects'; a lengthy enquiry or a hostile bid 
allows others to benefit directly or indirectly from the bid process at the expense of the 
bidder. Moreover, if a firm transacts one or more mergers and acquisitions that are 
deemed to fail or destroy shareholder value after the event this will have a material 
impact on that firm's ability to cement deals in the future. In this respect the Finance and 
Financial Analysis literature might offer guidance on successful imPlementation of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Finance and Event Studies 
The accepted wisdom is that mergers and acquisitions rarely create value for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms. In as much as there are value-creating merger benefits 
these accrue almost exclusively to the target firm shareholders. The wealth effects for 
shareholders is surnmarised succinctly by Loughran and Vijh [1997]: 
i. Target shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns from all 
acquisitions; 
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ii. Acquiring shareholders earn little or no abnormal returns from tender offers 
(hostile bids usually paid in cash); and 
iii. Acquiring shareholders earn negative abnormal returns from mergers (agreed 
bids usually paid in stock). 
Such conclusions are derived from 'event studies' of abnormal share price returns over 
the period of the takeover announcement. This analysis was introduced by the eminent 
academic Eugene Fama in 1969 and underpins the paradigm of stock market efficiency. 
Since then an extensive academic literature has built on the pros and cons of event study 
analysis in demonstrating stock market efficiency and establishing the benefits or 
otherwise of corporate actions including mergers and acquisitions. 
In an early appraisal of mergers Jensen and Ruback [1983] surveyed the abnormal 
returns generated by successful and unsuccessful takeovers. Considering takeovers as 
part of a corporate control mechanism whereby managerial teams compete for the rights 
to manage resources, target shareholders gained 8% from proxy contests, 20% from 
mergers and 30% from tender offers. Bidding shareholders did no worse than to break 
even. In the case of failed bids, there were small (5%) losses to target and bidder 
shareholders, except in proxy contests, where target shareholders still gained 8% 
notwithstanding the failure of the transaction (presumably reflecting the view that a 
higher bid would emerge now that the target was 'in play'). Jensen and Ruback saw 
these gains as a signal of increased efficiencies or synergies rather than the creation of 
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market power. As such they considered that anti-trust opposition to mergers imposed 
costs by restricting the transfer of corporate control. 
Roll [ 1986] pointed out, however, that there was a fundamental flaw in what became the 
prevailing view of mergers. Since bidders were usually much larger than targets the 
effect of the bid could be buried in the noise of the bidder's return volatility. This would 
be the case, particularly, over short time horizons. He argued that takeover gains may 
have been overestimated, if they existed at all. He forwarded a cynical view of mergers; 
that managers make bids even when valuation criteria should have suggested otherwise 
in what he coined the 'Hubris Hypothesis'. The rationale for bid activity could be 
explained by a combination of these factors, hubris on the part of individual decision 
makers in the acquiring firms as well as by tax benefits, corporate synergies or removing 
inefficient managers in the target firm. 
During the 1980s and 1990s there were various 'event studies' that analysed pre and 
post-merger share prices, often providing contradictory evidence on the pros and cons of 
mergers and acquisitions. Some authors such as Franks, Harris and Titman [19911 found 
no evidence from a study of 399 takeovers in the US between 1975 and 1984 of 
significant abnormal returns three years after the bid announcement. In their opinion the 
previous findings of poor performance after takeover was likely due to benchmark errors 
rather than mis-pricing at the time of the takeover. 
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Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker [1992], however, found that shareholders of acquiring 
firms suffer a statistically significant loss of 10% over the five years following a merger, 
and that this is robust to various specifications, such as firm size and estimation of risk 
(beta). Moreover, these authors found that in contrast to the accepted wisdom, the 
underperformance of acquirers was worse for 'non-conglomerate' mergers that is, 
between firms in similar lines of business. 
Barber and Lyon [1997] outline three specific criticisms of the statistical methods used 
to calculate long-term abnormal returns that in effect render any analysis that relies 
purely on stock market evidence as questionable: 
i. New Listing bias - sampled acquiring firms generally have a long post-event 
history of returns while firms that constitute the index or reference portfolio 
against which abnormal returns are measured include new firms that began 
trading subsequent to the event month; 
Rebalancing bias - the compound returns of a reference portfolio are calculated 
typically assuming periodic rebalancing (for example at the end of the month or 
quarter holdings within the portfolio are increased or reduced to maintain their 
index weighting) while the returns of the sample acquiring firms are 
compounded without rebalancing; and 
hi. Skewness bias - long-run abnormal returns are positively skewed. 
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The authors suggest that a way to eliminate these statistical biases is to match a sample 
of firms to 'control' firms of similar size and book-to-market ratios and then calculate 
the relative abnormal return from a 'buy-and-hold' strategy (known as BHAR). Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai [1999] identify two additional sources of misspecifi cation in long-run 
abnormal returns that unlike the three biases outlined above cannot be controlled. They 
are cross-sectional dependence in the sample observation and a poorly specified asset 
pricing model. 
According to recent analysis by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz [2005] managers are 
getting worse at making acquisitions. With the headline "Wealth destruction on a 
massive scale? " these authors refer to the findings from the period 1991 - 2001 that 
appear to show that acquiring firm's shareholders lost an aggregate $216bn, 50 times 
more than the aggregate lost in the 1980s merger boom from a mere six times more 
money spent. On close inspection, however, the majority of the loss can be attributed to 
deals struck in the Telecoms, Media and Technology (TMT) sector boom of 1998 - 
2001. The 'bad' deals were disproportionately value-destroying. Of the 4,136 
acquisitions that were made in the 1998 - 2001 period, 87 had an aggregate loss of 
$397bn versus an aggregate gain of $157bn for all other transactions. Because the 
extremely large loss deals could been assigned to firms that had become highly valued 
by the market for their previous acquisitions, Moeller concluded "acquiring firms 
strategy of growing through acquisitions is no longer sustainable and will not create as 
much value as theypreviously believed". 
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By contrast, Dobbs and colleagues of the strategy consulting firm McKinsey [2006] 
reported that their analysis of the current 'merger wave' is that, unlike the previous 
wave referred to in the Moeller study shareholders appear to be faring better this time 
round. Their analysis looked specifically at abnormal share prices in the two days prior 
to and after an announcement. The mix of deals is of course different, in terms of both 
bidder (more private equity-backed mergers) and targeted industries. However these two 
recent Papers serve to retain the lack of a common understanding in Finance regarding 
the merits of mergers and acquisitions. 
Financial Analysis 
Financial analysis is concerned with accounting and cash-based analysis of industries 
and firms that is usually conducted in the financial markets by experienced researchers. 
There is a body of work as discussed below that seeks to fill the gap in our 
understanding of the longer-term effects of mergers and acquisitions; used in 
conjunction with the event-based analysis of the academic Finance literature a more 
positive empirical understanding of the benefits of mergers begins to surface. 
Black [1989] described the case for integrating accounting research and share price data 
as "compelling". Healy, Palepu and Ruback [1992] find that merged firms experience 
improvements in asset productivity that is manifest in more favourable operating 
cashflow ratios relative to non-merging peers - even though post-merger cashflow is on 
average lower that the pre-merger case. The authors examined the post acquisition 
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performance of the 50 largest US mergers in the period 1979 - 1984. The size of the 
target firms were on average 42% of the size of the acquirers. Their study used the pro 
forma operating cash flow of the two merging firms for the period from five years prior 
to the year prior to the announcement and compared this to the operating cash flow 
delivered by the merged entity from year one to year five. 
The authors suggested a positive relationship between the post merger increase in 
operating cash flow and abnormal stock returns at the time the merger was announced. 
In so far as they could consider the details of the 50 mergers, those that were between 
overlapping businesses showed the greater cash flow improvements, although there 
were some exceptions. In their view the complexity and heterogeneity of the reasons for 
merger was an aspect that large scale studies would provide limited insight into and 
suggested that future research should rely on closer examination of a smaller number of 
mergers in greater detail. 
There have been calls for more use of financial analysis in anti-trust and merger cases. 
Indeed the CC has more recently been supplementing its workforce with accountants 
and the EC merger directorate has been recruiting staff with industry-specific 
knowledge. The OFT [1999] pointed out drawbacks in the use of stock market event 
studies in anti-trust and merger analysis. Specifically, observing positive abnormal 
returns in an event study analysis cannot distinguish between a merger that is expected 
to raise prices and one that is expected to lower costs. By the time of Interbrew's 
proposed acquisition of Bass Brewers [2001], the CC, 
having also dismissed 
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stockmarket-based analysis in previous cases, nevertheless drew on a financial analysis 
of cross-border brewing mergers to aid in the assessment of the question of market 
power versus efficiency gains. 
Steele [2002] analysed the controversial anti-trust investigation into the supply of 
banking services to small and medium-sized enterprises. That report saw extensive 
discussion on the use of accounting measures of profitability to infer monopoly profits, 
to which Steele had provided expert evidence as an accounting academic. Steele's work 
rebuts previous comments from the economist, Franklin Fisher that sought to undermine 
the CC investigation, and Steele's work. In Fisher's view: "There is a general question 
of whether one can in fact infer the presence of monopoly profits from accounting data, 
and in particular ftom the accounting rate of return ..... My 
firm opinion is in the 
negative ... ... ...... ... 
The fact that the Banking Review referred the SME banking case to 
the Competition Commission on the basis of profitability analysis is very disturbing". 
Notwithstanding Steele's work, criticism of the CC's use of accounting data to assess 
profitability remains controversial as discussed by Colley [2004]. 
3.3.5. Discussion of the Strategy and Finance literature 
Despite the extensive and well -established nature of Strategy and Finance research there 
remains a general perception that the role of mergers and acquisitions in firm and 
industry growth and development is far from understood. The NBER sought to address 
what it saw as a significant gap in the literature and the understanding of mergers and 
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acquisitions by the use of a major case-study based research programme. Its editor, 
Kaplan [2000] states: 
"Large sample studies - whether accounting-based or stock-based - cannot possibly 
capture the richness of the economic effects of mergers. And, with somefrequency, those 
large sample measures will not even capture the direction of the economic effect..... In 
sum, the voluminous economics, finance and strategy literatures on takeovers during the 
past twenty years offer little insight to practitioners or academics on what managers do 
to influence whether mergers succeed orfail" 
Kaplan and his colleagues sought to offer "probing analyses of high-profile mergers in a 
variety of industries" based on a series of case studies. Andrade [2001] however 
concluded that the case studies did not generate substantial insights into exactly how 
mergers and acquisitions created value, and consequently assessed the Kaplan work as 
largely failing to deliver against its objectives, commenting: "The studies revealed 
richness in economic data surrounding mergers that cannot be captured by large- 
sample studies. But, these studies did not generate substantial insights into exactly how 
mergers create value and therefore do not fill the gap as intended This area of 
investigation is wide open, spanning fields of Corporate Finance, Industrial 
Organisation, Organisations and Strategy" 
In the previous section the role of Economics in mergers and acquisitions was discussed 
and a gap was identified in the literature regarding 'portfolio effects'. In a letter to the 
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Financial Times, entitled "Markets serve consumers' interests better than the antitrust 
lawyers do" F Smith, Director, Consumer Alert [Financial Times, Monday December 6 
2004] offers a thou ght-provoking consumer perspective on the anti-trust process. He 
claims "regulators are not very good at understanding novel practices - creative ways 
of restructuring traditional activities and distribution systems ........ antitrust enforcers 
assume that thefuture will be static rather than dynamic" 
With anti-trust and competition policy relying heavily on the SCP tradition that 
originated in Economics, the comments of Professor Yarrow, Director of the Regulatory 
Policy Institute at the 'Oxford Competition Policy Conference', 2004, are illustrative. 
He identified a "problem in economics" that could only be filled by what he described as 
the time-consuming process of looking back through the history of interactions with the 
authorities that the evolution of an industry can be evaluated. Porter [1991], in 
repositioning his research away from its pure SCP origins claimed previously: "(I) 
concluded that detailed longitudinal case studies, covering long periods of time were 
necessary to study these phenomena (dynamic aspects offirm strategy) ..... to 
develop 
confidence about the appropriate variables and their influence on outcomes. This style 
of research nudges strategy research and industrial organization into the world of the 
historian". 
If a firm develops a skill in transacting successfully repeated mergers perhaps the RBV 
comes closest to bridging the gap between firms and their external interactions. If 
portfolios of brands are built over time through successive mergers this calls for 
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repeated interaction with the competition policy framework and it is likely to become a 
core skill for a firm in building a longer term competitive advantage in its industry. This 
might also go some way to explain why firms seem to be ignorant of the wide pool of 
Finance literature that tells them that mergers and acquisitions fail to add value. Event 
study analysis considers mergers as a snapshot in time but does not consider mergers 
and acquisitions within the same pool of firms over time. Financial Analysis informs the 
debate in that the stockmarket's short-term reaction (abnormal returns') may not give 
the correct longer term appraisal for the impact of mergers on firm performance. 
This thesis attempts to address the gaps in the understanding of the interaction between 
the competition authorities and firms that shape not only their own structure but that of 
the industry within which they operate. The following sections outline the key literature 
in discriminant analysis and case study methodology, the techniques that are employed 
to develop corporate strategy to incorporate this key interaction. 
3.4. Methodology literature 
3.4.1. Discriminant analysis literature 
Discriminant analysis is one of a set of multivariate statistical techniques that have 
evolved to capture relationships between qualitative and quantitative variables. 
Multivariate analysis has become increasingly popular in areas of social science such as 
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business and politics where researchers seek to capture the dynamics of open systems 
without compromising statistical rigour and objectivity. 
The objective of all discriminant analysis is to classify cases into two or more mutually 
exclusive groups based on a set of observed characteristics. It has been used extensively 
in the area of consumer credit, specifically the assessment of individuals as either good 
or bad credit risks. More recently its application to other economic and financial 
problems has brought a wider acceptance of what is a powerful and intuitive analytical 
tool. 
According to Myers and Forgy [1963], the first published study that dealt with credit 
rating systems was conducted under the auspices of the NBER in 1941. Employing 
discriminant analysis, its analyst, Durand, developed weighting systems for individual 
loan accounts with commercial banks and other credit providers. The origin of such 
discrimination between groups in a population was introduced in statistics by Fisher in 
1936, using examples from biological science. 
Durand's work was followed by similar analysis of department store card accounts and 
car dealerships. With varying degrees of accuracy in prediction of poor credit risk, the 
numerical rating systems developed allowed an improvement in purely subjective or 
judgmental approaches to evaluating credit. 
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Extending this early work and using a dataset of 300 cases of 'good accounts' and 300 
cases of 'repossessions' for the Universal Finance Company, a firm that purchased 
conditional sales contracts on mobile homes, Myers and Forgy developed a series of 
discriminant models. The models not only split the dataset on the basis of some 21 
predictive variables (such as age, marital status, bank account holder) but allowed the 
client firm to assess prediction within scoring quartiles; a feature that was particularly 
useful among the least credit worthy customers. 
Since these early examples from the US, the use of computer-aided scoring systems in 
consumer credit decisions has advanced rapidly, in the US, UK and other countries. In a 
review of statistical classification methods used in consumer credit industry Hand and 
Henley [1997] attribute this to the economic pressures resulting from the increased 
demand for credit allied with greater commercial competition. Developments in 
computer technology have allowed the introduction of wide scale sophisticated 
statistical modelling. Underpinning much of the credit scoring industry is discriminant 
analysis. Datasets typically contain more than 100,000 individual cases, with data on 
100 separate variables. However, it is common to find that across individual cases there 
is an incomplete set of information on all variables that is there are substantial missing 
values. 
A recent appraisal of forecasting consumer defaults and credit scoring by Thomas 
[2000], discusses the 'next generation' discriminant models that allow banks and finance 
institutions to not only identify creditwor-thy consumers, but also those that are 
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profitable to lend to. Notwithstanding the scale of the datasets available to lending 
institutions there is an inherent bias in the sample. Data is available on consumers that 
have been denied credit, but it is not usually possible to discover whether or not these 
consumers would have been good, that is profitable, clients with the benefit of time. 
Moreover, other modifications to the simple good risk/bad risk discriminant models 
include when and by how much additional credit should be granted to existing 
customers. 
A newer popular financial area that has employed discriminant analysis techniques is the 
prediction of corporate failure and the identification of takeover targets using widely 
available accounting and financial ratios. The former, in its guise as the stockmarket 
valuation technique known as 'Z scores', was a popular tool with investors in the early 
1990s. However, notwithstanding apparently high (99%) success rates Lin and Piesse 
[2004] have pointed to the demanding assumptions of such models with regard to the 
variable and model selection process as well as the distributional characteristics of the 
sample data. Work by Barnes [2000] on takeover prediction concluded that when 
comparing the efficacy of logit and discriminant models it was the choice of the form of 
the data - industry-relative versus raw accounting data by firm - that was more 
important than the choice of the statistical technique used. He concluded that the ability 
to predict takeover targets consistently in the UK using historical cost accounting data 
was poor regardless of the choice of estimating technique. 
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Whilst finance has been the most common field that has employed discriminant 
analysis, there are other significant and important social areas for which it can be 
extremely useful. Klecka [1980] illustrates the use of the technique in what was then a 
topical social problem, hostage-taking. His example studied the outcome of terrorist 
activity where there was a positive outcome from hostage taking even though the 
terrorists' demands had not been met. He hypothesized several variables as good 
predictors of safe release versus injury and/or execution of hostages, for example, the 
number of terrorists, the ratio of terrorists to hostages, tone of their rhetoric and whether 
they were an independent group or part of a larger militant network. 
Though clearly building on the well established application of discriminant analysis in 
financial and banking areas it is believed that this work is the first example of the 
technique in an application to merger policy and corporate strategy. It could prove a 
valuable tool in that it would remove the over-reliance on econometric models that are 
highly dependent on numerical datasets, such as scanner data, that are notoriously 
unreliable. It would allow a wider set of both qualitative and quantitative data to be used 
simultaneously in the decision process. 
3.4.2. Case study literature 
Over the past thirty years the case study has become a commonly used methodology in 
the social sciences, in particular to address complex business problems. It is often the 
method of choice to answer questions "how" and "why" in examining contemporary 
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events, but where the investigator has no direct control over the relevant events and 
behaviour. The case study methodology relies on many of the same techniques as a 
historical textual analysis but it adds two sources of evidence; direct observation of the 
events being studied and interviews with the persons involved in the events. The unique 
strength of the case study as a method is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence 
- documents, artefacts, interviews and observations. 
The case study methodology and its applicability to addressing complex business issues 
is not without major criticism. The study of a small number of cases is frequently 
questioned as a basis from which to establish reliability or to generalise to other 
situations and environments. Critics point out that the researcher frequently loses 
objectivity with the intense exposure to case-specific material and personnel. The 
proponents of the method, such as Yin [2003] counter: 
44 case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not 
to populations or universes ... in 
doing a case study your goal will be to expand and 
generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalisation)" 
Case studies, like other research strategies, are ways of investigating an empirical topic 
by following a set of pre-specified procedures. To build a defence to the more common 
criticisms of rigour, multiple case studies tend to be preferred: Analytical conclusions 
arising from two or more studies present a general cross-check on the validity of the 
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analysis, whether confirmatory or contradictory. The logic underlying the use of 
multiple-case studies is the same. Each case must be selected carefully so that it either 
predicts similar results ('literal replication') or contrasting results but for predictable 
reasons ('theoretical replication'). 
Yin [2003], argues that a well-trained and experienced investigator is needed to conduct 
a high-quality case study because of the continuous interaction between the theoretical 
issues being studies and the data being collected. He recommends the use of a 'Case 
Study Protocol' to increase the reliability of the research, with separate sections that 
outline the case study project, case study questions, data sources, analysis and field 
procedures and the use and presentation of data and documentation. Table 3.4. 
summarises the six separate sources of evidence most commonly used in case studies. 
Table 3.4. Sources of evidence used in case studies 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Stable - can be reviewed repeatedly 
Unobtrusive - not created as a result of Retrievability - can be low 
the case study Biased selectivity if collection is incomplete 
Documentation Exact - contains exact names, references Reporting bias - reflects (unknown) bias of 
and details of an event author 
Broad coverage - long span of time, many Access - may be deliberately blocked 
events and many Settings 
Archival Records As above 
for documentation As above for documentation 
Precise and quantitative Accessibility due to privacy reasons 
Targeted - focuses directly on case study 
Bias due to poorly constructed questions 
topic Response bias Interviews Insightful - provides perceived causal 
Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
inferences Reflexivity - interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear 
Time-consuming 
Selectivity - unless broad coverage 
Direct Observations Reality - covers events in real bme Reflexivity - event may proceed differenfly 
Contextual - covers context of event because it is being observed 
Cost - hours needed by human observers 
As above for direct observations As above for direct observations 
Participant-Observation Insightful into interpersonal behaviour and Bias due to investigator's manipulation of 
motives events 
Physical Artefacts 
Insightful into cultural features Selectivity 
Insightful into technical operations Availability 
Source: Yin (20031 
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In the two case studies presented in this thesis the researcher performed the role of 
Participant-Observation as described in Appendix I- 
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Chapter 4. Discriminant analysis 
A fundamental premise of a growth strategy based on mergers and acquisitions is that a 
firm cannot pursue this objective indefinitely without the path being blocked in some 
way by the interjection of one or more competition authorities. Once firms achieve 
sufficient scale, all but the smallest of subsequent acquisitions are liable for a full-scale 
investigation, modification and potential obfuscation by the authorities. With 
increasingly sophisticated and complex analysis being employed to identify and stop 
potential anti -competitive practices firms need to recognise and anticipate the outcome 
of interactions with the competition authorities. 
Scottish & Newcastle and Diageo (and its former constituent parties, Grand 
Metropolitan and Guinness) have been especially active in the merger process, latterly 
expanding cross-border as they have sought to become leading international alcoholic 
beverages firms. A central proposition of this thesis is that both Scottish & Newcastle 
and Diageo turned their ability to manage interactions with competition authorities into 
a source of long term competitive advantage. By contrast their major UK competitors, 
partly due to an inability to interact as successfully with the authorities have been forced 
to downsize or exit from the alcoholic beverages industry. 
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The merger process may be an especially important aspect of corporate strategy for 
firms operating in mature consumer product markets where brands, portfolios and 
distribution capabilities are critical success factors that can only be developed over a 
long period of time. If it follows that interaction with the competition authorities is 
crucial to growth it is logical to ask what factors a firm can exploit to maximise its 
chances of success in those interactions. 
The UK alcoholic beverages industry and its firms present an ideal test case from which 
to explore these factors. The industry has been a 'special interest' sector for the UK (and 
other) government for many generations because of its importance as an employer and 
source of tax revenues, both domestically and internationally from Scotch whisky 
exports. Consequently there is a long and detailed history of reports and enquiries that 
track the progress of the firms from regional and domestic vertically integrated 
brewer/retailers to multinational brand marketing firms with global distribution and 
extensive product portfolios. 
A rich database of well documented anti-trust and competition authority investigations 
into proposed mergers and acquisitions also exists. The longevity of the UK alcoholic 
beverages sector and its major firms means that it is Possible to observe several mergers 
and acquisitions by the same firm that have been investigated by both the same and 
different regulatory authorities (and individual regulators) over time. Each inquiry 
brings together industry, market and firm quantitative data, questionnaire information 
and the views, mainly qualitative, of suppliers, competitors and customers. 
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4.1. Discriminant analysis technique and methodology 
The richness of the data pertaining to the alcoholic beverages industry presents an 
opportunity to construct a more complex and dynamic model of anti-trust and merger 
policy than could be achieved from either purely qualitative (case study) or purely 
quantitative (econometric) analysis. The remainder of this chapter describes the 
application of a multivariate statistical analysis technique, discriminant analysis, to a 
dataset of qualitative and quantitative factors assembled during the collection of material 
for the case studies presented in the following chapters. 
4.1.1. Technique 
Discriminant analysis is a multivariate statistical technique that estimates the 
relationship between a single nonmetric (categorical) dependent variable and a set of 
metric independent variables. For example the categorical variables in this analysis are 
'Referred' or 'Not Referred', 'Transacted' or 'Not Transacted'. The independent 
variables are a mixture of qualitative and quantitative variables that are entered in either 
metric or non-metric (entered as dummy variables in binary form). The process of 
discriminant analysis modelling is shown schematically in Table 4.1. 
Discriminant analysis is particularly useful when the researcher is interested either in 
understanding group differences (profile analysis) or in classifying correctly a number 
of objects into separate groups (prediction). It is appropriate in situations where there is 
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a single categorical dependent variable and several metrically scaled independent 
varia es. Described as an equation it yields a model of the form: 
'Z' Score = a*(Variable 1) + b*(Variable 2) + c*(Variable 3)... +u 
The terms 'a, b, c ... 1 are known as the 'discriminant weights' similar to the estimated 
regression coefficients in multiple regression; u is a constant. The equation known as the 
'discriminant function' represents the combination 'variants' (a*Variable 1; b*Variable 
2 and so forth) that maximise the among-groups variation relative to the within-groups 
variation. For prediction purposes once the discriminant model has been constructed, 
new cases can be classified as belonging to one group or the other based on their 
'discriminant score' termed the 'Z' score. 
Table 4.1. Discriminant analysis process 
Stage Analysis Key Issues/Factors 
Evaluate group differences on a multivariate profile 
One Research Problem Classify observations into groups 
Identify dimensions of discrimination between groups 
Selection of independent variables 
Two Research Design Issues Sam le size considerations 
Creation of analysis and holdout samples 
Normality of independent variables 
Linearity of relationships Three Assumptions Lack of multicollinearity among independent variables 
Equal dispersion matrices 
F i Simultaneous or stepwise estimation unct on Estimation of Dischminant Siqnificance of discriminant function 
Four Determine optimal cutting score 
Assess Predictive Accuracy Speci criterion for assessing hit ratio 
Statistical significance of predictive accuracy 
Discriminant weights 
Five Evaluation of Discriminant Function Discriminant loadings 
Partial F values 
l Split-sample or cross-validation Six ts Validation of Discriminant Resu Profiling group differences 
Source: Adapted ftom Hair, JA et al 'Multivariate Data Analysis', Sixth Edition [2006] 
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The objective of the analysis is to maximise the discrimination between groups by 
setting a discriminant weight for each variable that maximises the between-group 
variance relative to the within-group variance. Typically the analysis is run in a stepwise 
fashion which allows variables to enter, exit and re-enter the prediction equation to 
enhance its efficacy. The statistical test is to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference in the means of the discriminant scores of the two groups. 
Typically a 'classification summary table' is also generated from known group 
membership that calculates the percentage of correctly classified cases in each group - 
the 'hit ratio'. In essence the hit ratio describes the efficacy of the discriminant model in 
the same way that the R2 statistic gives the 'goodness of fit' in multiple regression 
analysis. For the model to be meaningful the hit ratio must exceed, in a statistically 
significant way, the value that would be obtained from a random chance assignment of 
objects to one of two groups. 
4.1.2. Computer software and hardware 
In its original use as a credit scoring tool, mainframe computers were used to analyse 
small groups of cases with few variables. However, with the advent of low cost desk top 
computing power and specialist statistical software packages, discriminant analysis is 
now accessible to a far wider range of users and can be readily applied to problems 
involving large numbers of objects and variables. 
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The software used to produce all of the analysis presented in this chapter was SPSS 13.0 
for Windows, Version 13.01 (12 Dec 2004) running in a Microsoft Windows XP Home 
Edition 5.1.2600 operating system environment. The software and all of the data was 
stored and run on a Dell Dimension 8300 desktop computer with an Intel 9 Pentium ID 
4CPU 3.20 Ghz processor and 2048 NIB RAM. Running time for each model was less 
than 10 seconds which permitted rapid data processing and testing. 
The original SPSS model outputs run to some 200 pages in total so summary tables are 
included in this chapter for ease of reading. The original outputs are available from the 
author on request. 
4.2. Case definition and data capture 
4.2.1. The analytical objective 
It is assumed that the best possible outcome for any firm wishing to merge with or 
acquire another firm is for the transaction not to be referred to the comPetition 
authorities. Clearly, if a referral can be avoided then there is no regulatory barrier to it 
succeeding. Firms save the management time and costs of an enquiry. Lengthy enquires 
can give competitors several opportunities to attack the merging firms' market positions 
aggressively while its management is otherwise occupied. In addition, and in particular 
in the case of hostile bids, the target firm has ample time to deploy various tactics to 
thwart the bid. 
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The primary objective of this analysis is therefore to identify what factors lead to merger 
and acquisition cases being either 'Referred or 'Not Referred' to the competition 
authorities. Not all referrals lead to a bid being blocked by the regulatory authorities, 
and not all cleared bids then lead to completed mergers. Firms frequently point to 
lengthy investigations effectively derailing the merger process. Consequently there are 
bids that lapse even though they have regulatory clearance. Other bids have succeeded 
following a referral because they are cleared with or without the need for significant 
structural and/or behavioural remedies. 
If a merger or acquisition is referred to the competition authorities then the second best 
outcome, as opposed to not being referred at all, is for that referral to lead to the 
transaction being allowed to proceed with few if any remedies or restrictions being 
applied. The secondary objective of this analysis is therefore to identify what factors 
lead to a case being 'Transacted' or 'Not Transacted following a referral. 
4.2.2. Case definition 
A dataset containing detailed numerical and structural information on more than 40 
separate alcoholic beverages merger and acquisition cases has been assembled that 
cover all those proposed and completed by the major UK drinks firms that were in 
existence at the time of the first anti-trust investigation into brewing and pub retailing in 
1969. That is, Allied-Lyons, Bass, Grand Metropolitan, Guinness, Scottish & Newcastle 
and Whitbread. It includes purely UK brewing transactions, cross-border brewing 
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transactions, UK spirits transactions and cross-border spirits transactions as well as 
subsequent transactions between those categories spanning the four decades beginning 
in 1969. Additional UK cases, Hiram Walker's hostile approach for Highland 
Distilleries that was referred and Highland Distillers' agreed bid for Macallan-Glenlivet 
are also included because they were concerned specifically with the change of 
ownership of key Scotch malt distilleries and brands. 
The merger of Grand Metropolitan and Guinness to form Diageo, Diageo's acquisition 
of the bulk of the spirits assets of Seagram and Pernod Ricard's acquisition of Allied 
Domecq are each viewed as two separate cases given that both were investigated 
separately by the FTC and EC, with different evidence presented and slightly different 
outcomes. 
During the process of the separation of brewing and retailing assets that followed the 
second beer supply anti-trust investigation in 1989 (the 'Beer Orders') divestment of 
major brewer-owned pub estates created a new group of pub companies that through 
merger have now become large independent (quoted in the FTSE 100 or FTSE 250) 
firms in their own right. Their mergers have been omitted from the list, since they do not 
involve alcoholic beverage production and have often been accompanied by complex 
mortgage-backed security financing arrangements. The exception is the 1999 acquisition 
of Allied Domecq's retail operation, first proposed by Whitbread, but transacted by 
Punch Taverns because of the controversy that surrounded the two approaches. 
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The acquisitions of Greene King and Wolverhampton and Dudley Breweries, in 
existence as 'Regional Brewers' at the time of the 1989 MMC investigation have also 
been omitted. Although both firms had grown aggressively by acquisition of smaller 
rivals such that they now have operating structures that resemble the pre 'Beer Orders' 
Whitbread or Scottish & Newcastle, none of their acquisitions have been contested by 
the authorities. 
4.2.3. Defining the dependent variables 
To address the primary analytical objective, the 40 cases comprising the full dataset 
were split into two groups; Referred and Not Referred regardless of jurisdiction or 
combination of jurisdictions of the competition authorities to which the cases were 
referred 
In assigning cases to Referred and Not Referred groups some clarification is necessary. 
A Referred case in the UK results from an OFT decision to refer a merger for full 
investigation by the CC. In the US it results from the decision by the FTC to carry out a 
detailed investigation of the 'relevant market'. In Europe it results from the decision to 
proceed to a Phase 2 investigation. If a LTK merger went ahead without a referral to the 
CC it is in the Not Referred group. Similarly if the FTC cleared the bid without any 
investigation and the EC deemed that it was in keeping with EU Competition law at 
Phase I of an investigation that would also be a Not Referred case. 
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To address the secondary analytical objective, the Referred dataset was subdivided into 
two further subgroups; Transacted and Not Transacted. Again the jurisdiction of the 
competition authorities that the cases were referred to was ignored. 
The possibility that success factors might vary when dealing with competition 
authorities in different jurisdictions was also considered by re-running the analysis with 
cases involving only UK competition authorities. This 'UK Only' analysis therefore 
excluded any cases that had involved either EU and/or US competition authorities. The 
cases which did not involve the UK competition authorities were also analysed in the 
same way as the All Cases and UK Only Cases models except that there are insufficient 
instances of cases where the case had been referred but then subsequently did not 
transact to produce a statistically valid result to address the secondary analytical 
question (one of four referred cases was blocked). 
Hair et al provide guidelines on the ideal ratio of sample size, that is, number of cases to 
the number of independent variables that is needed for a discriminant analysis model to 
be useful statistically. If the sample size is too small, differences in the data may just 
reflect sampling error. Conversely if the sample size is too large, all differences 
identified in the data may appear significant even though in practice they are irrelevant 
to the problem being addressed. Many discriminant analysis studies have suggested a 
ratio of 20 observations for each predictor variable, albeit this ideal may be difficult to 
achieve in practice. At a bare minimum Hair suggests five observations Per independent 
variable. 
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The sample size of each category must also be considered. At a minimum the smallest 
group size of a category must exceed the number of independent variables, with each 
category as a 'practical guideline' comprising 20 observations. Moreover, ideally the 
categories should be of approximately equal sizes to avoid an inherent over- 
classification of the larger group. Table 4.2 summarises the numbers of cases included 
in each of the model groups and subgroups in this analysis. 
Table 4.2. Discriminant analysis group and subgroup sizes 
Model I Number of Cases 
All Cases 
Original Cases 40 
Referred 16 
Not Referred 24 
Transacted after Referral 7 
Not Transacted after Referral 9 
UK Only Cases 
Original Cases 26 
Referred 12 
Not Referred 14 
Transacted after Referral 4 
Not Transacted after Referral 8 
Non-UK Cases 
Original Cases 14 
Referred 4 
Not Referred 10 
Transacted after Referral 3 
Not Transacted after Referral 1 
4.2.4. Defining the independent variables 
For discriminant analysis to be effective, it is essential that independent variables are 
chosen that a priori are expected to be Potentially good predictors of the outcome. For 
example, when trying to predict corporate bankruptcy it would be rational to start with C) 
variables such as profits, sales and costs. However, in many cases, the problem being 
modelled is more complex and the data less discrete than this. It is therefore common to 
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find other multivariate techniques such as factor analysis or cluster analysis employed 
first to reduce and order the data into a smaller number of intuitive variables before 
conducting discriminant analysis. This is particularly the case where, for example, raw 
data has been collected from a questionnaire and where the researcher does not have a 
detailed understanding of possible relationships between variables. 
In the study presented here, the number of potential variables is not large and as the data 
has been extracted largely from published documents such as CC investigation 
summaries and annual reports and accounts the dataset has by its nature been subject to 
prior reduction and sorting. Therefore, the author did not consider it necessary to pre- 
treat the data further before performing the discriminant analysis. 
The independent variables in the analysis presented here were generally observable 
directly from the raw data and include: 
i. Market shares of bidder and target firms; 
ii. Market prices of the relevant products at the time of the merger; 
Political and structural variables, for example, donations to various political 
parties, and whether the merger was agreed or hostile; and 
iv. Financial performance statistics for bidder and target firms. 
The primary source of raw data that was used to assemble the independent variables was 
original documentation published by the CC, EC and FTC after each merger 
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investigation. These contain a detailed market analysis with the UK documents also 
supplying a rudimentary financial analysis of the firms. Substantial quantitative and 
qualitative commentary from competitors, suppliers, buyers, trade union and other 
related industry groups is also included in UK reports. In addition, individuals, several 
of whom have held senior positions in the industry have usually written comments to 
mergers in their own capacity. The sheer scale of commentary published by the CC after 
its enquiries has rarely been available in investigations carried out by the US and 
European authorities. However, the EC has often provided more comprehensive market 
analysis, in particular for the major cross-border spirits mergers. In aggregate there were 
a combined 40 official documents from the CC, EC, FTC and DoJ. Whilst nearly all of 
these documents are now available to download from the various official websites, the 
early UK documents were read initially in the archive section of the Oxford University 
Bodleian Library. 
Where a merger or acquisition proceeded without the intervention of the competition 
authorities, financial and market share analysis was captured from contemporaneous 
documentation, such as annual reports and accounts and industry/trade surveys. Recent 
(from the mid 1990s to date) annual reports and accounts are available online on each 
firm's website. Prior to this, back copies of most firms' accounts have been accessed 
from the archives at the London Business School, the British Library and the University 
of Strathclyde. 
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In total more than two hundred annual reports and accounts were accessed (up to 37 
years for each of the six major UK firms, plus several years just prior to merger for 
some 20 target firms). With the exception of a few missing years, report and accounts 
were available for the six major UK alcoholic beverages firms, Allied Domecq, Bass, 
Grand Metropolitan, Guinness, Scottish & Newcastle and Whitbread for the period 1969 
to the point at which they ceased to exist (Allied Domecq in 2005, Bass in 2003, 
Guinness and Grand Met separately in 1997). The author downloaded as PDF files 
annual report and accounts for the major UK firms. They are generally available from 
1999 to date, with some earlier reports in some cases (Allied Domecq from 1994, 
Pemod Ricard from 1987). 
The author also utilised more than 20 of her previous industry publications, written in 
her career as a City investment analyst in the period 1992 - 1999. A further 10 market 
research reports, including those of industry bodies such as the Scotch Whisky 
Association, the Gin & Vodka Association of Great Britain, the British Beer and Pub 
Association were relied on in the analysis. Finally there were an additional 32 firm press 
documents and press releases accessed, some of which were viewed from their websites. 
A full list of all of the documents that were read and absorbed into the database is 
contained at the end of the Bibliography. Table 4.3. summarises the variables that form 
the dataset for discriminant analysis. A full set of dependent and independent variable 
values for each case in the dataset is shown in Table 4.4. The independent variables are 
described in more detail in the next section of this chapter. 
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4.3. Independent variables 
4.3.1. Dominance and market price variables 
Market shares 
There are four separate variables that fall into this category: 
i. Bidder % Market: Acquiring firm percentage share of an economic market. This is 
one that the merging firms and industry both recognise as a discrete market. For 
example, in the Scottish & Newcastle acquisition of Courage it would be UK beer 
sales. In the case of Hiram Walker's proposed acquisition of Highland Distilleries 
it would be control of malt distilleries (whisky fillings). 
Target % Market: The same as above for the target's market share prior to the 
merger. 
iii. Market Leader %: The market share of the industry leader (the bidder, target or 
another firm) at the time of the merger. 
iv. PM Dominance: A categorical variable, taking a Yes = 1, or No =0 value 
depending on whether post merger the firm has a 25% share or more of what would 
be defined (or was defined in the case of an official investigation) of an anti-trust 
'relevant market'. An example of a 'relevant market' was vermouth in Greece in 
Grand Met )s acquisition of Cinzano. 
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The method that the regulatory authorities have used for calculating market share has 
changed several times over the period covered by this study. This reflects the evolution 
of policy, the quantity and type of data that is available and the increasing ability to 
handle and manipulate data and information using computers. In the very early UK beer 
inquiries, total share of beer production and sales tended to be the extent of the market 
analysis. In the latter part of the 1980s the MMC moved to differentiating between sales 
to the on-trade and off-trade against the backdrop of the rapid demise of pub beer 
consumption. 
By the mid 1990s the 'relevant market' was divided into share of ale and lager, in 
recognition of the fact that lager had replaced ale as the drink of choice. By the time of 
Interbrew's proposed acquisition of Bass Brewers in 2000, in common with the trends in 
the US HHIs were calculated on a national and television region basis and brand 
portfolios were analysed in depth, with shares of more narrowly defined categories 
derived, for example, premium and standard lager, and national and international 
brands. 
In the spirits industry, the increased scale and scope of acquisitions has led to joint 
and/or simultaneous investigation by both the US and EC authorities. The investigation 
into the 2001 acquisition by Diageo and Pernod Ricard of Seagram's spirits operation 
was hailed as a triumph of cross-border co-operation. Yet the coordinated approach had 
to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate US-style economic analysis that does not 
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recognise 'portfolio effects' with European analysis that does (at least prior to the recent 
ECJ and CH appeal decisions in Tetra Laval and GE/Honeywell, discussed above). 
As far as the FTC is concerned spirits categories are pre-set and recognised by 
consumers, with brands sitting neatly within category definitions as narrow as premium 
rum or deluxe Scotch. In most cases this defines the market for anti-trust purposes 
around no more than two or three brands. In the Diageo/Seagram merger, the FTC was 
concerned specifically with a potential duopoly in rum between Bacardi and Diageo 
post-merger. Specifically, as it has elucidated recently in Commentary on the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, [2006]: "Although a smaller rival before the merger, Diageo's 
Malibu imposed a significant competitive constraint on Seagram's and Bacardi" 
Conversely the FTC takes a much looser stance on defining the geographic market as 
the whole of the US, notwithstanding the fact that there is state-level regulation of 
wholesaling and retailing of alcohol that acts as a barrier to the flow of products across 
state boundaries. In the Diageo/Seagram acquisition the EC concluded that where a 
system akin to the US 'Control States' exists such as that in some Scandinavia countries 
it creates significant supply and pricing inertia that cannot be eroded by legitimate 
paralleling. The EC has sought remedies from the parties accordingly. 
Following the merger of Grand Met and Guinness in 1997, the subsequent large-scale 
spirits mergers have come with ready-made remedies, carving up the portfolios to head 
off criticism of too many brands or too much perceived market share in any part of the 
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portfolio. In the US this has had to accommodate very narrow and somewhat illogical 
(to the industry and its consumers) category definitions, whereas in Europe the key has 
been to concede distribution in certain countries by granting a third party competitor 
distribution rights over one or more brands. The precedent having been set in Diageo 
and Pernod Ricard's joint bid for Seagram (with prior learning from the 1997 merger 
that formed Diageo), this structure has now been copied successfully by Pernod Ricard 
with partner with Fortune Brands in its cleared bid for Allied Domecq. 
Table 4.5 summarises all market share information that was collected from CC, FTC 
and EC investigation reports for every merger and acquisition. Data was also taken from 
the two anti-trust investigations into the UK beer industry (in 1969 and 1989). In 
addition, the author relied on data that had been supplied either directly from the firms 
or from trade data and sources at the time and that was then reproduced in commercial 
research documents that are listed in the Bibliography. 
Market price 
There is one variable in this category: 
i. Real Prices: The real (inflation adjusted) percentage change in price of the product 
in the year prior to the announcement of the acquisition. This therefore adjusted for 
the level of retail price inflation in the country of the acquisition. 
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Gaining accurate and consistent Price data is by no means an easy task. Of all of the 
variables used in this analysis, a researcher would develop reluctantly an argument 
based solely or primarily on it. Original evidence is almost impossible to verify, not 
least because of the impact of retrospective discounting that is a routine feature of 
consumer goods industries. There is secrecy in a firm's pricing policy. It does not 
account for structural shifts in quality, including differences in alcohol content that have 
been a feature of the beer industry. This is more the shame because it is such a crucial 
variable for competition authorities to understand fully and from which to derive 
decisions about market power 
Generally the CC has considered the impact of a brewing merger on retail prices only. In 
the UK brewing industry prior to the dismantling of the vertical tie there was limited 
difference between the change in wholesale and retail beer prices. This is clearly no 
longer the case with the emergence of independent retail pub chains that buy centrally 
and then supply their own tied tenants. In addition the structural decline of the pub trade 
relative to off trade sales has seen the increasing importance of the major supermarket 
groups in forcing down wholesale prices. 
It is difficult to access accurate retail and wholesale prices that is consistent over time 
for both beer and spirits. The many complications that distort prices include the practice 
of granting retrospective discounts, the tendency to quote ýaverage' price that reflects a 
combination of genuine price and changes in mix (that is, it is not a 'like-for-like' 
comparison), the impact of excise taxes that distorts cross-border figures (some pricing I= 
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is net of tax while some is inclusive, depending on the buyer, the type of product and the 
location). There are organisations (International Wine & Spirits Record, Nielsen) that 
compile data directly from the firms and markets themselves, and on a brand-by-brand 
basis, but the cost of acquiring this is prohibitively expensive and often the information 
is restricted to industry participants. 
On the basis of documents that the author could access from the Scotch Whisky 
Association, the British Beer and Pub Association. and market research reports from 
firms such as Euromonitor that are held by The British Library in London on a read-only 
basis, various price series were compiled for beer and spirits that have been used as 
'estimates' of the pricing environment at the time of each investigation. The volume and 
value of exports of Scotch is presented in the annual statistics report from the Scotch 
Whisky Association and surnmarised in Table 4.6. This is wholesale and net of duty 
data, and has been used as a proxy for international spirits prices where market-specific 
data was not available. It is a crude estimate in that value does not distinguish between 
price and mix. 
UK wholesale beer, wines and spirits prices: this data has been used as the price base in 
UK only mergers and acquisitions. The information is supplied in the annual British 
Beer and Pub Association statistical handbook and surnmarised in Table 4.7. and Table 
4.8.. US spirits and European beer, wines and spirits: some limited data was available 
for the late 1990s to date from the various market research reports referred to 
previously. 
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Table 4.7. UK beer prices 
Year ear Beer PPI Bec Beer RPI hange % change All Items RPI % change W/sale Beer % Retail Beer % 
1964 
1965 
11 6 
8 6/, 
14.1 
14.8 5ý0% 3.7% 
1966 . 0 ý/, 4.0% 4 15.4 41% -0.1% 
1967 1' 3.1% 3 V, 15.8 2.6% 0 5% 
1968 0.7% 16.5 4.4% -3.7% 
1969 14.7 8.1% 17 4 5.5% 16% 
1970 15.8 7,5% 18.5 63% 1.2% 
1971 17.1 8.2% 20.3 9.7% -1.5% 
1972 18.0 5.3% 21.7 6.9% -1.6% 
1973 18.6 3.3% 23.7 9.2% -5.9% 
1974 20.8 11.8% 27.5 16.0% -4,2% 
1975 25ý8 24.0% 34.2 24.4% -0.3% 
1976 30.8 19.4% 39.8 16ý4% 3.0% 
1977 36.4 18.2% 46.1 15.8% 2.4% 
1978 39.5 8.5% 50.0 8.5% 0.1% 
1919 44.1 11,6% 56.7 114% -1.8% 
1980 54.4 23.4% 66.8 17.8 5.5% 
1981 37, 64.7 18.9% 74.8 120 7.0% 
1982 41.8 12.7% 72.9 12.7% 81 2 8,6% 4 1% 4.1% 
1983 44.8 7.2% 79.1 8.5% 85.0 4.7% 2,5% 3.8% 
1984 48.5 8.3% 85.4 8.0% 89.2 4.9% 3,3% 3.0% 
1985 52.5 8.2% 92.0 7.7% 94.6 6,1% 2.2% 1.7% 
1986 55.1 5.0% 97.3 5.8% 97,8 3.4% 1.6% 2.4% 
1987 57.0 3.4% 101.8 4.6% 101.9 4.2% -0.7% 0.4% 
1988 59.8 4.9% 108.0 6.1% 106.9 4.9% 0.0% 1.2% 
1989 62.8 5.0% 114.9 6.4% 115.2 7.8% -2.7% -1.4% 
1990 57. a 8.0% 126.4 100% 126.1 9.5% -1,5% 0.5% 
1991 _ 74 5 - 9.9% 142.6 12.8% 133.5 5.9% 4 0% 6.9% 
1992 79.3 6.4% 152.2 6.7% 138.5 3.7% 2.7% 3.0% 
1993 83.5 5.3% 160.1 5.2% 140.7 1.6% 3.7% 3.6% 
1994 88.6 6.1% 165.0 3.1% 1441 2.4% 3.7% 06% 
1995 92.7 4.6% 171.9 4.2% 149.1 3.5% 1.2% 0.7% 
1996 91.4 . 1.4% 177.9 3.5% 152.7 2.4% -3 
8% 1.1% 
1997 93.5 2.3% 184.4 3.7% 157.5 3.1% -0.8% 0.5% 
1998 97.0 3.7% 191.7 4.0% 162.9 3.4% 0.3% 0.5% 
1999 99.0 2.1% 197.8 3.2% 165.4 1.5% 0.5% 1.6% 
2000 100,0 1.0% 201.9 2.1% 170.3 3.0%- -10% -OA% 
2001 101.8 1.8% 206.6 2.3% 173.3 1.8%- 0.0% 0,6% 
2002 103.6 t8% 211.3 2.3% 176.2 1.7% -0.1% 
16% 
2003 105.2 1.5% 215.9 2.2% 181,3 2.9% -1.4% -0.7% 
- 2004 1 108.8 1 3.4% 1 220.3 2.0% 186.7 3.0% 1 0.4% T -0,9% 
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. able 4.8. UK wines and spirits prices 
Year 
1964 
1965 
W&SRPI 
22-2 
23.9 
% change 
7.7% 
All Items RPI 
14.1 
14.8 
% change 
5.0% 
W/sale W&S % 
-2.1% 
Retail W&S% 
2.7% 
1966 24.9 4.2% 15.4 4.1% 2.7% 0.1% 
1967 25.5 2.4% 15.8 2.6% -4,6% -0ý2% 
1968 26.1 2.4% 165 4A % 0. 8% -2.1% 
1969 27.8 6.5% 17.4 , 5.5% - 1.6% 1.1% 
1970 28.1 1.1% 18.5 6.3% -8.4% -5.2% 
1971 28.8 2,5% 20.3 9.7% -6.6% -7.2% 
1972 29.3 1.7% 21.7 6.9% -4 2% -5.2% 
1973 30.3 3.4% 23.7 9.2% -9.2% -5 8% 
1974 33.0 8.9% 27.5 16.0% -3.6% -7.1% 
1975 40.4 22.4% 34.2 24.4% -15.4% -1.9% 
1976 46.8 15.8% 39.8 16.4% 0.7% -&5% 
1977 51.8 10.7% 46.1 15.8% -1.0% -5.1% 
1978 54.0 4.2% 50ýO 8.5% 6.2% -4.2% 
1979 59.1 9.4% 56.7 13.4% -1.7% -4ý0% 
1980 68A 15.7% 66.8 17.8% -7.0% -2.1% 
1981 78.2 14.3% 74.8 12.0% -4.4% 2.4% 
1982 85.0 8.7% 81.2 8.6% -0.6% 0.1% 
1983 90.0 5.9% 85.0 4.7% 3.9% 1.2% 
1984 92.2 2.4% 89,2 4.9% 2.0% -2.5% 
1985 95.7 3.8% 94.6 6.1% 3.2% -2.3% 
1986 98.3 2.7% 97.8 3.4% -0.4% -0.7% 
1987 101.6 3.4% 101.9 _ 4.2% 0.2% -0.8% 
1988 105.3 3.6% 106.9 4.9% 5.9% -1ý3% 
1989 110.0 4.5% 115.2 7.8% T9% -3.3% 
1990 120.1 9.2% 126.1 9.5% 9.1% -0.3% 
1991 134.3 11.8% 133.5 5.9% 6.2% 6.0% 
1992 142.3 6.0% 138.5 3.7% 1.4% 2.2% 
1993 14T2 3.4% 140.7 1.6% -5A% 1.9% 
1994 149.6 1 ý6% 144.1 2.4% 4.2% -0.8% 
1995 154.3 3.1% 149.1 3.5% -35% -U% 
1996 157.3 1.9% 152.7 2.4%_ -0ý3% -0.5% 
1997 _ 159.4 1.3% 157.5 31% -5.7% -1ý8% 
1998 163.4 2.5% 162.9 3.4% -ito% -0.9% 
1999 166.1 1.7% 165.4 _ 1ý5%- -3.3% 
2000 167.6 0.9% 170.3 3.0% -3.8% -2.1% 
2001 170.6 1.8% 173.3 1.8% 2.2% 0.0% 
2002 174.5 2.3% 176.2 1.7% 0.6% 
2003 178.0 2.0% 181.3 2.9% -0.9% 
20F4 181.3 1.9% 186.7 30% -1 1 
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4.3.2. Political and structural variables 
There are four variables in this category, three of which are political and one structural. 
i. Bidder Donations: this is a categorical variable with Yes = 1, No =0 if the bidder 
was making donations to a UK political party. 
Target Donations: as above but where the target was making such donations. 
iii. Investigator: this is a continuous variable that represents the number of years that 
the investigating commissioner had been in post at the time he/she either cleared 
the merger or decided to refer it for further investigation. 
iv. Bid Type: this is a categorical variable with Yes = 1, No =0 if the merger was a 
hostile approach from the bidder to the target. 
Political Donations 
The alcoholic beverages industry has always had a political voice as a function of its 
role as a revenue generator, particularly through exports of Scotch whisky and a major 
employer. Previous merger cases have emphasised these points in attempting to stave 
off overseas suitors (Highland Distilleries defence against Hiram Walker, Allied-Lyons 
and Scottish & Newcastle against Elders IXL). Where regional brewers have been under 
attack from larger players, for example, in the case of Matthew Brown versus Scottish & 
Newcastle the operation of breweries and distribution depots in working-class areas - 
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and the potential threat of unemployment in a post-merger rationalization programme - 
has frequently been relied on as a blocking mechanism. 
It seems logical to include a variable that captures political donations for bidders and 
targets for UK merger cases. There is no evidence that donations to political parties 
were given specifically to influence a particular competition enquiry. Indeed donations 
tended to occur over a long period of time as part of a continuous lobbying campaign 
that gave the industry an opportunity to influence the political landscape and give it a 
voice during periods of significant merger and acquisition activity. During the 1990s 
there was a backlash against UK political donations and many previous Conservative 
party supporters stopped making them. This occurred before the election of a Labour 
government in 1997. Historically, 'The Beerage' has been inherently Conservative in its 
allegiances. There are no examples of donations to Labour- affiliated organisations. 
Table 4.9 has been compiled from all UK firms that feature as either bidders or targets 
in the discriminant analysis that donated to UK political parties in the period 1969 - 
2005. 
Ideally a similar variable would be included that tracked political donations in the US 
and Europe. However, disclosure requirements remain such that although there is more 
than a suspicion of the importance of political affiliations, the data and information are 
not available. Pressure is mounting for disclosure in the US. UK firms are increasingly 
seeking shareholder approval for still unspecified political donations in Europe and 
other jurisdictions. 
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Table 4.9. Political donations by firms 
Firm Year Party/Organisation Amount Ek 
1968 South West Industrial Council 1.1 
1969 South West Industrial Council 11 
1970 South West Industrial Council 1.1 
1971 South West Industrial Council 1.6 
1981 South West Industrial Council 1.5 
1981 British United Industdalists 70.0 
1988 Conservative Party 95.0 
Allied Brewedes/Allied Domecq 1988 South West Industrial Council 2.0 
1988 British United Industrialists 5.0 
1989 Conservative Party 95.0 
1989 South West Industrial Council 2.0 
1989 British United Industrialists 5.0 
1991 Conservative Party 110.0 
1994 No Donations 
1995 No Donations 
1972 British United Industnalists 4.0 
Watney Mann Economic League 0.6 
Halifax Conservative Association 0.1 
1984 Conservative & Unionist Party 1.3 
Highland Distillers 1990 Conservative & Unionist Party 4.5 
1992 Conservative & Unionist Party 7.0 
Bass 
1969 Party not specified 0.1 
1973- No Donations 
Guinness 
1974 Party not specified 
1983-91 No Donations 
1969 Conservative Party & Associations 8.0 
1981 Conservative Party & Associations 3.0 
tle S tti h&N 
1984 Conservative Party & Associations 10.0 
co s ewcas 
1992 Conservative Party & Associations 70.0 
1994 Conservative Parly & Associations 50.0 
1997 Conservative Party & Associations 50.0 
1969 Conservative Associations 20.8 
1971 Conservative Associations 0.5 
1971 Economic League 1.5 
1973 Conservative Associations 0.1 
1975 Conservative Associations 1.8 
1983 Economic League 5.4 
Whitbread 1984 Economic League 2.6 
1986 No Donations 
1987 No Donations 
1988 Party not specified 76.5 
1989 Conservatives 30.0 
1990 Conservatives 15.2 
1998- No Donations 
Arthur Bell 1984 No Donations 
Distillers 1984 Conservatives 50.0 
Greenalls 1994-99 North West Industrial Council 2.5 
Grand Met 1969- No Known Donations 
invergordon Distillers 1991 No Donations 
JW Cameron/Ellerman Lines 1981 No Known Donations 
Home Brewery 1986 No Known Donations 
Courage Group/Imperial Group 1982 No Known Donations 
Dv 1972 Conservative Associations 10.0 
Truman Hanbury Buxton 1971 Conservative & Unionist Association 0.2 
Bulmers 1998-2002 No Donations 
Unilever 1969 No Known Donations 
167 
It has always been the case that LTK donations have to be disclosed on the face of the 
annual report and accounts in line with donations to charities. It is not mandatory for UK 
firms to disclose payments to overseas political entities, including lobby firms in the US 
and Europe. However, major UK firms tend to make a general disclosure that they make 
such payments. Whilst donations to UK political parties are now less common the 
incidence of donations overseas has been rising. 
Investigator 
At the date of the announcement of each merger the number of years that the chief 
decision-maker had been in post might have an impact on whether the bid was referred 
or otherwise. It would be reasonable to expect that a person new to the job, seeing a 
complex and large deal would be more inclined to refer. However a countervailing force 
to clear early exists if a merger looked uncomplicated, more so if there were many other 
mergers pending in other sectors that might warrant more attention. While data is 
available that would show the workload of the authorities at every point over the 
duration of the dataset, collecting and collating the data, in particular for Europe and the 
US would be onerous. However, hostile bids have tended to be more prevalent during 
merger booms, and in this sense the bid structure variable should capture the essence of 
how busy the various regulators were at the time. 
The names, political affiliations and dates of office have been compiled from MMC/CC, 
FTC and EC websites for all key investigators that were responsible for overseeing the 
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mergers and acquisitions of the major UK alcoholic beverages firms in the 1969 - 2005 
period, are shown in Table 4.10. Exact dates and political affiliations are only available 
for UK and US investigators. The data was used to construct a variable of number of 
years in the post. 
Table 4.10. Key investigator's jurisdiction 
Year Appointed Name Party 
UK (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) 
1964 October Douglas Jay Labour 
1967 August Anthony Crossland Labour 
1969 October Roy Mason Labour 
1970 June Michael Noble Conservative 
1970 October John Davies Conservative 
1972 November Peter Walker Conservative 
1974 March Peter Shore Labour 
1976 April Edmund Dell Labour 
1978 November John Smith Labour 
1979 May John Nott Conservative 
1981 January John Biffen Conservative 
1982 April Lord Cockfield Conservative 
1983 June Cecil Parkinson Conservative 
1983 October Norman Tebbitt Conservative 
1985 September Leon Brittan Conservative 
1986 January PaulChannon Conservative 
1987 June Lord Young Conservative 
1989 July Nicholas Ridley Conservative 
1990 July Peter Lilley Conservative 
1992 April Michael Heseltine Conservative 
1995 July Ian Lang Conservative 
1997 May Margaret Beckett Labour 
1998 July Peter Mandelson Labour 
1998 December Stephen Byers Labour 
2001 June Patricia Hewitt Labour 
2005 May Alan Johnson Labour 
US (Chairman of Federal Trade Commission) 
1961 March Dixon Democrat 
1970 January Weinberger Republican 
1970 August Macintyre Democrat 
1970 September Kirkpatrick Republican 
1973 February Engman Republican 
1976 January Dixon Democrat 
1976 March Collier Republican 
1977 April Pertschuk Democrat 
1981 March Clanton Republican 
1981 September Miller Republican 
1985 October Calvani Republican 
1986 April Oliver Republican 
1989 August Steiger Republican 
1995 April Pitofsky Democrat 
2001 June Muns Republican 
2004 August Majoras Republican 
EU (European Competition Commissioner) 
1967 N/A Maan Sassen 
1971 N/A Albert Borschette 
1976 N/A Raymond Vouel 
1981 NIA Frans Andnessen 
1985 January Peter Sutherland 
1989 January Leon Brittan 
1995 January Karel van Mierl 
1999 September Mario Monti 
2004 November Neelie Kroes 
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Bid structure 
It is clear from experience (and from viewing the cases) that hostile bids attract much 
attention in the media, and might therefore be expected to influence the regulatory 
process. 
Hostile bids would appear to be more prevalent during merger booms, and this would be 
borne out by the bunching of hostile bids in the UK alcoholic beverages sector in the 
1980s. Hostile bids have all but disappeared in this industry. This is due to a 
combination of scale (the industry having already restructured considerably) and 
ownership structure. However, there may also be an implicit -reaction 
to previous 
incidence of referrals of hostile as opposed to agreed bids. 
Conceptually, firms might anticipate that an agreed bid will be more likely to clear than 
a hostile one. If two parties have negotiated a merger then they will have addressed 
potential regulatory problems as part of the process. Conversely, a hostile bid suggests 
opportunism, with the bidder expecting to claw back the price premium paid to the 
target shareholders by way of exploiting the enhanced market power in the form of 
higher prices to consumers. Regulators need to be wary of jumping to conclusions, 
however, in particular where 'cosy' agreements have been reached. A case could be 
made for giving more attention to agreed mergers with pre-formed regulatory arguments 
in place; this is one of the few occasions where it appears legitimate for competitors to 
Cco-operate' to produce a market solution. 
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4.3.3. Financial performance variables 
There are five separate variables in this category: 
i. Bidder Margin: The operating margin of the bidder (this may be a division if it is 
part of a larger group) in the last available financial year. It is defined as the 
operating profit percentage of gross turnover. Net (of duty) turnover is not 
available consistently across firms over the full period of the study consequently 
gross turnover is used in the model. 
ii. Target Margin: As above for target firm or division. 
iii. Bidder Gearing: This variable is the net financial debt of the bidder group as a 
percentage of its total capital (equity and debt) at the time of the merger 
iv. Bidder Return: The operating returns of the bidder (this may be a division if it is 
part of a larger group) in the last available financial year. It is defined as the 
operating profit as a percentage of its total capital (equity and debt) at the time of 
the merger. 
v. Target Return: As above for target firm or division. 
A full definition of all financial ratios used in the discriminant and case study analysis is 
contained in Appendix 2. 
Financial analysis is starting to feature in merger inquiries, in particular those 
undertaken by the CC. It can be a useful complement to the complex and often 
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theoretical approach of econometrics to identifying markets and what actually happens 
in real life firms and industries. Understanding the current and historic profile of 
operating returns for bidders, targets and their wider industries completes the picture and 
is as valid an indicator of the likely direction of prices in the post merger environment. 
The use of financial analysis in anti-trust and merger inquiries is not without its critics 
as highlighted by Steele [2002] in the small business banking enquiry. Financial ratios 
taken in isolation can lead to unstable predictions. In blocking Interbrew's proposed 
acquisition of Bass Brewers, the CC relied heavily on comparisons of EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) in previous pan-European 
mergers. It concluded that a 'high' EBITDA multiple paid in conjunction with low cost 
savings projections signalled a likely future abuse of market power; hence the 
acquisition was blocked. However, to infer overpayment from this ratio alone is 
dangerous. EBITDA is not finance neutral, and therefore does not signal whether a firm 
has overpaid relative to its true cost of capital. In addition, firms tend to err on the side 
of caution in estimating the efficiency gains from a merger, due to sensitivity to the 
issue of job losses. 
Several financial variables have been constructed. These ratios are all easy to compute 
from available firm data. A measure of operating cash flow would have been desirable 
and likely significant, however the raw data to compute such a ratio is not widely 
available. Many of the acquisitions have been between divisions of larger groups and it 
is impossible to derive a divisional cash flow without access to management accounts. 
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Again owing to the lack of divisional information the financial gearing of the bidder 
group only was prepared. It is the bidder's financial health that will determine ultimately 
whether the firm can proceed with the acquisition as planned. The financial health of the 
bidder was a feature in several UK investigations that took place during the 1980s 
merger wave. Moreover, merger guidelines in both the US and Europe require some 
assessment of the financial status of both bidder and target in considering the wider 
market implications of mergers. 
4.4. Deriving 'The Model' 
4.4.1. Estimation of discriminant function and predictive accuracy 
The research objective of the discriminant analysis modelling carried out here is to 
identify only those very significant discriminating independent variables from the larger 
set of data that correspond to the factors that determine 'Referred' or 'Not Referred' in 
firm interactions with competition authorities. Unlike, for example, a credit scoring 
exercise, the purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter is not to produce a 
predictive model which would, say, allow us to assess the likely chances of any given 
firm succeeding in its interaction with the competition authorities before it launches a 
hostile bid. 
With this research objective in mind, a stepwise estimation methodology was chosen, 
rather than a simultaneous estimation on the dataset. In stepwise estimation the single 
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best discriminating variable enters the discriminant function first. This is then paired 
with all the other variables, one at a time, to find the second variable that is best able to 
improve the discriminating power of the function in combination with the first variable. 
This is reflected in a reduction in the Wilk's Lambda statistic. SPSS continues the 
process, adding the third, fourth and so on variable until there is no further significant 
contribution to the discrimination between the groups. 
Hair [2006] considers that the stepwise approach is better when there are a large number 
of independent variables. However, the solution becomes less stable as the ratio of 
sample size to starting number of variables falls. In such cases, validation is essential. In 
addition, running strict criteria for entry and exit of variables into a stepwise estimation 
is also recommended. SPSS sets automatically a 'conservative' F value for entry and 
exit of 3.84 (entry) and 2.71 (removal). An F value of 3.84 corresponds to a 'a 
significance' level of 0.05 (95% confidence interval)). The exit F value of 2.71 
corresponds to a 'a significance' level of 0.10 (90% confidence interval). 
A variable is entered into the model if its F value is greater than the entry value and 
removed if it is less than the removal value. Entry must be greater than removal and 
both values must be positive. Lowering the entry level allows more variables into the 
model. Conversely, increasing the removal level removes more variables from the 
model. Given the small sample size in this discriminant analysis model the conservative 
F values of 3.84 for entry and 2.71 for removal were retained so that a very small 
number of highly significant variables remained in the final model. 
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Having chosen the stepwise methodology the statistical significance of the discriminant 
function must be evaluated with reference to either the Mahalanobis D2 (or alternatively 
Rao's V) ratio. The Mahalanobis D2 procedure, chosen as an option in SPSS, is based on 
generalised squared distance in Euclidean space that adjusts for unequal variances. 
Cases with large Mahalanobis D2 distance have extreme values on one or more of the 
independent variables and are therefore assigned to different groups, whereas smaller 
differences identify cases in the same group. In the stepwise estimation the variable that 
maximises the Mahalanobis D2 between the. two groups is entered, hence the ratio 
increases at each stage. 
There are three ways to determine the relative importance of significant independent 
variables that define the discriminant function; Discriminant Weights, Discriminant 
Loadings (also known as Structure Correlations, and listed in SPSS as a Structure 
Matrix) and Partial F Values. Discriminant weights are the traditional approach to 
interpreting discriminant functions. They are the weight whose size relates to the 
discriminating power of that independent variable across the groups of the dependent 
variable. Independent variables with large discriminating power usually have large 
weights and those with little discriminatory power usually have small weights. The 
interpretation of discriminant weights is analogous to the interpretation of beta weights 
in regression analysis and is therefore subject to the same criticisms; they are influenced 
by multico I linearity and are subject to considerable instability. 
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Discriminant loadings are the simple linear correlations between each independent 
variable and the discriminant Z score for each discriminant function. Discriminant 
loadings reflect the variance that the indePendent variables share with the discriminant 
function. In this regard they can be interpreted like factor loadings in assessing the 
relative contribution of each independent variable to the discriminant function. They are 
the preferred evaluation tool in assessing the contribution of each significant variable 
because they are a standardised measure of importance (ranging from 0 to 1), are 
calculated for every variable whether or not used in the discriminant function and are 
unaffected by multicollinearity. As a rule-of-thumb loadings greater than 0.4, or less 
than -0.4, are considered substantive for interpretative purposes. 
Finally, in using a stepwise estimation process, SPSS also lists F values. The larger the 
F value, the greater the discriminating power of the independent variable. In practice 
using F values for ranking purposes performs the same task as discriminant loadings, but 
in addition, F values indicate the associated level of significance of each variable. 
Predictive Accuracy 
The number of correctly classified cases, known as the Hit Ratio, is a measure of the 
efficacy of the discriminant model. It should be as close to 100% as possible that is all 
cases correctly assigned to the groups if the discriminant function contains variables that 
separate the groups well. At its lower bound, a rule-of-thumb suggests that for the 
discriminant function to be meaningful and useful for predictive purposes, the hit ratio 
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must be at least 25% greater than chance. In other words, if there was an equal prior 
probability of a case being assigned to one of two groups, the hit ratio has to be at least 
25% higher than 50% to be significant. 
Maximum Chance Criterion is the more conservative measure of predictive accuracy in 
the classification of cases. It is calculated from the percentage of cases in the largest 
group on the rationale that the best uninformed choice is to classify every observation 
into the largest group. It is used when the sole objective is to maximise the percentage 
correctly classified. It therefore generates the highest standard for comparison with the 
Hit Ratio. The Proportional Chance Criterion is usually recommended for unequal size 
groups and where the research objective is to identify correctly members of all groups. It 
is less conservative a measure than the maximum chance criterion. The average 
probability of classification is calculated adjusting for group sizes. 
In the most conservative case, and to have the greatest degree of confidence that the 
discriminant function is classifying well, the percentage uplift on the maximum chance 
criterion for each group should be above 25%. This is on grounds that there is little 
benefit of a high overall hit ratio, based on the larger group if the smaller group cases 
are poorly classified. 
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4.4.2. Background assumptions 
The variables must a priori satisfy four key statistical conditions in order to provide 
confidence that the output from discriminant analysis is both meaningful and 
statistically significant: 
i. Normality of the independent variables; 
ii. Linearity of the relationships among the independent variables; 
iii. Equality of dispersion matrices (covariance) for dependent variable subgroups; and 
iv. Lack of multico I linearity among the independent variables. 
Each of these criteria can be tested in SPSS, and the summary of the statistical analysis 
carried out on the sample prior to carrying out the discriminant analysis is shown in 
Table 4.11. 
Normality 
Before assessing multivariate normality, the independent variables individually have to 
be shown to be normal. In the event that the independent variables are not normal, the 
multivariate normality condition will be broken. However, showing that the independent 
variables individually are normal does not a priori prove multivariate normality. 
Currently, it is not possible to test for multivariate normality in SPSS (for example, by 
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using Mardia's Statistic to assess skewness and kurtosis) although a histogram plot of 
the multivariate solution can give a graphical illustration. 
In addition the common rule-of-thumb tests for normality of the variables - the 
assessment of skewness and kurtosis - are available. Skewness is the tilt in a distribution 
whereas kurtosis is the peakedness in a distribution. The degree of skewness should be 
within the +2 to -2 range when the data is normally distributed (some researchers use the 
stricter +1 to -1 condition), with positive implying a long right-hand tail and negative 
implying a long left-hand tail. For kurtosis the +2 to -2 range is held for normal 
distributions, although some researchers allow the less restrictive +3 to -3 range. 
Positive kurtosis signals too few cases in the tail of the distribution whereas negative 
kurtosis signals too many cases in the tail ffat' tail). 
From the background statistical analysis of the independent variables it is clear that 
several variables break the skewness and kurtosis normality constraints. Looking at the 
'All Cases' dataset of 40 original cases, two variables, Bidder Margin and Bidder 
Gearing are particularly high on both measures. All other variables are either well within 
the range for both, or sufficiently close to be confident of normal distributions. Looking 
at the original data there is an obvious outlier in both Bidder Margin and Bidder Gearing 
that is Punch Taverns, the firm that won the bidding for Allied Domecq's UK retail 
estate in 1999. Eliminating this case from the analysis brings the skewness and kurtosis 
measure for both Bidder Margin and Bidder Gearing into the normal distribution range. 
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Similarly in the 'UK Only' dataset of 26 original cases, Punch Taverns causes non- 
normality in Bidder Margin and Bidder Gearing. This reflects the fact that having 
recently been formed from the spin-out of Bass's tenanted pub estate that was privately 
owned and debt-financed, its operating margin and level of gearing (debt as a percentage 
of total assets) was somewhat distorting. Other acquiring firms have had significant 
levels of gearing, most notably Elders IXL that bid unsuccessfully for both Allied-Lyons 
and Scottish & Newcastle in the 1980s (and which did form the basis for referral to the 
MCC), however, even then gearing did not exceed 70%. With regard to operating 
margins, carrying none of the normal overheads of a managed estate, tenanted pub 
companies, in particular those with attractive long-term supply contracts would typically 
boast margins (though not returns) in the 60 - 70% range. 
The elimination of HP Bulmer, the cider producer that was 'rescued' by Scottish & 
Newcastle in 2003, reduces both skewness and kurtosis in Target % Market (share) and 
Market Leader % (share) to normal levels. HP Bulmer was an unusual merger partner in 
that it was the leader in the UK domestic cider market with 66% market share, the 
second player, Matthew Clark, accounting for the majority of the remaining 34% of the 
UK cider market. However, the researcher is loathe to eliminate this firm from the 
analysis because the lack of even an initial investigation by the OFT is in itself 
interesting, not so much for its huge share of a small and then declining category but the 
fact that, along with Matthew Clark, it was a major free-trade beer distributor, once 
viewed by the MMC (and CC) in the aftermath of the 'Beer Orders' as a 'Protected 
species'. 
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Finally, the removal of Macallan-Glenlivet from the analysis brings skewness and 
kurtosis of Target Margin to the normal range. This firm was the subject of an agreed 
bid from Highland Distillers, not a major UK alcoholic beverages firm, but a major 
Scotch player by virtue of the strength of The Famous Grouse. Macallan was unique 
among the smaller independent whisky producers in that it had developed its own single 
malt brand in preference to selling fillings into the trade. Consequently it had very high 
margins, even by Scotch whisky industry standards. In 1980, when Hiram Walker made 
an aggressive bid for Highland Distillers, the bid was blocked following an investigation 
by the NIMC primarily because of the importance of Highland in the fillings market. 
Interestingly Scotch observers might have been more concerned about the ownership of 
Macallan-Glenlivet. Although small its fillings are well sought after being a key 
ingredient in the two major blends, The Famous Grouse, and J&B Rare. 
Linearity 
Another key condition for discriminant analysis is that the independent variables are 
linear with respect to the dependent variable. An ANOVA table computed from the 
Linearity Test of Means in SPSS displays the F Value and its associated significance 
that indicates a deviation from linearity for the relationship between dependent and an 
independent variable. If the F Value significance is below a critical value - ordinarily 
taken as < . 05 - there 
is significant nonlinearity. 
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Testing the independent variables in turn against the dependent variable, Referred/Not 
Referred suggests that only PM Dominance in both the 'All Cases' and 'UK Only 
Cases' models displays significant nonlinearity. The reading for Bidder % Market, at 
0.087, albeit above the critical level, is low with respect to the level for all other 
independent variables. 
Cnx. rprinnrj- 
The relevant statistical test for the equality of the covariance (dispersion) matrices of the 
independent variables across the groups of the dependent variable is known as Box's M. 
When the M is not significant, the researcher accepts the null hypothesis that the groups 
do not differ. The test is highly sensitive to group size and departures from multivariate 
normality. 
According to Hair et al [2006] mixed evidence exists concerning the sensitivity of 
discriminant analysis to both the assumptions of multivariate normality and equality of 
covariance. Others have commented that it is a conservative test and that the null 
hypothesis is rejected too often. Hair suggests the use of a conservative significance 
level - 0.01 or less - as an adjustment for the sensitivity of the statistic. 
However, a Box's M test was run routinely for each of the discriminant models, and the 
results recorded. For the 'All Cases' model that had 40 original cases, the Box's M test 
showed nonsignificance, with all significance levels on runs of the model being above 
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0.09. With the 'UK Only' model that had 26 original cases, the M was also 
nonsigni icant, with all significance levels on runs of the model being above 0.03 
(although this is sufficiently close to 0.01 to suggest there may be a hint of unequal 
dispersion matrices). For the 'Non-UK Cases' model that comprised 14 original cases 
the Box's M could not be computed as there were fewer than two non-singular group 
covariance matrices. 
Multicollinearity 
This is the result of high levels of correlation among the independent variables that is 
one variable can be highly explained or predicted by one or more of the other variables. 
It thus adds little explanatory power to the clataset. Multicollinearity, measured by 
Tolerance, becomes especially problematic in stepwise discriminant analysis, such as 
that employed here, in that it can reduce markedly the estimated impact of independent 
variables in the discriminant function. However, Eisenbeis [1977] in an authoritative 
early work that addressed the pitfalls in discriminant analysis warned against excluding 
variables from the analysis on the belief that multicol linearity was harmful. He 
concluded that multicollinearity is a sample property that is largely an irrelevant concern 
in discriminant analysis except where the correlations are such that it is no longer 
possible to invert the dispersion matrices. He Pointed to empirical evidence that 
seemingly unimportant variables on a univariate basis may be important discriminators 
in a multivariate context. 
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In the discriminant analysis models, where significant variables (low Wilk's lambda - 
0.78 1, and high F value - 10.640) do not appear in the discriminant function it is usually 
a sign of multicollinearity. In this instance PM Dominance, the variable that reflects a 
4relevant market' dominant position that would be created through the merger is the 
most significant omission from the discriminant function in both 'All Cases' and 'UK 
Only Cases'. Multicollinearity is confirmed by the lowest Tolerance statistic of the set 
of variables at 0.784 (the other variables being close to 1) in the 'All Cases' model and 
0.392 in the 'UK Only Cases' model. Its omission is logical on grounds that it would be 
highly correlated with Bidder % Market; if a pre-merger bidding firm has a high market 
share in the wider economically defined market it is extremely likely that it will have a 
'dominant' position in one or more narrowly defined anti-trust markets both pre- and 
post-merger. 
Less pronounced is the relationship between Bidder % Market and the variable Bidder 
Margin that also does not appear in the discriminant function. It has a Wilk's lambda of 
0.973 and an F value of 1.056, although these ratios are not significant. Tolerance 
statistics of close to I in both models does not imply multicollinearity. However one 
would expect some multicollinearity with Bidder % Market in that a high market share 
in an economic market should, ordinarily generate higher operating margins. There are 
examples where this is not the case, for example, with HP Bulmer, market leader in a 
small category that was in rapid decline. 
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Given that multicol linearity is an inherent feature of such a specific database, drawn 
from one industry where common patterns of market share and financial returns might 
be anticipated, the discriminant function has to be interpreted with care. It is therefore 
recommended that discriminant loadings are used in the interpretation of the 
discriminant function rather than discriminant weights, as discussed previously. 
4.5. Results 
The dataset described in the previous sections was divided into a series of subsets before 
starting the modelling process. A baseline set of models called 'All Cases' were run 
using all of the merger cases and all of the dataset. Some variations of the 'All Cases' 
models were run excluding what appeared to be outlier cases involving Punch Taverns 
(a pub operator) and HP Bulmer (a cider producer). 
A second set of models, called 'UK Only Cases' were run that included only those cases 
which were exclusively within the remit of the UK competition authorities. Variations 
of these were also run excluding the two outlier companies, Punch Taverns and Bulmer. 
A final set of models were run, called 'Non-UK' that included only those cases which 
were excluded from the 'UK Only Cases' analysis. The purpose of running the 'UK 
Only Cases' and 'Non-LTK' models separately was to examine whether and to what 
extent competition authority treatment of the alcoholic beverages industry had varied 
between jurisdictions. The remainder of this section contains a detailed description and 
discussion of each modelling exercise. 
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4.5.1 All Cases 
In the first run of the model, all 40 cases in the dataset were included. Of the 40 cases, 
16 were deemed to be in the 'Referred' category and 24 in 'Not Referred', designated I 
and 0 respectively in the SPSS programme. 
Table 4.12 shows the key relevant statistical output for the 'All Cases' run of the model. 
In addition to this run with all 40 cases, two further runs were made from the same 
dataset but removing, stepwise, Punch Tavern's acquisition of Allied Retail and Scottish 
& Newcastle's acquisition of HP Bulmer. Punch Taverns was a tenanted pub company 
that was entirely debt-financed; consequently operating margin and group gearing ratios 
for this case were deemed outliers. HP Bulmer was a cider firm with 66% market share 
of its category, this again representing an out of entry in the target market share variable. 
Their removal did not improve the overall efficacy of the model or the statistical 
significance of the variables. 
Two variables were shown to be significant; Bidder % Market at the time of the bid, and 
Bid Type, that is whether the bid was hostile. A higher bidder market share and a hostile 
bid structure are more likely to lead to a referral. 
Table 4.13 shows which cases were classified incorrectly with the reasons for referral or 
lack of referral. 
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The significance of Bidder % Market in the referral process is not surprising given that 
competition policy is designed to prevent abuses of market power. There is more 
likelihood of an abuse of market power the larger is the market share of the firm. If it is 
large pre-merger but there is no evidence of an abuse of market power the authorities 
have to be sure that in the event of a further lessening of competition by the removal of 
another competitor the expectation for the abuse of market power is unchanged. 
Although Bid Type is a powerful discriminating variable it is less so than Bidder % 
Market. Whilst its discriminant loading of 0.219 falls below the 'rule-of-thumb' cut off 
point the fact that the F Value of significance is 11.673 implies it is a variable to include 
in the discriminant function. The fact that a firm is more likely to be referred if the bid is 
hostile makes for an interesting discussion, in particular with regard to the tactics 
employed by the merger parties. 
From a regulatory point of view a non-hostile bid should arouse more suspicion than a 
hostile one because in this instance both target and bidder have an incentive to collude 
in their representations to the competition authorities that does not occur in a hostile 
case. If a bid is agreed, possibly with up-front remedies, there is arguably an even 
stronger case for referral. Given the powers of the regulatory authorities notwithstanding 
their own time constraints it could be argued that agreed bids by major firms should not 
be dismissed lightly. 
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Of the 40 cases in the 'All Cases' dataset only 16 were referred. These 16 cases were 
analysed further in a 'Transacted' and 'Not Transacted discriminant model. Of the 16, 
seven were transacted and nine were not transacted, either because they were blocked or 
were abandoned by the bidder. The latter was more likely to be the case in the UK 
where most of the hostile bids occurred. 
Whilst this discriminant model is developed from a small subset of only 16 cases, there 
are roughly equal numbers of cases that were transacted and not transacted. The model 
shows that only Target Margin % is significant with a loading of 1.000 and an F Value 
of 10.567. However, the variable appears to be positively correlated with 'Transacted'. 
This could either be a function of an anomalous result from a very small sample size, 
although the classification accuracy and statistical significance of the independent 
variable is high. Alternatively it could simply be an artefact of the merger clearance 
process. 
Bidder firms are more likely to compromise during the remedies procedure to ensure 
that an 'attractive' target (in the sense of higher margins) is absorbed. If there was no 
such remedy procedure the only other possible explanation is that having undergone an 
investigation process, the bidder then pursues an 'attractive' target more aggressively 
than a less attractive one and hence the likelihood of a transaction is positively related to 
the target's margins. 
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4.5.2. UK Only Cases 
In total there were 26 'LTK Only Cases' of which 12 were referred. Of those that were 
referred, four were transacted and eight were either blocked or abandoned by the bidder. 
A summary of the analysis for 'UK Only Cases' is presented in Table 4.14.. 
Where cases were classified incorrectly the reason for referral or lack of referral is 
surnmarised in Table 4.15.. 
As with the 'All Cases' model, Bidder % Market is the most significant discriminating 
variable in the 'UK Only Cases' models, with a loading of 15.329. The model was also 
run with Punch Taverns and HP Bulmer removed sequentially. Similarly this had little 
noticeable effect on the efficacy of the model and significance of the variables. 
It is noteworthy that trailing prices of beer and spirits do not show up as significant 
variables in the UK Only model. One might have expected that mergers proposed during 
and after the publication of the 'Beer Orders', with its recommendations for better 
choice and price for consumers in pubs would have tagged product market prices. 
Clearly there was much discussion in the many merger enquiries about relevant retail 
and wholesale prices of beer. The industry's increasing calls for a consideration of the 
difference between these two sets of prices in reaching merger decisions fell on stony 
ground. The model certainly backs this conclusion. 
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Looking at 'UK Only Cases' it is clear why the Enterprise Act 2002 with its objectives 
of removing politics from the merger process was enacted. Bidder Donations, in this 
case, exclusively, monies paid to the Conservative Party and its affiliated enterprises, is 
a significant variable that is negatively correlated with referral. Interestingly no major 
'LTK Only' deals in the drinks industry have been announced in the new regime. 
Moreover, following the experiences of Bass and its thwarted attempt to merge with 
Carlsberg-Tetley in 1996/7, UK merger activity by the majors in the UK has all but 
dried up. This may be because historically having been aligned to the Conservative 
Party as an industry few have been prepared to 'gamble' with a new government, more 
so given the experiences of Bass/CT and Whitbread's failure to gain early approval for 
Allied Domecq's retail chain. 
Of the three cases that were incorrectly classified, all three were refer-red when the 
model would have predicted early clearance. Somewhat surprisingly all three involved 
Allied-Lyons (later re-named Allied Domecq). This Conservative supporter was 
thwarted in its agreed merger with Unilever in 1969, during a Labour government, albeit 
the bid was cleared. But the ability to stave off the hostile bid from Elders IXL in 1986 
when there was a Conservative government may be significant. In 1992, and against the 
dissenting view Of the highly respected Professor Beesley, Allied had to endure a 
lengthy enquiry into its merger with Carlsberg UK, when the model predicted early 
clearance. Not long after political donations to the Conservative party ceased. 
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This raises two important business questions. Is the importance of Bidder Donations 
industry specific and is it replicable across national boundaries? Other UK sectors and 
firms might, historically, have different political affiliations, and it would be interesting 
to discover how such firms and sectors have faired in the referral and/or anti-trust 
process. It has become somewhat unfashionable to make political donations at the firm 
level in the UK and in this sense many of the UK drinks firms that were ardent 
Conservative Party supporters stopped doing so in the 1990s. However, the lack of 
disclosure of affiliations and monies paid to European and US political institutions and 
lobby groups is of concern, more so because shareholders in UK listed firms are 
increasingly asked to approve such spending routinely at annual general meetings. It is 
therefore not possible to link donations to the regulatory process in the same way as it 
was possible in the UK over the period of this study. 
4.5.3. Non-UK Cases 
There are a relatively small number of 'Non-UK Cases', consisting of a mix of cases 
investigated by the EC and/or FTC. Of the 14 cases, four were referred and ten 
proceeded without referral. Of the referred cases, only the Grand Met hostile approach 
for Irish Distillers in 1988 was blocked. At the time this bid was controversial and the 
source of much political debate. The initial bid had involved an approach for Irish 
Distillers by a joint venture group controlled by Grand Met, but with Allied-Lyons and 
Guinness as partners. Irish Distillers made what was described as a 'decisive tactical 
move' by making a formal complaint to the EC. A lengthy and heated debate took place 
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in the Irish parliament on 13 July 1988. On 29 July 1988, the EC blocked the joint bid 
on grounds that it infringed Article 85 and ordered the three parties to bid separately. 
Grand Met presented a revised bid, but by that time Pernod Ricard had made a white 
knight offer for the Irish firrn that was accepted by its shareholders. 
Of the other three referred cases, two pertained, unsurprisingly, to the merger of Grand 
Met and Guinness in Europe and the US respectively. Whilst the FTC referred the 
subsequent acquisition of Seagram by Diageo for further analysis, the EC cleared it at 
Phase 1 on the basis of the structural remedies agreed by Diageo and its acquisition 
partner, Pernod Ricard. The Pemod Ricard acquisition of Allied Domecq, structured 
similarly with partner Fortune Brands was cleared by both the US and Europe at the first 
stage. 
Table 4.16 describes the 'Non-UK Cases' model. It shows that the likelihood of being 
referred is positively correlated to only one significant variable, 'PM Dominance'. This 
is a Yes/No variable based on whether the investigating authorities had identified one or 
more highly concentrated 'relevant market' as a result of the merger. PM Dominance 
can be explained largely in terms of the scale of the pre-merger market share in the 
wider economically defined market, and it is consequently not significant in the 'All 
Cases' model. However, in the 'Non-UK Cases' model it illustrates the more narrowly 
defined anti-trust markets that have been used consistently by overseas regulators. Given 
that II of the 'Non-UK Cases' involve spirits mergers and acquisitions, where there has 
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been emphasis on category and subcategory spirits brands and market shares in the US 
and Europe, the significance and direction of this variable is not surprising. 
The model shows, however that two cases were strictly speaking misclassified, as 
described in Table 4.17. Both were relatively small agreed acquisitions by one of the 
major spirits firms that involved brands and distribution infrastructure in a specific 
country where the parties had worked together on a joint-venture basis prior to the 
acquisition. The brands in themselves were not, perhaps, as important as the distribution 
opportunity. In the case of Allied Domecq's acquisition of Pedro Domecq, the 
infrastructure in Spain and number of brands and categories covered were significantly 
larger. 
In common with the 'UK Only Cases', the 'Non-UK Cases' model shows fewer 
incorrectly classified cases than in the 'All Cases' models. There is overlap in two of the 
three cases with the 'All Cases' model and the UK dataset, but no overlap at all with the 
Non-UK dataset. This reflects different significant variables in the discriminant 
function. Interestingly in the UK all three cases were referred when the model would 
have predicted non-referral whereas the two non-UK cases, both European, saw no 
referral when the significance test would have predicted otherwise. This could relate to 
the former 'public interest' test that was part of UK inquiries prior to the Enterprise Act. 
Alternatively it might just reflect a sense of Proportionality in the EC when considering 
a merger with essentially a principal effect in one-member state, for example Italy and 
Spain in these two cases. 
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Table 4.16. Non-UK Cases model summary 
Non-UK Cases (14) 
Models Referred Referred then Transacted 
Model Summary 
Number of cases 4 3 
Stepwise Stepwise 
M th d 
Mahalanobis distance Mahalanobis distance 
e o Compute from group size Compute from group size 
Leave-one-out classification Leave-one-out classification 
Efficacy 
Box's M Test (significance) 
Eigenvalue 1.143 
Canonical Correlation 0.730 Insufficient cases 
Variance Explained 53. 3% 
Probabilities 
P i Not Referred (0) 71% r or Referred (1) 29% 
C V lid ted Not Referred (0) 80% ross- a a Referred (1) 100% Insufficient cases 
lift M i Ch U Not Referred (0) 12% p ( ax mum ance) Referred (1) 250% 
Hit Rate (Overall) 86% 
Significant Variables 
Wilks'Lambda PM Dominance 0.467 
Mahalanobis D2 PM Dominance 4.800 
fficient cases Ins u 
Exact F Statistic PM Dominance 13.714 
Discriminant Loading PM Dominance 1.000 
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4.6. Interpretation and validation 
4.6.1. Preliminary findings 
For all versions of the discriminant analysis models described above the dominance 
variables, namely Bidder % Market or the identification of post-merger category 
dominance ('PM Dominance') were the key factors in determining whether a case is 
referred to the competition authorities or not. This confirms the a priori conjecture that, 
regardless of jurisdiction, those alcoholic beverages firms that grew and intend to grow 
in future by use of a merger and acquisition strategy cannot assume their strategy will 
proceed without factoring in the interaction with the competition authorities. 
The second finding, drawn from the 'UK Only Cases' models, is that political factors 
have had some impact on the likelihood of a bid being referred to the competition 
authorities. This confirms that the decision to make the CC independent of government 
ministers was based on the correct premise. As no data was available to test the 
importance of political factors in jurisdictions outside the UK it is impossible to say 
whether political factors have and continue to have an influence on competition 
authority referrals outside the LTK jurisdiction. 
The third conclusion that can be drawn from the 'All Cases' models is that adopting a 
strategy of pursuing 'agreed' merger and acquisition transactions is more likely to result 
in clearance without further investigation by the competition authorities. This is an 
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important result and suggests that a 'co-operative' merger and acquisitions strategy is 
more likely to succeed with regulators than where a firm launches 'hostile' bids without 
the agreement of the target management. Given that referrals often result in mergers 
being abandoned this must be factored into merger strategy. 
It is therefore tempting to conclude that co-operation between management teams, not 
only in agreeing the bid terms but also in identifying subsequent potential disposals of 
parts of the joint business that may be required to satisfy the competition authorities is a 
crucial success factor in adopting a strategy of growth by merger and acquisition. 
Indeed, it is striking that following 'failed' attempts in the mid 1980s merger boom, both 
Scottish & Newcastle and Grand Met (on its own and as part of Diageo) have pursued 
'agreed' bids as part of their growth path. Both have also been active in presenting 
upfront merger remedies before the competition authorities imposed them, or at least 
showed the willingness to compromise. 
However, this cannot be the whole story; Allied Domecq's acquisitions were agreed, as 
were those of Bass (Carlberg-Tetley) and Whitbread (acquisition of Allied Domecq 
Retailing). Bass and Whitbread both appeared only once each as bidders in the Period of 
study. However failure by both to proceed without a referral to the CC (Whitbread) and 
subsequent lengthy enquiry that led ultimately to the proposed deal being blocked (Bass) 
was directly responsible for both firms' exit from UK brewing and retailing. 
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The Allied Dornecq experiences are somewhat more puzzling, in that it does not seem to 
have been deterred by investigations by the UK CC (although at the time of the 
Carlsberg-Tetley merger its complained bitterly about the impact of the lengthy 
investigation and remedies on the efficacy of the business), and was brave enough to 
strike deals in both North America and Europe. What seems to have caused the final 
capitulation in spirits, following the merger of Grand Met and Guinness, was its 
inability to find a merger partner with which to pursue the subsequent deals in the 
industry. 
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4.6.2. Internal and external validity 
The analysis presented here is produced from a sample of 'Referred' and 'Not Referred 
transactions involving the major UK alcoholic beverage firms. Although the models 
only contain independent variables that exceed significantly the threshold of 
significance defined by a range of test statistics further validation is necessary to ensure 
that what is observed really has genuine significance and that the result could be 
replicated using a completely new sample of data. 
Unfortunately, there is only a small sample of available cases in the alcoholic beverages 
industry and there remains a significant risk from such a small sample that there is so 
much sampling error that identification of all but the most significant independent 
variables is impossible and/or that the results are not generalisable or lack external 
validity. It cannot therefore be ruled out that if a new sample of alcoholic beverages 
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mergers and acquisitions were to subsequently become available a new set of 
independent variables might be identified if the discriminant analysis modelling 
procedure was repeated. 
In addition, it has to be borne in mind that as with any longitudinal study the political, 
legal and structural environment changes over the time period used. There are obvious 
cmerger waves' that are identifiable throughout history. In these waves the 
preponderance of hostile bids is greater. Counter to this is the scale and ownership 
structure of firms in any particular industry at any give time; if large mergers have 
already taken place, future target firms may be either large in themselves or remain in 
the private sector. Finally, when considering only one industry, there is likely to be an 
increased likelihood of referral over time reflecting increasingly larger deals and 
amalgamations of existing large firms. 
Holdout sampling 
Ordinarily, validation of discriminant analysis models is carried out by splitting the 
initial sample into two roughly equal size groups, using one of the groups - the analysis 
sample - to build the discriminant model, and the second group - the validation or 
holdout sample - to test the robustness of the predictions from the first model. However, 
given that the original sample size amounts to only 40 cases, splitting the sample into a 
model and a test group in this way is impractical. For such small sample sizes, 
systematic use of the 'leave-one-out' method is the only viable approach to validation. 
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Cross-validation 
Applying the 'leave-one-out' validation process to a sample of 40 has the effect of 
producing 39 separate test samples each with a slightly different composition of cases. 
The principal effect is to reduce the hit rate classification and if the cases that are used in 
calculating the discriminant function are also those that are being classified, there should 
be an inherent upward bias in the prediction accuracy of the 'leave-one-out' models as 
compared to the original model. 
A 'leave-one-out' validation test was conducted on the 'All Cases', 'UK Only Cases' 
and 'Non-UK Cases'. The hit rate following 'leave-one-out' cross-validation was still 
significantly higher than chance classification. We can therefore conclude that all of the 
models presented here are 'internally valid'. That is we can be confident that the 
significant independent variables that were observed would also appear to be significant 
variables if a new sample of cases from the alcoholic beverages industry were available. 
It cannot be concluded with confidence that the models presented here are 'externally 
valid' although there is no reason to believe that they are not. Confirmation of 'external 
validity' could only be achieved if a different sample of mergers and acquisitions from a 
different industrial sector, a completely different time period, or involving a different set 
of competition authorities was modelled. If these were available further significant 
independent variables may have been found. Unfortunately, given the nature of mergers 
and acquisitions data, capturing the necessary data to permit external validation across a 
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number of industrial sectors, time periods and competition authority jurisdictions would 
have required more time and analytical resource than was available in this study. Clearly 
this remains a fertile topic for further work. 
4.6.3. Discriminant analysis versus logistic regression 
As a final validation test, consideration was given as to whether the choice of 
discriminant analysis as an analytical technique may have influenced the results, for 
example because it is known that unequal covariance matrices can have an adverse 
impact on both the estimation and classification process in discriminant analysis. 
Logistic Regression has been cited as a possible alternative technique by Hair et al, in 
particular for problems involving a binary dependent variable. Logistic regression does 
not face the strict assumptions for multivariate normality and equal covariance matrices 
and is viewed as more robust when these assumptions are not met. Researchers point to 
its straightforward statistical tests, similar approaches to incorporating metric and non- 
metric variables and non-linear effects and a wide range of diagnostics that make it 
preferable to discriminant analysis even when the multivariate conditions are met. 
A stepwise logistic regression was performed on the 'All Cases' dataset. Bidder market 
share was the most significant variable, with a score of 12.594 (0.000 significance). Bid 
type entered as a second significant variable at step 2 with a score of 4.226 (0.040 
significance). The overall prediction accuracy of the model was 75%. The model gave 
exactly the same overall percentage classification success as the 'All Cases' 
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discriminant analysis model, and with the same goup membership. Given that the 
logistic regression approach produced exactly the same results it can be concluded that 
the prediction efficacy of the discriminant analysis modelling is not an artefact of the 
technique itself 
4.6.4. Conclusions 
Whilst the discriminant analysis models yield significant explanatory variables and 
respond satisfactorily to classification under strict statistical criteria there are several 
aspects of the dataset and variables, and consequently the results that require 
qualification. The dataset is small at 40 original cases, although each case has its full 
complement of independent variables. Given the small sample size the researcher, 
mindful of the Hair et al bare minimum requirements (five observations Per independent 
variable) restricted the choice of independent variables to those that a priori were 
anticipated to be significant. Some of the variables are of higher quality than others, for 
example, the market share data collected and available to the competition authorities at 
the time of each merger tends to be undisputed (although there tends to be a differential 
view between the two parties regarding the definition of the market) and whether the bid 
was hostile or agreed is a statement of fact. However, the market prices variable, as 
described above, is a wide guesstimate of the reality of the price profile in the product 
market, given that it tends to reflect at best a list wholesale price (often derived from 
retail prices) that ignores discounts. 
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Chapter 5. Case study of Scottish & Newcastle 
Scottish & Newcastle is the UK's largest brewer and the only UK-owned firm that 
remains from the 1989 pre-'Beer Orders' 'Big 6' brewer-retailers. This chapter presents 
an in depth analysis of the dismantling of its pub and leisure portfolio during the 1990s, 
culminating in the complete exit from pub retailing in 2003, and subsequent merger and 
acquisition activity it is now a pure brewer, with leading positions in the brewing 
markets of the UK, France, Portugal, Finland and Russia. Table 5.1 charts the 
development of Scottish & Newcastle from its origins in the Edinburgh and Newcastle 
family brewing firms of William Younger and John Barras through successive rounds of 
acquisition and divestment. 
5.1. Background 
At the time of the first anti-trust investigation into the UK brewing market in 1969, 
Scottish & Newcastle was by far the smallest of the "Big 6" brewers with a limited tied 
pub estate. From its base in Scotland and the North, it had pursued, and with some 
success, market share in the free trade in the South. However, the other brewers 
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responded aggressively and from the mid-1970s, its beer sales declined by 20%. It was 
at this stage that the ambitious firm moved to an acquisition-led strategy to pursue 
growth. 
Table 5.1. Major events in Scottish & Newcastle corporate history 
Year Event 
2003 Sold managed pub estate, effecting complete exit. Acquired HIP Bulmer (Strongbow cider; wholesale distribution network) and 51 % of Centralcer 
2002 
Acquired Hartwall (Finland; included 50% stake in Baltic Beverage Holdings). 
Strategic partnerships with share stakes implemented in India (United Breweries) and Greece (Boutari 
Group) 
2000 
Acquired Kronenbourg (France and Belgium beer subsidiaries of Groupe Danone). Bought 49% share 
stake in Centralcer (Portugal). 
Started divestment of leased estate to Royal Bank of Scotland, initially to comply with Beer Orders, and 
various parcels of pubs from managed estate. 
Disposed of leisure interests, Center Parcs and Pontin's. 
1999 Acquired Greenall's pubs, restaurants and lodqes. 
1995 Acquired Courage for E430m (owned John Smith, Foster's European and Kronenbourg UK distribution ýghts) 
1993 Acquired Chef & Brewer managed pub estate for F-628.5m 
1991 Bought remaining minority 25.2% in Center Parcs 
1989 
Defended successfully hostile bid from Elders IXL 
Disposed of Thistle Hotels for E645m 
Purchased controlling stakes in Center Parcs and Pontin's 
1988 Hostile bid announced by Elders IXL, owner of Couraqe. 
1987 Acquired Matthew Brown for El 18m. 
1986 Acquired Home Brewery for El 23m 
1985 
Launched hostile bid for Matthew Brown. 
Acquired Moray Firth Maltings for E23m. 
Sold Scotch whisky interests, Charles Mackinlay to invergordon Distillers. 
1984 Abandoned acquisition of JW Cameron 
following referral to MIVIC 
Disposed of Gough Brothers. 
1979 Acquired Royal Brewery (Manchester), and Gough Brothers (off licences) 
1965 Formed Thistle Hotels from existing hotel assets 
1960 Scottish Brewers merged with The Newcastle Breweries to form Scottish & Newcastle Breweries Ltd 
1931 William Younger and William McEwan merged to form Scottish Brewers Ltd. 
1913 William McEwan died. William Younger, his nephew, took on the running of the Edinburgh brewery 
1890 Newcastle Breweries launched at Tyne brewery 
1884 John Barras took over Tyne brewery 
1856 William McEwan established Fountain brewery in Edinburgh 
1803 William Younger 11 acquired Abbey brewery at Holyrood 
1770 John Barras established in Gateshead by John Barras Snr and William Johnston 
1749 William Younger brewery established in Leith 
Source: Scottish & Newcastle website 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Scottish & Newcastle was a frequent party to discussions 
with the UK competition authorities. It abandoned an agreed bid for a neighbouring 
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brewing firm when the acquisition was referred to the CC, embarked on one hostile bid 
that was cleared following a lengthy CC enquiry, and was on the receiving end of a 
bitterly contested hostile bid from an overseas conglomerate. Further opportunities for 
discussions with the competition authorities came with acquisitions in the 1990s, 
notably the 1995 acquisition of Courage that was waved through without referral. 
5.1.1. Early acquisition activity 
In 1984, Scottish & Newcastle proposed the acquisition of its Hartlepoo I -based 
neighbour, JW Cameron, an ailing firm that was a subsidiary of the conglomerate 
Ellerman Group. The acquisition was referred to the NIMC and shortly afterwards the 
bid was abandoned. Instead, the two firms reached an agreement in July 1985 to swap 
Tyneside pubs for Cleveland and North Yorkshire pubs. Cameron's limped into the 
1990s and was acquired by Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries in 1993. 
Undeterred by the failure to gain rapid approval for the acquisition of Cameron, Scottish 
& Newcastle announced a hostile bid for Matthew Brown on 18 March 1985, having 
started buying shares in the firm in January 1985. The acquisition was referred to the 
MMC on 24 April 1985. Although the bid was cleared it took an additional two years of 
negotiations between the parties before the deal was consummated in 1987. Matthew 
Brown was one of the larger and more successful of the regional brewers that had, itself 
grown by acquisition in the North West, latterly extending into Yorkshire with the 
acquisition of Theakston. At the time it comprised four breweries and 527 tied houses. 
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Unusually for a regional brewer, it had developed successfWly its own lager brand, 
Slalom. 
Scottish & Newcastle's argument to the MEMC investigation was that Matthew Brown 
presented a means of strengthening its ability to compete more effectively with the other 
"Big 6" and the regional brewers. It was well placed to offer greater competition to the 
national brewing groups because of its size and had a proven ability to compete 
successfully in the free trade "even without the security and advantages of a large tied 
estate". However, it needed to establish a larger platform and have access to Matthew 
Brown's English 'heritage' ale brands to ensure maximum effective competition. 
Scottish & Newcastle's argument in favour of allowing strengthening of its competitive 
position within the 'Big 6' through this merger, supported by the views of the Industry 
Department of Scotland and one other smaller brewer, was not shared by the NEMC. Nor 
indeed did it agree that Matthew Brown was doomed to disappear. Nevertheless the bid 
was cleared as the MMC did not see any adverse impact on consumer choice resulting 
from the elimination of Matthew Brown. 
5.1.2. Fending off an unwarranted approach 
A tuming point in the for-tunes of Scottish & Newcastle was in its ability to persuade the 
UK competition authorities that an unwelcome approach from the aggressive Australian 
conglomerate, Elders IXL should be blocked. 
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Elders IXL controlled the largest brewer in Australia, Carlton United Breweries, and 
owned the Foster's lager brand. Its ambitious management believed that the UK beer 
market was inefficient, poorly managed and consequently ripe for rational isation. It saw 
the beer market becoming increasingly international and sought to use the UK as the 
platform for international growth into Europe as part of a larger plan to Tosterise' the 
world. Having failed to acquire Allied-Lyons in early 1986, in a test-case hostile 
approach, Elders IXL was the successful bidder in the auction for Courage in November 
1986, sold by Hanson Trust following its acquisition of its previous owner, Imperial 
Tobacco. Significantly, in the auction process Hanson Trust had held discussions with 
Scottish & Newcastle but the two parties could not agree a price for Courage and 
Hanson Trust believed there would be problems in gaining regulatory clearance. 
Initially, Elders IXL tried to forge a national distribution agreement with Scottish & 
Newcastle. As discussions. continued, the debate centred on an agreed merger of the two 
beer businesses under Scottish & Newcastle control. However, Elders IXL, in an 
attempt to move the process forward quickly, started to buy shares in Scottish & 
Newcastle. The two companies had several further meetings during which time Elders 
increased its shareholding in Scottish & Newcastle further. When no agreement was 
reached between the parties, Elders launched a fl. 6bn hostile bid on 17 October 1988. 
The bid was referred to the NfMC on 9 November 1988. 
Whilst Scottish & Newcastle mustered support from all (Scottish) quarters to stave off 
the bid, the actions of Elders IXL that were somewhat aggressive by UK standards at the 
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time undoubtedly played a part in the final decision of the MMC to block the bid. On the 
morning of the referral, Elders bought more shares in the stock market, taking its 
holding in Scottish & Newcastle to 23.6%, and prompting the Secretary of State to make 
an order to freeze the shareholding and limit the voting rights to 15% of the equity. 
Elders justified its actions on the basis they were designed to stop Scottish & Newcastle 
instigating a 'poison pill' during the course of the MMC investigation. Moreover it 
claimed its actions did not breach the Substantial Acquisition Rules or the Fair Trading 
Act. 
It is difficult to conclude that the decision to block was anything but a political one, 
given the position of Scottish & Newcastle as a leading firm in the Scottish business 
establishment. Leading beer buyers such as Tesco, and J Sainsbury gave evidence that 
they saw no adverse impact from this merger. In its deliberations to the merger enquiry 
in addition to offering general criticisms of the structure and operation of the UK 
brewing industry, Elders suggested that the industry attracted an unusual amount of 
sentimental interest. In its opinion this was confused with genuine public interest issues 
in what was a highly regulated and very "political" industry. 
5.1.3. Courage acquisition 
Following the ratification of the 1989 'Beer Orders' there was a period of unprecedented 
and immense upheaval as the UK brewing industry was forced to cope with the sale of 
substantial parts of the major brewer/retailers tied estates. The firms were given until 
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November 1992 to comply with the orders; in the intervening period the UK economy 
entered a deep recession that impacted both beer consumption and pub visits. 
Having escaped the clutches of Elders LXL, Scottish & Newcastle was in the fortunate 
and unique position among the 'Big 6' in not having an estate large enough to require 
divestment to comply with the 'Beer Orders': in 1989 its pub estate was just under the 
limit of 2000 outlets. It had the luxury of being able to watch from the sidelines as its 
competitors were forced to consider their strategies content - at least initially - to build 
a leisure business, using the proceeds from the sale of the home-built Thistle hotel chain 
to acquire Center Parcs and Pontin's. 
Scottish & Newcastle's ambitions to be a leader in the domestic brewing and retailing 
scene came as a result of the actions of its two southern competitors, Grand Met and 
Courage, the subsidiary of old adversary Elders IXL. Both these firms had longer-term 
objectives outside the UK, and outside brewing. Their common vision for the structure 
of UK brewing - an argument that Elders IXL had presented on two occasions to the 
MMC in merger cases - being manifest in the 1990 agreement, referred to as the 
'breweries- for-pubs swap'. The enlarged Courage brewing presented a serious challenge 
to Bass's decades of supremacy, and allowed considerable cost to be extracted from the 
production base at the same time. It also made a more attractive merger partner for the 
ambitious Scottish & Newcastle. 
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With the Conservative party's term in office coming to an end, a Scottish firm that had 
thus far faired well under a Conservative-contro I led MMC, was, perhaps, the only one 
of the big brewers that had enough confidence to attempt to breach the 25% market 
share 'rule' through merger. It had learnt at first hand about the Courage business as a 
buyer of its beer in the newly acquired Chef & Brewer estate that Scottish bought from 
Grand Met in 1993. 
On 18 May 1995, Scottish & Newcastle announced that it had reached an agreement 
with Foster's, formerly called Elders IXL, to acquire its UK subsidiary, Courage, for 
E425m, paid for with the aid of a f354m rights issue. In essence the deal gave Scottish 
& Newcastle the rights to brew, package and market the Foster's brands in the UK, 
Republic of Ireland and Continental Europe. 
The rationale for the timing and relative merits of the Courage deal were stated: 
i. LTK brewers are becoming increasingly dependent on free trade sales, where 
success relies on the strength of their brands and the quality and price 
competitiveness of their products and services. 
ii. S&N, with its traditional strengths as a free trade brewer is well placed to respond 
to these challenges. However.... it is important to develop the Group's presence in 
geographic areas where it is currently under-represented and to continue to develop 
its brand portfolio. 
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iii. The acquisition of Courage will complement this (Chef & Brewer's) geographic 
expansion and will enable the Group to create a brewing business with a 
distribution network, brand portfolio and cost Profile which will provide a strong 
base for growth in the UK and Continental Europe. 
iv. The combined product ranges will provide the merged business with an enhanced 
portfolio of strong brands with which to compete in the free on and off trade 
sectors. 
v. The merged business will provide opportunities for significant cost savings through 
purchasing efficiencies, reductions in overheads and the integration of operating 
resources. 
The Courage deal catapulted Scottish & Newcastle into the number one spot in UK 
brewing, displacing long-term leader Bass. The acquisition brought two leading beer 
brands, Foster's and John Smith's that collectively accounted for nearly 30% of 
Courage's 17.6mhl volume. The deal also brought the Foster's licence for Europe, in 
addition to modern and relatively more efficient plant at Reading (5mhl lager capacity) 
and Tadcaster (2.5mhl ale capacity). Scottish's existing brewery in Edinburgh that had 
been responsible for most of the group's lager and ale production, had capacity of 
3.25mhl, with a then state-of-the-art canning line that met demand in the off trade. 
Collectively these were three of the largest sites in the UK, rendering the rest of the 
combined firms' brewing capacity more or less redundant and provided opportunities to 
expand and distribute nationally from these three locations. Forecast cost savings in the 
third year after the acquisition were at least E40m per annum - the figure came in at 
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closer to E75m, and arguably, could and should have been pushed harder, as Scottish & 
Newcastle has admitted more recently. 
Through the Courage acquisition Scottish & Newcastle had become a truly 
geographically balanced national brewer with a market share close to 30%, some seven 
percentage points higher than long-term market leader Bass. Having been the market 
leader for so long Bass was less than delighted at the demotion to second place; in a 
matter of little over a year Bass challenged the number one position through its own 
proposed but unsuccessful merger with Carlberg Tetley as discussed below. 
5.1.4. Cementing domestic leadership 
Scottish & Newcastle set out to become a national brewer with a managed pub portfolio 
of leading branded concepts that also had a national reach. To this end the 1995 Courage 
deal was only part of the story. Having entered the South on a large scale through the 
1993 acquisition of the Chef & Brewer pub estate from Grand Met, the 1999 acquisition 
of Greenalls' managed estate expanded the presence in the North West. At this stage 
Scottish & Newcastle could more or less claim to own a national managed pub operation 
to sit alongside its national brewing assets, albeit one that required considerable capital 
investment and some in-fill expansion into key areas in the Midlands. 
The author argued in 1998, prior to the acquisition of the Greenalls estate, that Scottish 
& Newcastle should remain in pub retailing. The traditional vertically integrated 
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structure provided a platform for pricing power, reduced marketing spend and gave 
control over distribution. In its 2001 Annual Review the Chairman of Scottish & 
Newcastle claimed: 
"Our commitment to UKpub retailing reflects both confidence in the growth prospects 
of the retained business and a strong belief that such an estate provides an invaluable 
shop windowfor our beer brands. It is in this on trade environment, not only here in the 
UK but in other markets around the world that much of beer brand building occurs. " 
However, by April 2003, after several international brewers had indicated their interest 
in being acquired, as discussed below, and under mounting pressure from some leading 
institutional investors Scottish & Newcastle was forced to concede that it was not 
possible to be both a domestic retailer and international brewer: 
"The Board believes that the best route for sustained value creation for Scottish & 
Newcastle is to focus on and develop its international beer business, driving value and 
improving returns on capitalfrom its existing European platform". 
On 6 October 2003, the firm announced the sale of S&N Retail to a private equity 
consortium, Spirit, for E2.5bn in cash. A long-term supply and distribution agreement 
was signed between Scottish Courage and Spirit for the provision of beer, wine, cider 
and other beverages. However, with the continued decline in wholesale beer prices the 
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new contract was significantly below the implied transfer price that Scottish Courage 
had historically booked on sales to its retail sister firm. 
5.2. Response of Scottish & Newcastle's competitors 
5.2.1. Bass 
At the start of the 1990s, Bass was a brewing and leisure conglomerate that comprised 
the UK's largest brewer/retailer, the Holiday Inn hotels franchise (bought in parts 
between 1988 and 1990), diversified leisure operation spanning gaming (Coral Racing), 
bingo (Gala) and amusement with prize (AWP) machine manufacture, and a controlling 
interest in the Britvic soft drinks business. Under pressure from shareholders to simplify 
the group structure and create cohesive strategies within each of the 'core' businesses of 
brewing, pub retailing and hotels, Bass embarked on the acquisition trail. Initially, it 
made piecemeal investments in brewing in the Czech Republic and China, and reached 
an agreement to brew and distribute Grolsch in the UK. However, once it was overtaken 
as the leading UK brewer by Scottish & Newcastle, the acquisition focus was on 
regaining pole position at home. 
On 25 August 1996 Bass Plc acquired Allied Domecq's 50% stake in Carlsberg Tetley 
(CTL). Subject to regulatory approval Bass agreed to merge its brewing operations with 
those of CTL and acquire an additional 30% shareholding in the enlarged enterprise, 
Bass Carlsberg-Tetley (BCT). On 9 December 1996 the proposed merger was referred 
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to the NIMC. The merger would have created the UK's largest brewer with 37% market 
share of beer production (Bass 23%; CTL 14%) and with a tied estate of 4,400 pubs. 
Scottish Courage had a market share of 28% with 2,700 tied outlets. Whitbread had a 
market share of 13% and a tied estate of 4,400 outlets. 
The merger was given clearance on a majority decision subject to Bass reducing the size 
of its pub estate to 2,500 outlets. However, the publication of the findings corresponded 
with a change in Government. The new Secretary of State, Margaret Beckett, did not 
accept the advice of the MMC, agreeing with the dissenter of the MMC panel, Professor 
David Newbery, and blocked the merger. In any event, Bass had concluded that the 
remedy to sell down to 2,500 outlets and in the manner suggested by the MMC was 
onerous and the fallback arrangements of the merger were enacted. 
At the end of 1997, and prompted partly by the failure to buy CTL, Bass sold its 
tenanted pub estate to the firm now known as Punch Taverns. It also sold the gaming 
and bingo operations. At that stage it was operating at some 2000 pubs below its 'Beer 
Orders' licence limit. It eventually expanded its managed pub portfolio to exploit the 
licence limit through a side agreement to buy 550 of the largest Allied Retail pubs 
following Punch Taverns' successful bid for Allied Retail in 1999. Bass also acquired 
the Inter- Continental Hotel operation in March 1998 for fl. 78bn, giving it a step change 
in scale as an international hotel operator. 
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Following the failure to acquire CTL to reassert its leadership in UK brewing Bass opted 
to exit the industry to expand its presence in international hotels and domestic pub 
retailing. In 2000 it sold its brewing operation to Interbrew for E2.3bn, the proceeds 
helping to eliminate the debt taken on to fund the February 1998 acquisition and future 
development of Inter Continental and the Elbn spent on the former Allied Retail 
managed pubs. 
In February 2003, Bass now renamed Six Continents, demerged, creating 
InterContinental Hotels Group (hotels and the Britvic investment) and Mitchells & 
Butlers (managed pubs, bars and restaurants). This was described at the time by group 
chairman, Sir Ian Prosser, as the 'Yzinal significant move" in the five year focus plan. 
5.2.2. Whitbread 
In the post 'Beer Orders' environment, in common with the other major brewer/retailers, 
Whitbread had sought a new strategy for its brewing and pub operations. 
Notwithstanding the success of the Whitbread Beer Company (WBC) in marketing its 
portfolio, the reliance on Heineken and Stella Artois was problematic, with the barrelage 
licence fee creating an operational cost disadvantage. Whilst not going the whole way to 
divesting WBC, it Was de-emphasised in the portfolio at a time when the group's 
success as a retailer became increasingly evident. The cross-shareholding relationship 
with the Whitbread Investment Company (WIC) was unwound; WIC simultaneously 
sold its equity stakes in various regional brewers. The brewing operation was placed on 
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an ýarms length' relationship with the retailing business. In essence the foundation was 
laid for an independent VvrBC. 
On 25 May 1999, Whitbread announced that it had reached an agreement with Allied 
Domecq, subject to shareholder and regulatory approval, to buy Allied Domecq 
Retailing UK for E2.36bn. This was the division of Allied Domecq that comprised 3,500 
leased and managed pubs, a 50% share in the off-licence chain First Quench (the other 
50% owned already by Whitbread as a result of the merger of Thresher and Victoria 
Wine) and 25% stake in Britannia Soft Drinks (the parent company of Britvic that was 
controlled by Bass, and in which Whitbread also had a 25% stake). In order to comply 
with established regulatory requirements Whitbread announced that it would separate 
WBC following completion of the acquisition. 
Following the surprise (to the parties, their advisers and The City) intervention of the 
new Secretary of State, Stephen Byers and the prospect of a CC investigation, 
Whitbread withdrew from the acquisition, clearing the way for the Punch Taverns/Bass 
bid that many believed raised more significant competition concerns. Whitbread carried 
through its objective to exit brewing, however, and in May 2000, sold WBC to 
Interbrew for f400m. 
The disposal prompted a complete strategic review of the group that concluded that its 
future did not lie in the pub market either, but in hotels, restaurants and fitness concepts. 
All pub and pub-related assets were sold. Since the 2000 strategic review the group has 
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narrowed its portfolio further to encompass primarily budget hotels (Travel Inn), coffee 
shops (Costa Coffee) and fitness clubs (David Lloyd) with surplus cash returned to 
shareholders. 
5.3. Scottish & Newcastle's international acquisitions 
Scottish & Newcastle was transformed through the Courage deal into not only the UK 
number one, but a firm with an option to expand an internationally recognised beer 
brand, Fosters into the European market. Whether there was ever a great likelihood of 
significant volume potential given national beer style and brand preferences it 
nevertheless signalled an interest in being an international player. 
On 20 March 2000 Scottish & Newcastle announced that it had reached an agreement 
with French food group, Danone, to acquire Kronenbourg and Alken Maes, its French 
and Belgian brewing operations for f1.8bn. At the time Danone also had equity 
investments in Italy and Spain, both of which were sold prior to the full transfer of 
ownership of Kronenbourg to Scottish & Newcastle. 
There had been rumours for some time that Scottish & Newcastle was poised to make a 
move intemationally. Indeed, a feature article in The Sunday Times on 22 November 
1998 suggested that Scottish & Newcastle was in talks to buy Kronenbourg for f2bn. 
The author wrote on 10 December 1998 that such a deal, if it could be agreed, would be 
beneficial to Scottish & Newcastle shareholders in that it would give the firm number 
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one position in the consolidating European brewing industry, with the ownership of a 
brand (Kronenbourg 1664) that could provide the basis for growth in the lucrative US 
imported beer market. Over time, the significant valuation gap with Heineken, the then 
European market leader would be closed. Danone had made little secret of its interest in 
exiting brewing to concentrate on its food and mineral water operations. In the listing 
particulars for the Danone acquisition, Scottish & Newcastle justified its purchase: 
"For some time we have made clear our objective to deliver shareholder value through 
creating a major international beer business able to deliver genuinely international 
brands, exploit the spread of best practice and capitalise on the anticipated growth in 
global beer consumption, Yhis transaction represents a major step towards our 
objective ..... ... 
In both the short and the long term, this base will provide the plaýform 
for three further development routes: investment in similar businesses (such as those in 
Spain and Italy), exporting premium brands andfurther complementary acquisitions. " 
Kronenbourg was the French market leader with a share of 40% and owned one of the 
largest breweries at its headquarters near Strasbourg. Alken Maes was the number two 
player in the much smaller Belgian market with a share of 14%, the market being 
dominated by Interbrew (now called InBev) the rival firm that also had a significant 
export business to France. Scottish & Newcastle had developed a relationship with 
Danone over the five years of ownership of Courage, which was responsible for licensed 
production and sales of the premium Kronenbourg 1664 in the UK. In aggregate the 
Kronenbourg standard and 1664 premium brands had annual sales of 8mhl -a minnow 
224 
by comparison to Budweiser global sales volume of 50mhl and Heineken's I 8mhl - but 
enough to underpin Danone as the third largest brewer in Europe in 1996 with a 6% 
share of the very fragmented market. 
The Kronenbourg acquisition was followed quickly by the purchase of Finland's leading 
brewer, Hartwall in February 2002 for E1.3bn, and control of the Portuguese brewer 
Centralcer in 2003. There have also been minority investments in the emerging markets 
of India and China, in Greece and in the UK with the acquisition of the leading cider 
producer, HP Bulmer. Hartwall was the most significant acquisition, not for its leading 
position in Finland (a duopoly beer market) but because it came with a 50% stake in a 
joint-venture with Carlsberg, Baltic Beverage Holdings (BBH) that owned and managed 
the Baltika brewery, the largest brewery in St Petersburg. Baltika accounted for 33% of 
the growing Russian market. 
5.4. Post-acquisition operating performance 
Figure 5.1. and Figure 5.2 track the performance of the UK's major brewers from 1992, 
the first year of full implementation of the 'Beer Orders' to 1999, the last year that both 
Bass and Whitbread were involved in UK brewing. It is clear that the Courage deal 
transformed Scottish and Newcastle's UK brewing margins and returns from what 
appeared to be terminal decline in the aftermath of the 'Beer Orders'. Certainly its 
experience post Courage demonstrated that it had something of a future compared to 
Whitbread and Carlsberg-Tetley. The chart also illustrates however, that Bass's position 
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provided a firmer base from which to develop a larger (interriational) beer Portfolio, if 
indeed that could be a value-added strategy. 
Although wholesale beer prices remained under pressure, not least within the Courage 
business following the expiration of the lucrative supply contract to the Inntrepreneur 
estate that ended in 1997 (and which transferred to Scottish & Newcastle on the change 
of ownership), Scottish & Newcastle had the benefit of significant efficiency measures 
that shielded margins from the price discounting pressure in the free trade. Breweries 
were closed and distribution was rationalised in addition to an increased emphasis on the 
leading brands in the portfolio with successful campaigns for the former Courage brand, 
John Smith's in particular. The improvement in operating returns reflects the efficiency 
gains. 
Figure 5.1. Operating margins of major brewers 
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The true test of whether the Courage deal has been a transformational one for Scottish 
rests in two attributes. Has it given Scottish a sustainable margin advantage in LTK 
brewing, and one that allows a 'superior' return to shareholders? Has it created a 
powerful platform from which to expand and create a leading position internationally, a 
key argument in both the Courage acquisition and the 1989 failed bid by Courage's 
parent Elders IXL for Scottish & Newcastle? 
Figure 5.2. Operating returns of major brewers 
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Recent performance in the UK has been disappointing. Following a period of margin 
enhancement from the year after the merger came into effect margins and returns rose 
until 2002, but then dipped significantly in 2003. Part of this - of the order of 0.5% 
points - can be explained by the adverse effect of the divestment of the pub operations 
and simultaneous replacement with a long term supply contract at market rates to their 
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new owner that cost an estimated E14m per annum. In addition, the acquisition of the 
low margin and high capital intensive Bulmer's cider business also clouds the current 
picture, adding a further 0.5% points reduction in the smoothed operating margin. 
Market conditions deteriorated generally in 2003 with aggressive pricing in the off- 
trade. According to Scottish & Newcastle since 2000 the UK beer market overall has 
declined 5.4%. With indirect costs increasing 10%, overall brewing profits fell by 16% 
(Source: Seminar on the UK beer business, 23 June 2004). In response it has been 
forced to take a fresh look at its cost base, announcing the closure of the two breweries 
in Edinburgh and Newcastle that were so closely aligned to its past. Added to various 
other initiatives in the supply chain the firm anticipates annual cost savings of f60m in 
fiscal 2006. Assuming no underlying margin pressure and reductions in gross revenue, 
the additional profit would take operating margins and returns in the UK back to pre-pub 
disposal levels. 
However, notwithstanding the more challenging operating environment encountered in 
the UK, the true disappointment in the business - and one that has posed substantial and 
unresolved questions for the firm's mergers and acquisitions strategy has been the 
failure of the overseas brewing deals to launch Scottish & Newcastle as a formidable 
international competitor. 
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At the time of the Danone acquisition in 2000, Scottish and Newcastle said: 
C4 r, - r or some time we have made clear our objective to deliver shareholder value through 
creating a major international beer business able to develop genuinely international 
brands, exploit the spread of best practice and capitalise on the anticipated growth in 
global beer consumption. This transaction represents a major step towards our 
objective" 
As an array of international brewing businesses were added to the French purchase 
(Finland, Portugal, Greece, China and India) operating and cash returns have fallen 
sharply. Free cash flow benefited temporarily from the sale of the capital intensive pub 
estate, but there has not been an upwards shift in returns to shareholders. 
5.5. Conclusion 
It is evident from the profile of the financial ratios, shown in Figure 5.3, that chart the 
firm's development since the Danone acquisition in 2000, that Scottish & Newcastle has 
been less successful in its international merger and acquisition strategy. While it is not 
possible to apportion blame between poor strategy and poor implementation, 
undoubtedly both have played their part. 
This performance is in stark contrast to that of Diageo, discussed in the following 
chapter that also engaged in high profile international acquisitions in the 1990s. Scottish 
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& Newcastle has adopted a strategy of international mergers and acquisition aimed at 
broadening its geographic exposure. It is clear that the firm has been successful in 
managing its interactions with the competition authorities during the execution of those 
strategies, always favouring an agreed bid structure. However, it is also clear that while 
developing the core skill of gaining merger clearance as an essential element of the 
firm's growth strategy good work can be undone by choosing the wrong targets or by 
poor implementation. 
Figure 5.3. Scottish & Newcastle financial ratios 
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Chapter 6. Case study of Diageo 
Diageo is the group that was formed from the 1997 merger of the two major UK 
alcoholic beverages firms Grand Metropolitan and Guinness. The group is almost 
exclusively dedicated to the production and marketing of international spirits brands, 
with additional volume derived from wine and the eponymous Guinness stout. It has 
now completed the divestment of all of the former Grand Met food and fast food 
operations. Table 6.1. shows the major events in the group's corporate history. 
6.1. History of Grand Metropolitan 
The origins of the former Grand Metropolitan lay in the post-War property development 
empire of Sir Maxwell Joseph. Starting initially in the London hotel market, his flair for 
property investment aligned to an aggressive acquisition strategy brought pub retailing 
and several food and drink firms into the Grand Met portfolio. Having established a 
deal-making culture successive management teams expanded the group into - and out of 
- Inter- Continental hotels, William Hill, Express Dairies, and the Liggett Corporation 
(tobacco, eye and healthcare). Perhaps the best known, and at the time controversial 
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acquisition was the 1989 purchase of Pillsbury that included the Burger King fast food 
empire. 
Table 6.1. Major events in Diageo corporate history 
Year Event 
2005 Acquired Bushmills Irish whiskey from Pernod Ricard post acquisition of Allied Domecq 
2004 Restructured the US joint venture with Moet Hennessy 
2002 Announced sale of Burger King. Disposal of Malibu and Mumm Cuvee Napa brands to Allied Domecq 
2001 Acquired Seagram spirits assets jointly with Pernod Ricard. Sold Pillsbury to General Mills 
2000 Retirement of George Bull, John McGrath and Anthony Greener Paul Walsh became group chief executive 
1999 Sale of Cruzcampo to Heineken Disposal of Metaxa, Asbach Uralt, Cinzano and Vecchia Romagna 
1998 Di sposal of Dewar's and Bombay to Bacardi 
1997 Grand Met and Guinness announced merger to form Diageo 
1996 Grand Met sold Pearle Vision 
1995 Grand Met acquired Pet (Old El Paso Mexican food, Progresso soups and animal food) 
1994 Guinness restructured cross-shareholding with LVMH to take 34% direct stake in Moet Hennessy. LVMH 
retained stake in Guinness 
1993 Grand Met sold Chef & Brewer pub estate. Guinness acquired Desnoes & Geddes (Jamaican brewer of Red Stripe) 
1992 Grand Met sold Express Dairy and Eden Vale; acquired Cinzano 
1991 Guinness acquired Cruzcampo (Spain's largest brewer) 
1990 Grand Met transacted 
'breweries-for-pubs' swap with Elders IXL/Courage. 
Guinness/LVMH cross-shareholding increased to 24%. 
1989 Grand Met acquired Pillsbury (included Burger Kinq, Green Giant and Haagen-Dazs) 
1988 
Grand Met sold Inter-Continental hotels. Unsuccessful bids for Martell and Irish Distillers. 
Guinness and LVMH established a 12% cross-shareholding structure to 'protect' underlying distribution 
I 
joint ventures 
1987 Grand Met acquired Heublein (owner of Smirnoff) 
1986 Guinness acquired 
Distillers Company Limited (Johnnie Walker Scotch). 
Grand Met sold Mecca Leisure. 
1985 Guinness acquired Arthur Bell. Grand Met sold Liggett. 
1983 Grand Met acquired Pearle (eye care), Children's World (nurseries) and Quality Care (healthcare) 
1981 Grand Met acquired Inter-Continental Hotels from Pan Am 
1980 Grand Met acquired 
Liggett Group (cigarettes, Alpo pet foods and J&B Rare US distributor). lDV launched 
Malibu 
1974 IDV launched Bailey's Irish Cream 
1972 Grand Met acquired Watney Mann, which owned IDV 
1971 Grand Met acquired Truman Hanbury Buxton 
1970 Grand Met acquired Berni Inns and Mecca (bingo) 
1969 Grand Met acquired Express Dairy (Eden Vale, Express and Ski) 
1966 Grand Met acquired Levy & Franks (Chef & Brewer) 
1963 Guinness opened its first brewery in Africa (Nigeria) 
1962 IDV formed from merger of United Wine Traders and W&A Gilbey 
1947 Grand Met bouqht first London hotel (The Mandeville) 
1934 Grand Met founded by Maxwell Joseph 
1909 Johnnie Walker Red and Black Label launched 
1877 Distillers Company Limited formed from six lowland grain whisky distillenes 
1851 Gilbey's gin 
distillery established in Camden Town; Justerini & Brooks merged with Twiss Brownings to 
form United Wine Traders 
1769 Gordon's qin distillery established in London 
1759 Guinness brewery established in Dublin 
1749 Johnson and Justerini formed partnership, predecessor of Justerini and Brooks ( J&B) 
Source: Diageo website, Soldana website, London Business School case study (1988) 
232 
Grand Met's involvement in international drinks started in the 1970s, when it inherited 
reluctantly International Distillers and Vintners (IDV) as a result of the hostile approach 
for the brewing firm Watney Mann. In an attempt to thwart the hostile approach from its 
Southern rival (Grand Met had acquired Truman Hanbury Buxton in the previous year), 
Watney Mann, owner of Red Barrel beer and the Chef & Brewer pub estate, bought the 
minorities in its associate IDV. Grand Met had struck a side deal with Rank Group to 
offload IDV following the integration of Watney Mann. This agreement fell through, 
leaving a heavily indebted Grand Met having just completed the largest industrial deal 
in the UK, on the verge of bankruptcy in the 1973/4 recession. 
When Max Joseph retired in 1980 he was replaced by his chosen successor, (Sir) 
Stanley Grinstead. The acquisition strategy continued unabated, with the purchase of the 
US tobacco conglo, merate, Liggett Group (owner of Alpo pet food and Paddington 
Corporation, the US distributor of IDV's J&B Rare), Inter-Continental hotels from Pan 
American Airlines, Pearle eye care and Children's World nurseries. An outside 
management team was brought in to rationalise the domestic portfolio of brands and 
retail concepts, notably, (Lord) Allan Sheppard, who went on to replace Grinstead at the 
helm of Grand Met in 1986. Sheppard recruited a team of younger managers that had 
similar operational experience from industrial sectors such as the motor industry. Like 
Sheppard, many of these managers, such as Ian Martin and John McGrath went on to 
senior positions in Grand Met, and subsequently to leading non-executive positions in 
other groups. 
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Shortly after his appointment as group chief executive, Sheppard announced the 
acquisition of the US wine and spirits producer, Heublein for $1.2bn. This brought 
ownership and control of Smimoff, a brand that IDV had distributed in several countries 
for more than 30 years, a strategic alliance with the owner of the leading tequila, Jose 
Cuervo, and gave Grand Met a 15% market share of the US spirits and 11.5% of the US 
wine markets. The acquired brands added critical mass to the IDV operation of long- 
standing Scotch brand J&B and recently developed brands Bailey's and Malibu. 
This marked a crucial turning point for Grand Met. A leading position in the key US 
spirits market and a growing portfolio of acquired and home-gown brands presented a 
growth platform that could not be replicated through acquisition of any of the 
competitor UK brewing and pub firms. Presiding over what insiders described as very 
lively and wide ranging strategy meetings with a management style that he likened to 
cstrangulation' Sheppard was usually firmly at the heart of acquisition rumours in the 
spirits industry. During 1988 two significant hostile deals were proposed but ultimately 
rejected, Mar-tell Cognac and Irish Distillers, in the later case blocked by the EC 
following an intensive lobbying campaign by both the firm and the Irish authorities. 
During this period Grand Met was also believed to have contemplated hostile bids for 
LVNIH, Guinness and a raft of smaller producers with leading brands, such as Highland 
Distillers. However, the cost and complexity of such deals, with additional (family) 
blocking stakes in most cases made such aspirations futile. Consequently Sheppard 
turned his attention to the US food industry and in 1989 acquired Pillsbury, an 
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underperforming food firm with vertically integrated assets in flour and dough products 
and processed vegetables, in addition to a sizeable restaurant operation that included the 
number two fast food chain, Burger King. 
In addition to integrating and rationalizing Pillsbury to bring efficiency and margins up 
to industry standards, the early 1990s were spent planning and executing an exit from 
the low-growth UK brewing and pub retailing sectors. Commentators suggested at the 
time that Grand Met was instrumental behind the scenes in providing many of the ideas 
and much of the analysis of the case for the ending of the vertical tie that was partially 
effected through the 'Beer Orders'. Therefore it was of little surprise to find the firm 
making the first strategic move in the immediate aftermath of the 'Beer Orders'. 
On 12 March 1990, Elders IXL and Grand Met announced their agreement to swap 
brewing and pub assets through a complex three-stage process. The merger was referred 
to the MMC on 27 April 1990. Owing to the fact that the parties had expressed their 
willingness to put forward possible remedies if necessary, provided their fundamental 
aims could be accommodated, the investigation was completed by October 1990. The 
transaction was complex. In summary, Elders IXL, through its Courage subsidiary 
acquired the brewing assets of Grand Met, Watney Mann Truman, holder of the 
exclusive licence to brew Foster's in the UK. Grand Met took a 50% shareholding in the 
Courage tenanted pub operation, renamed Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd (IEL) and injected 
its 3,565 tenanted pubs to create an enlarged IEL. IEL was administered under a service 
agreement by Grand Met's property subsidiary, Grand Met Estates Ltd. Both the wholly 
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owned Grand Met managed pubs, Grand Met Retailing (GMR) and IEL signed ten year 
exclusive supply contracts to Courage, altered to five years to comply with EU law. 
This was the first significant development in Grand Met's exit from brewing and pub 
retailing. The firm sold Grand Met Retailing, which included the Chef & Brewer chain 
to the ambitious Scottish & Newcastle in 1993. By 1996, the year after Scottish & 
Newcastle's subsequent decision to acquire Courage, all that remained from Grand 
Met's brewing past was IEL. IEL paid back the loans to its parents, and was a fully 
independent operation. With Pillsbury and Burger King in significantly better shape 
there was now scope for a landmark deal in spirits. 
6.2. History of Guinness 
Arthur Guinness established a brewery at St James' Gate, Dublin in 1759. With a 
relatively small home market and mass emigration from Ireland in the 19ý' century, 
Guinness became an internationally recognised name. A brewery was established at 
Park Royal in London, to meet UK demand, largely from the growing Irish immigrant 
community. However, Guinness did not ado t the UK vertically integrated p 
brewer/retailer structure, opting to sell its beer brand into both the free and tied trade 
alike. Without the distraction and capital intensity of pub retailing, it was able to exploit 
opportunities overseas, and by the 1980s had a portfolio of majority and minority stakes 
in brewers in Nigeria, the Caribbean and Malaysia. This supplemented the export 
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business from St James' Gate that was largely in the form of concentrate that was sold to 
partner brewers for local bottling and distribution. 
During the 1960s, as lager emerged as the beer of choice in the UK and Ireland, 
Guinness was viewed increasingly as an 'old man's' drink. To address the business 
decline it established in conjunction with several brewers (including Courage and 
Scottish & Newcastle), Harp lager. As lager's share of LTK beer consumption grew, 
other major UK brewers in addition to the consortium members developed their own 
brands and sought to brew internationally recognised lagers under licence. Harp lager 
inevitably lost market share to these heritage brands. By the 1980s, Guinness was 
effectively 'back to square one'. 
The still family-controlled business brought in an outsider, marketing professional 
Ernest Saunders as chief executive. The Guinness brand was repositioned with a 
younger image employing a groundbreaking marketing campaign featuring the actor 
Rudger Heuer. The decline in the UK was arrested and Saunders and his team turned its 
attention to acquisitions, in particular those with more significant international scope. In 
1985 Guinness acquired Arthur Bell, owner of the UK and South Africa's leading 
Scotch brand. In 1986 came the controversial acquisition of the leading whisky producer 
and brand owner, the Distillers Company (DCL). It was this acquisition with brands 
Johnnie Walker and Gordon's and a self-sufficient Scotch production profile that 
created the platform for a global branded spirits operation; this underpins the successor 
firm, Diageo even today. 
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Unfortunately the Saunders team had entered into an illegal share-support scheme to 
guarantee the success of Guinness' bid for Distillers. Saunders' subsequent arrest, trial U -- 
and imprisonment made way for a new management team under (Sir) Anthony Tennant, 
a drinks industry veteran from IDV. He turned his attention to building a distribution 
infrastructure to support the growth of the brands bought by Saunders. One of the first 
strategic moves was to form a distribution alliance with the French luxury goods firm, 
Louis Vuitton Moýt Hennessy (LVMH) that covered the ma or markets of the US Japan j7 
and other parts of the Far East. There had been a pre-existing relationship for partner 
distribution in France and the UK. In 1988 the alliance was cemented by a complex 
cross-shareholding relationship between Guinness and LVNIH group holding 
companies. 
Following the retirement of Anthony Tennant in the mid 1990s, and the succession of 
Tony Greener, a 'cooling' in the relationship between the Guinness management and 
Bernard Amault at LVMH occurred. The cross-shareholding structure was reorganised 
with Guinness trading its stake in LVMH for a larger minority holding (34%) in the 
Moýt Hennessy subsidiary, and LVMH reducing and finally selling in entirety its 
holding in Guinness. 
Tony Greener's tenure at the top of Guinness was a somewhat unhappy one. He 
inherited excellent distribution to support an array of leading Scotch brands but his 
predecessor had not addressed sufficiently marketing and brand positioning. Greener 
also had to deal with a weak Spanish brewing operation, Cruzcampo that under-mined 
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the good work in the Guinness brewing subsidiary, GBW. Shortly after the merger with 
Grand Met, Cruzcampo was sold to Heineken in June 1999 for E425m, some f50m less 
than the original price paid in 1992 by the Tennant team. 
6.3. Diageo merger 
By 1996 Grand Met had divested its traditional domestic brewing and retailing 
operations, in addition to a range of other peripheral assets and in so doing had freed up 
both capital and management time. It had spent several years working hard to improve 
the efficiency- of Pillsbury and Burger King was making headway against market leader 
McDonalds in the core US market. However, notwithstanding the operating benefits 
from the restructuring programme, the US food operation was subscale relative to other 
US and multinational food conglomerates and the US market was showing early signs of 
an explosion in demand for private label, fuelled by a power shift downstream to food 
retailers in much the same way as in the UK and parts of Western Europe. 
The performance of the international spirits market, in terms of both mood and trading, 
was near to the lows last seen in the 1970s at the time of the so-called 'whisky loch'. A 
revival in fortunes in the mid 1980s, when consumers were keen to trade up to premium 
and deluxe brands and where overseas markets had started to open up was a distant 
memory. The 1990 recession, tax increases in the US and a lower inflation environment 
had undermined brand pricing. The growth in private label and value brands in 
developed markets supported by previously overoptimistic volume growth projections 
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had created a new 'whisky loch'. At the same time brand owners were compelled to 
spend more to support their leading names by way of marketing campaigns and 
maintaining international distribution networks. In many of the major spirits markets 
unless a brand was in the top two or three in its category it was in danger of being de- 
listed (and this did happen to some previously well-known brands). 
As a result of the merger and acquisition activity in the mid-1980s, four major quoted 
firms emerged as global, full-service spirits marketers and distributors, Grand Met, 
Guinness, Seagam and Allied Domecq. In addition there was a smattering of private 
operators, including Bacardi, Pernod Ricard and Brown Forman, each with one or two 
leading brands and supra-national distribution. The annual running cost of a fully-owned 
and controlled distribution network was estimated at close to E300m. This was an 
enormous fixed cost for a firm that did not have leading brands and full category 
coverage. The rational response was to amalgamate one or more portfolios, eliminate an 
entire distribution network, and sell of the 'tail' of non-performing brands from both 
portfolios to release capital to support the leading brands. 
However, most observers questioned whether rationalisation on this scale was possible. 
Given the size of the majors, hostile bids seemed unlikely. Moreover, tie-ups within the 
premier division would lead inevitably to a lengthy regulatory investigation in one or 
more jurisdictions that would scupper any deal. 
240 
In so far as there had been rumours of merger and acquisition activity they had centred 
on a tie-up between Seagram and Allied Domecq. These two firms were thought to have 
spoken purposefully about a merger in 1986, but on failing to agree terms (possibly due 
to the family ownership structure of Seagram) other deals had been sought by the 
parties. Allied-Lyons, as it was then known, was embroiled in a bitter defence against a 
hostile bid from Elders IXL, and derailed the bid with the 'white knight' acquisition of 
Hiram Walker. Seagram occupied itself elsewhere in unrelated industries. 
Whilst Grand Met's spirits operation, IDV, was performing relatively well, with well- 
regarded and supported brands, its more innovative portfolio was narrow and non- 
traditional. The lack of a leading international Scotch and/or Cognac brands was a 
serious barrier to growth in the emerging markets of Asia. The management had tried 
several times, unsuccessfully to resolve the shortfall through acquisition in the 1980s. 
Aside from strong and lucrative positions in the US (Smirnoff and Baileys) and Spain 
(J&B Rare) it had a necessarily restricted geographic focus; without international brown 
spirits brands building and maintaining a global network was an unachievable goal. 
By contrast, Guinness had a wide ranging international portfolio because of its 
dominance of Scotch. Through the joint venture relationship with Modt Hennessy it 
could also play the competitive position of Scotch and Cognac in its distribution 
network. However, there were group-level distractions brought about by the increasingly 
frosty relationship with Moýt Hennessy's parent, LVMH, and a GBW operation that was 
struggling to revive the ill-fated 1991/2 Spanish brewing acquisitions. 
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The possibility of discussions between Grand Met and Guinness surfaced in autumn 
1996 with a bizarre 'leak' to The Sunday Telegraph of a confidential report from within 
Lazards, investment banking adviser to Guinness. It pointed to the prospect of a mega 
deal between Guinness and Grand Met, with Guinness taking the initiative as bidder. 
Deepening the intrigue was that Lazard's sister company, Lazard Frere in Paris acted in 
a similar capacity for LVMH. Indeed, one of Lazard Frere's senior partners, was on the 
board of LVNIH, and a close confident of M Amault. 
On 12 May 1997, after an apparent senior-level courtship of a matter of weeks following 
a dinner at a secluded London hotel on 10 April 1997, the chairmen of Grand Met and 
Guinness announced their intention to join via a 'no-premium merger'. Technically, 
Guinness acquired Grand Met, the marginally larger firm, to avoid triggering a 'Control 
Event' clause in the joint venture agreement between United Distillers and Mo&- 
Hennessy. 
According to the Listing Particulars ("Proposed merger of Guinness plc and Grand 
Metropolitan PIC) the stated rationale was to establish: 
i. Complementary and broad product and brand range: combined spirits and wines 
business offer consumers some of the most attractive brands across most major 
spirits categories. 
ii. Greater geographic breadth: necessary critical mass and local market capabilities to 
exploit the opportunities for growth (in emerging markets) 
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Enhanced marketing capability 
iv. Greater cost efficiency: generate operating cost savings of some fI 75m per annum 
in the third year of trading following the merger 
v. Financial capability to develop the business: both organically and by acquisition 
The rationale for the merger between the two was clear. Guinness was heavily 
dependent on Scotch, creating significant geographic breadth but little depth in most 
markets. Grand Met's spirits subsidiary, IDV had a broader spread of spirits categories 
but a relatively insignificant exposure to Scotch (and Cognac) that limited expansion 
opportunities in Asia/Pacific and Latin America. 
In addition to these stated objectives there were other less public, but equally important 
potential positives for either party to the merger. The relationship between Guinness and 
LVMH had gone sour some years earlier following the departure of Anthony Tennant. 
The 1994 restructuring of the relationship that left Guinness with a direct 34% stake in 
Mo&-Hennessy, and LVMH with a smaller shareholding in Guinness was a temporary 
compromise; Guinness' bargaining position with LVMH was weak, even if LVME was 
keen to divest its spirits operation. As part of an enlarged spirits multinational the 
significance of the Modt-Hennessy shareholding would be diluted as there would be 
other brands with which to share distribution overheads. 
For Grand Met a major spirits deal provided a useful diversion from a US food 
operation that had completed the rationalisation programme but now faced the challenge 
of private label and from a resurgent McDonald's in the US fast food market. 
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Demerging the three separate and unrelated parts of Grand Met had been considered but 
there were significant tax disadvantages in doing so. The general upheaval in the wake 
of a merger could provide opportunities to simplify and resolve outstanding tax and 
financial issues. 
However, in addition to having to deal with the deeply disgruntled LVME (as discussed 
below) there were two significant hurdles to clear, the FTC and EC investigations into 
the merger. 
6.3.1. The EC judgment 
On 20 June 1997 the European Commission declared its decision to initiate proceedings. 
Following the submission of remedies by the parties, the deal was cleared on 15 October 
1997. 
The EC recognised the importance of both distribution and the structure of the portfolio 
in creating or strengthening a 'dominant' position. It had experience of several cross- 
border spirits acquisitions albeit of a lesser size* and had conducted a lengthy 
investigation into a merger in the branded bottled mineral water industry some years 
earlier (Nestle/Perrier) that raised similar distribution and brand portfolio issues. 
Unsurprisingly the merging parties argued for the widest possible 'relevant market' for 
both products and geography, namely, all spirits (market research showed consumers 
244 
willing to substitute one type of spirit for another according to occasion, availability and 
price) and all geography (a single European market; differential taxation between 
countries was not an issue given that product was shipped 'under-bond' and could 
therefore be parallel imported legitimately). 
On the basis of its own questioning of Diageo's competitors and customers, the EC 
concluded that just because several different types of spirits were consumed by the same 
consumers at different times did not place them in the same market. Moreover, they 
pointed to significant supply side differences that created a natural distinction between 
brown and white spirits. Firm brand marketing strategies supported individual spirit 
types and specific brands within the category, implying that the relevant product market 
had to be no wider than each spirits type. Scotch constituted a separate market given its 
heritage and price positioning. However, further subdivision to the level of price points 
such as standard, premium and deluxe was not necessary given a continuum of prices 
within most categories. Regarding geography, the EC concluded that the relevant 
geographic market for spirits sales, with the exception of duty-free, was national. This 
reflected different consumption patterns and the manner in which distribution channels 
were organised. 
On the supply side, no adverse findings were identified. IDV added an incremental 15% 
to UD's 40 - 50% market share of grain whisky production through 
its joint venture 
agreement for the North British distillery. There were few barriers to entry to grain 
production given that the process and ingredients were the same as for other grain-based 
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spirits. There were other major suppliers of grain whisky, such as Allied Domecq and 
William Grant. Moreover, the Scotch industry had always been characterised by 
significant concentration in the supply of grain. The situation with regard to malt 
distilleries was less significant given the combined group's 25 - 35% share. The leading 
single malt brands were owned by independent Scotch producers. 
The EC pointed to the importance of distribution and 'portfolio effects' in the spirits 
industry, drawing on its findings in earlier EC cases. The major spirits companies were 
vertically integrated into distribution which provided an effective barrier to entry to 
smaller players and one-brand firms. Where new entry had occurred it had generally 
been from US-based spirits groups with established brands, such as Jim Beam Brands 
and Brown-Forman, but their market position had remained almost negligible. The EC 
stance was that "the market power derivingfrom a porýfblio of brands exceeds the sum 
of its parts". A firm owning a portfolio of leading brands was in a strong position 
relative to customers by virtue of its relative importance as a supplier, creating a 
platform for tying or bundling, and the threat to withdraw supplies. When ten 
competitors and customers were asked by the EC 'does possession of a leading brand in 
all or most spirits categories help sales of spirits in generalT eight replied that it would 
help "a lot". The EC concluded that in some markets buyer power was unlikely to be 
sufficient to prevent the creation or reinforcement of a dominant position as a result of 
the merger. 
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At the country level, the main area of focus was Greece, Europe's seventh largest 
market overall, and fifth largest Scotch market. Greece accounted for 3% of global 
Scotch volumes compared to France (I I%), UK (10%), Spain (9%) and Germany (4%). 
As shown in Table 6.2., collectively the merger parties would have had almost full 
control of Greece, and in particular would have accounted for 60% of the Greek Scotch 
market, that itself represented over 40% of total spirits consumption. The EC was 
especially concerned about the portfolio coverage in a market that had a very 
fragmented retail base. 
Table 6.2. Greek spirits market in 1995 
Category Volume % Guinness % Category Grand Met % Category 
Scotch whisky 42.8 45-55 <10 
Other (mainly ouzo) 24.3 - 30 
Brandy/Cognac 9.6 70-80 
Liqueurs 8.5 30 
Vodka 7.8 <10 10-20 
Rum 4.2 75-85 
Gin 2.8 80-90 <2 
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities: Industry estimates 
Other markets that were scrutinised heavily were Spain, Ireland and 
Belgium/Luxembourg, the latter two being very small spirits markets. In Spain, the EC 
considered that a dominant position would be created in Scotch (largely as a result of the 
combination of market leader, J&B Rare with Johnnie Walker Red Label and Dewar's). 
In Ireland, the issue was more of consolidation of spirits distributors, with the new firm 
consolidating effectively three distributors into one, leaving only one other significant 
independent player in the market. This in turn would strengthen existing dominant 
positions in Scotch and brandy/Cognac. 
247 
Having argued hard at the outset that the merger did not break EC competition 
requirements, the merging parties wasted little time in addressing the EC's concerns 
with remedies. They agreed to the divestment of all rights in Europe and the 'Succession 
States' to the two Scotch brands, Dewar's and Ainslie's, to end the distribution 
agreements for Wyborowa vodka and Gilbey's gin in Belgium/Luxembourg and Bacardi 
in Greece. In addition they agreed to resolve the concentration of distribution in Ireland 
by one of two unspecified methods (in the event, equity shareholdings were sold to 
private equity and minority shareholders). 
6.3.2. The FTC judgment 
Due to the international scope of the merger, the US regulatory authorities investigated 
it simultaneously with the EC. On 17 April 1998, more than three months after the 
merger took effect, the FTC announced clearance with conditions. A proposed consent 
made on 15 December 1997 required the total divestment of Dewar's Scotch and 
Bombay gin. The two brands plus associated assets were sold to Bacardi for $1.9bn in 
June 1998. The FTC investigation and decision was noted as one that had resulted from 
significant international co-operation between the US, EC, Canadian, Mexican and 
Australian authorities. The sale of assets to Bacardi was a record sum for a government- 
mandated divestment. 
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The detail of the FTC's analysis are somewhat sparse, however, it focused on premium 
Scotch and premium gin as two 'relevant markets' that were highly concentrated, and 
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where concentration would increase as a result of the merger. Its geographic market 
definition was the US in total even though there are state-level distribution regulations 
that prevent firms selling their products nationally. In premium Scotch, Guinness was 
the largest firm in the US with a market share of 68% (Dewar's and Johnnie Walker Red 
Label) and Grand Met the second largest with 24% share (J&B Rare). HHI would 
increase by 3000 points to 8000 as a result of the merger. In premium gin, Guinness was 
market leader with 58% share (Tanqueray) and Grand Met was the number three with 
15% share (Bombay). HHI would increase by 1700 points to 6000 as a result of the 
merger. The merger would create a substantial lessening of competition in these two 
relevant markets, resulting in higher prices. 
6.4. Response of Diageo's competitors 
As part of their strategic reviews firms started to prepare their submissions to the 
regulatory authorities to attempt to stall the merger, or at least scupper Diageo's plans to 
keep the proposed portfolio of brands intact. In this respect Seagram was keen to protect 
its leading position in the US and Allied Domecq was minded to minimise the threat in 
its key market, Spain. There were in addition some specific flashpoints to resolve, 
ranging from the small - agency agreements that IDV had with other brand owners such 
as Brown-Forman - to the very large and complex - the joint venture between Guinness 
and LVMR7 and likely response of M Amault. 
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6.4.1. LVMH 
M Arnault was less than pleased at the prospect of being a minority shareholder in 
Diageo, more so because as a board member of Guinness he was only made aware of the 
merger at the board meeting that took place on 9 May 1997, three days before the 
announcement. Adding to the insult was the fact that LVMH had sold a 7% stake in 
Guinness a little more than six months earlier for 170p per share less (f230m) than the 
share price on the day of the announcement. 
As Grand Met and Guinness went through the summer of 1997 the greater threat to the 
merger came from LVMH rather than the possibility of regulatory intervention. LVMH 
started to buy shares in Grand Met with a view to blocking the bid; a holding of 10% 
allowed a shareholder to convene an EGM under section 368 of the Companies Act. At 
25% the merger could have been blocked entirely. By 3 July 1997, LVME owned 6.3% 
of Grand Met, in addition to the existing shareholding of 14.2% in Guinness. 
LVMH urged the parties to accept its proposal for a three-way merger of the spirits 
operations of IDV (Grand Met), UD (Guinness) and Modt Hennessy (LVMH), with the 
simultaneous divestment of Burger King, Pillsbury and GBW. This proposal was ruled 
out largely for tax reasons (in the event, this is exactly what has happened to Diageo 
with the passage of time). 
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LVMH additionally threatened legal action on Guinness with regard to the 'Control 
Event' clauses in the joint venture agreement with Mo6t Hennessy that if successful 
would have forced Guinness to sell its half of the various distribution joint ventures at 
net asset value, and the 34% stake in MO& Hennessy for a maximum 15% discount to 
fair value. Worse still was the additional part of the 'Control Event' clause that stated 
that LVME would retain exclusive distribution control over UD's brands in the joint 
venture markets (US, Japan and most of Europe) for the following ten years. Whilst the 
legal challenge seemed unlikely to be successful - the merger was structured technically 
as Guinness acquiring Grand Met for the very reason to avoid triggering the 'Control 
Event' clause, there was likely to be a long-drawn out legal process heading ultimately 
for arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. 
On II October 1997, by which time LVME owned 11% of the shares of Grand Met and 
11.46% of the shares of Guinness, Guinness announced that it had reached an agreement 
with LVMH to extend the distribution joint venture with Mo& Hennessy in return for a 
payment of ; E250m (in effect the opportunity loss from selling shares in Guinness six 
months before the merger announcement). The extended distribution agreement to cover 
named IDV brands meant that Diageo would gain additional merger cost savings of 
L20m by year three. 
With the extended distribution agreement it seemed that eventually the majority holding 
in Moýt Hennessy would be sold to Diageo. However, whether motivated by the success 
of the Millennium celebrations for Champagne sales, or the high profile failure to 
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capture Gucci, LVNM had a change of heart with respect to its ongoing involvement in 
the international drinks industry. Following Diageo's acquisition and subsequent 
integration of the Seagram spirits assets, Diageo took in-house all US brands that had 
previously been distributed in North America by the joint venture Schieffelin & 
Somerset, leaving Mo& Hennessy with a limited sub-scale portfolio in that key market. 
In November 2004 Modt Hennessy acquired the Scotch producer, Glenmorangie. It 
remains unclear whether there is an eventual exit route for Moýt Hennessy. 
6.4.2. Allied Domecq 
At the time of the proposed merger with Unilever in 1969, Allied Breweries, the 
forerunner of Allied-Lyons and Allied Domecq was the UK's second largest producer of 
beer, the second largest owner of retail outlets with 8,300 public houses and 1,700 off 
licences, and by virtue of the 1968 acquisition of Showerings, it was also the UK's 
largest wines and spirits company. It had a fledgling African brewing business with 
breweries in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania but a much larger and more important 
operation in the Netherlands. Allied Breweries was ambitious to create a major 
international alcoholic beverages business, mindful of the limited extent to which it 
could expand in the home market. Its first attempt to become a major international force 
was via the proposed merger with Unilever. When that failed, it diversified into food 
through the 1978 purchase of J Lyons, the cakes and tea business. 
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It was not until forced into drastic action to thwart a hostile approach from the 
aggressive Australian conglomerate Elders IXL in October 1985 that Allied-Lyons 
emerged on the international spirits scene. In March 1986, during the course of the 
MMC investigation, Allied-Lyons announced that it had reached an agreement to buy 
the spirits division of the Canadian group Hiram Walker Resources for El. 2bn, acting as 
a 'white knight' against Gulf Canada, part of Olympia & York Enterprises (Canary 
Wharf). 
Having escaped the clutches of Elders IXL even though the bid was cleared, the Hiram 
Walker deal transformed Allied-Lyons into a major international spirits brand owner 
and distributor, with critical mass in the UK and North America and a portfolio that had 
significant brand positions in other leading spirits markets, such as Spain. Hiram 
Walker's brands included Ballantine's, Canadian Club, Courvoisier and Kahlua. In 
addition there were extensive grain and malt whisky assets. 
Shortly after Hiram Walker, Allied-Lyons cemented further alliances and mergers in the 
spirits industry. In 1988 it concluded a joint venture distribution agreement with the 
private Japanese group, Suntory. In 1989 it acquired Whitbread's spirits operation, J 
Burrough, owner of Beefeater gin. The final move in the attempt to build a global spirits 
empire came in 1994 with the consolidation of a long-standing relationship with the 
Mora Figueroa families of Pedro Domecq, owner of Sauza tequila and various Spanish 
whiskies, brandies and sherries. This firm had a dual Power base in Spain and Mexico. 
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In common with Grand Met, during this process of international spirits development 
Allied-Lyons was also forced to address the impact of the 'Beer Orders' position for its 
historic base in LTK brewing and retailing. In common with Grand Met, it also concluded 
that its brewing operation was sub-scale. On 22 October 1991 it announced an 
agreement to merge its UK brewing operations with those of Carlsberg AS, in what was, 
in effect, a copy-cat deal of the earlier Grand Met/Courage tie-up. The merger was 
referred to the MMC on 9 March 1992, and was cleared with remedies in July 1992. 
However, by then the market had deteriorated significantly. Having waited more than 
two years after the 'Beer Orders' report to complete the deal, the newly merged firm, 
Carlsberg-Tetley Limited, under Allied management struggled to rationalise. Two years 
before the termination of a five year supply agreement to Allied Retail, Allied Domecq, 
as it was now called under new chairman Sir Christopher Hogg, announced its intention 
to quit brewing. In 1996, it concluded a deal whereby Bass would be the majority 
shareholder in an enlarged Bass Brewers/CTL with Carlsberg retaining a minority 
interest. In 1999, the pub portfolio was sold to Punch Taverns. With a refocused group 
structure and new outside management many anticipated a spirits merger to rival that of 
Diageo. However, no spirits deal was forthcoming, despite intermittent rumours of a 
global alliance (although not a full-scale merger) with Seagram. In the 1998 results 
announcement the chairman commented: 
"We remain keenly aware of the potential benefits of consolidation in the industry but 
have so far been ftustrated by the unwillingness of the other major players to dilute the 
controlling holdings in their equity". 
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This situation continued, and in the meantime the operation drifted somewhat aimlessly, 
with a long tail of underperforming brands, and no obvious way to counter the strategic 
threat from Diageo. It was finally on the receiving end of a bid approach in 2005 from 
the smaller Pernod Ricard and Fortune Brands acting as partners. In the press release 
that accompanied the Allied Board's recommendation to shareholders new chairman, Sir 
Gerry Robinson stated the reasons for accepting the deal: 
"The two most significant developments in the past decade have been the formation of 
Diageo itseýf in 1997 and the sale of Seagram's wines and spirits business to Diageo 
and Pernod Ricard in 2001 ... ... In these increasingly challenging market conditions, the 
needforfurther consolidation in the distilled spirits industry has become increasingly 
apparent. Given the shareholder structures of the majority of Allied Domecq's 
significant competitors, there was always the possibility that Allied Domecqs 
participation in Stich consolidation would be as the subject of an acquisition rather than 
as the acquirer" 
6.4.3. Seagram 
There were rumours for many years about a tie-up be-tween Seagram and Allied 
Domecq. The two firms were believed to have discussed a merger in 1986, around the 
time of Allied's acquisition of Hiram Walker, but could not agree terms. There was 
considerable strategic rationale in their combination given the mix of brands and their 
255 
geographic strengths and weaknesses. The author laid out the logic in October 1995 
'Allied Domecq -A Radical Restructuring Proposal'. 
At the time of the Diageo merger Seagram was enjoying relatively greater success 
largely due to its then 'dominance' of the US spirits market and strong presence in 
Asia/Pacific - it was the only one of the top four international spirits firms to own a 
leading Scotch (Chivas Regal) and Cognac (Martell). It had been quick to restructure its 
US portfolio following the 1991 tax increase and had reallocated resources behind a 
smaller number of core brands, in particular Captain Morgan and Crown Royal. 
However, it was still weak in Europe, the one area where Allied Domecq had the 
elements of a sustainable market position as a result of Ballantine's. The question was 
whether Seagram, having recently sold its shareholding in Du Pont, was more taken by 
the new media investment in the portfolio, MCA/Time Warner. Whilst the firm was 
managed by Edgar Bronfrnan Jr, his uncle, Charles, and father, Edgar Sr, were still very 
much involved behind the scenes. They were spirits industry die-hards. 
Whilst Allied Domecq remained openly silent about the Diageo merger, the Seagram 
management team was more vocal and direct. The first plan of attack was to have the 
merger blocked. Robert Matschullat, Seagram's chief financial officer pointed to 
"serious anti-trust issues, in the US, Europe and elsewhere. The industry is suffering 
from over-capacity but it is hard for us to imagine a more anti-competitive way of 
dealing with it than with this deal. I don't know if they (Diageo) think the regulatory 
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authorities are snoozing but if this deal goes through I believe it will only be after a 
huge amount ofscrutiny and only with major divestitures" 
Seagram was said to have employed an entire team of lawyers that landed on mass at the 
EC. However, it did not succeed in blocking the deal and the divestment ordered by the 
EC investigation was modest on any reckoning. In June 2000 Seagram, now pursuing 
aggressively a future in Media backed into Vivendi, with the additional merger of Canal 
Plus, forming Vivendi Universal, a US$52bn media conglomerate. As part of the 
agreement the wines and spirits operation was put up for sale and sold to a joint venture 
of Diageo and Pernod Ricard in 2001. 
6.4.4. Bacardi 
As part of the process of gaining approval from the US FTC for the merger, Diageo was 
forced to divest Dewar's Scotch and Bombay gin. The FTC had concluded that the 
combined US Presence in premium Scotch and premium gin was 92% and 58% 
respectively prior to the forced divestment. Dewar's, a Guinness brand was the leading 
US Scotch with a 15% share of the total category, with J&B Rare (Grand Met) and 
Johnnie Walker Red Label (Guinness) each representing 8% of the total Scotch 
category. Bombay (Grand Met) accounted for a mere 2% share of the US gin category, 
albeit the super premium Bombay Sapphire was growing rapidly, driven by an 
aggressive marketing campaign. Tanqueray (Guinness) accounted for 10% of the total 
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gin category, with a virtual duopoly with Beefeater (Allied Domecq) in the premium 
import segment. 
The forced divestment of a leading Scotch and a quality well-supported premium gin 
assured significant trade interest. Bacardi emerged as the successful bidder, paying 
$1.9bn, several $100m more than market expectations. Because of its focus principally 
on one category, and specifically one brand, Bacardi had been keen to forge links with 
other leading private firms with non-competing brands. It shared distribution for the 
bulk of its US sales with Brown-Forman, owner of Jack Daniel's and Southern Comfort, 
as a result of a merchandising accord signed in 1991 shortly prior to the acquisition of 
Martini in 1992. With new (outside) blood at the top of the firm as the author 
commented at the time: 
"It is difficult to imagine that Bacardi will remain on the sidelines during the next phase 
of the industry's reconstruction" 
Having completed the acquisition of Dewar's and Bombay in June 1998, funded by 
debt) the Bacardi top team looked closely at a public offering mindful that any future 
rationalisation opportunities would almost certainly require an issue of equity. However, 
it was not until 2004, and another management team later that the first tentative steps on 
the IPO track took place with the agreement of the family shareholders to create a new 
class of shares. In the intervening period Seagram's spirits assets became available. 
Unable to strike a partnership agreement Bacardi was unable to muscle in on the 
258 
Seagram's sale. With little further progress towards an IPO and another change of 
management, Bacardi also missed out on the 2005 acquisition of Allied Domecq. 
6.4.5. Pernod Ricard 
A relative newcomer to international spirits Pernod Ricard grew rapidly from its core 
product base of anis (an aniseed flavoured spirit that is popular in southern France and 
northern Spain), and is now the second largest spirits firm internationallY as a result of 
two major transactions, the 2001 joint purchase of Seagram as the junior partner to 
Diageo, and the 2005 acquisition of Allied Domecq in conjunction with junior partner, 
Fortune Brands. Unlike Allied Domecq it was able to raise the finance to do deals and 
capable of acting in partnership with others to get the brands it wanted. 
6.5. Diageo subsequent merger and acquisition strategy 
The merger of Grand Met and Guinness generated significant cost savings in 
downstream functions through the effective removal of one of the two pre-existing 
distribution networks. Moreover it established a portfolio of leading brands that spanned 
almost every market and product category. However, the portfolio was still not optimal; 
the 'perfect' portfolio would have included Bacardi. In addition in the core US market, 
third party distributors had perceptively too much sway over product portfolios. Diageo 
aspired to the same arrangement of exclusivity with distributors enjoyed by the largest 
beer producer in the US, Anheuser-Busch. To force exclusivity a wider portfolio and a 
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market share closer to 25% would be required. The merger, post the divestment of 
Dewar's and Bombay gave a share closer to 20%. 
Having captured most of the cost cutting benefits from the merger and sold off the 
peripheral or 'tail' brands to increase efficiency further (country brands such as Metaxa, 
Asbach Uralt, Cinzano and Vecchia Romagna), Diageo turned its attention to its wider 
portfolio of assets. In 1999 the ill-fated Cruzcampo, Spanish beer operation was sold to 
Heineken opening the way for a restructuring of the brewing business, Guinness 
Brewing Worldwide that started in 2000 with its incorporation into the wider spirits 
portfolio. This gave additional projected cost savings of E130m per annum by year 
three. In 2004 the restructuring went further with the transfer of all brewing to St 
James's Gate, with the closure of London's Park Royal brewery and redevelopment of 
the extensive site. 
Pillsbury and Burger King were also earmarked for sale. In July 2000 Diageo announced 
an agreement with fellow Minneapolis food firm General Mills to combine their two 
dough-based food operations with Diageo retaining a 33% minority shareholding in the 
enlarged General Mills. The shareholding was sold eventually in several tranches 
between 2004 and 2005. In December 2002 the Burger King business was sold to a 
consortium of private equity firms. 
While the group restructuring was taking place the opportunity for perhaps a final large- 
scale spirits acquisition presented itself as a result of Seagram's decision to merge with 
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the French media conglomerate, Vivendi. Acting in conjunction with the French spirits 
firm Pernod Ricard, Diageo announced on 11 December 2000 that it would buy 
Seagram's spirits operations from Vivendi. Diageo retained US flagship brands Captain 
Morgan rum and Crown Royal Canadian whiskey, in addition to other North American 
whiskeys and peripheral rum and wine brands. Paul Walsh, Diageo's new chief 
executive officer commented: "This transaction is the next step in transforming Diageo 
ftom a food and drinks group with four operating businesses, into a focused leader in 
the global beverage alcohol industry". 
Ahead of notifying the EC and FTC the two acquiring parties had put in place a 
'Framework and Implementation Agreement' that specified which of the Seagram assets 
Diageo and Pernod Ricard would acquire respectively. Certain other assets were to be 
held jointly pending divestment to third parties. 
6.5.1. The EC judgment 
The EC was notified formally on 20 March 2001 and cleared the acquisition with 
proposed remedies on 8 May 2001. The 'Framework and Implementation Agreement' 
had been structured by the parties to avoid competition concerns such that the EC could 
not identify any situations where overlaps between the parties would create or 
strengthen a dominant position in any national market. Similarly there were no examples 
of the creation or strengthening of collective dominance. 
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However, post-merger 'portfolio effects' that could give rise to competition concerns 
were identified in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain for post-merger Pernod Ricard, and 
in Iceland (where the government was the monopoly retailer for all off-trade liquor, 
similar to in US 'Control States'), Spain and the UK for post-merger Diageo. The 
concerns in Spain and the UK, by far the most significant markets for Diageo were not 
deemed sufficiently large to attract additional remedies. However, in Iceland Diageo 
was forced to entrust permanently the distribution of Captain Morgan to an independent 
third party, thus removing the opportunity for portfolio leverage through this brand 
position. This was hardly onerous. 
6.5.2. The FTC judgment 
In October 2001, the FTC issued a draft complaint against the joint acquisition of the 
Seagram portfolio on grounds that in five relevant product markets, the result of the 
elimination of substantial competition between Diageo and Seagram would be higher 
prices for US consumers. The five relevant markets were premium rum, popular gin, 
deluxe Scotch, single malt Scotch and Cognac as set out in Table 6.3.. 
Following remedies proposed by the parties, the FTC approved the acquisition on 19 
December 2001. In premium rum, as defined by the FTC, Diageo agreed to divest the 
Malibu brand worldwide to an approved acquirer, and to put in place various procedures 
to ensure that it did not gain commercially sensitive information about Seagram's gin, a 
competitor of Gordon's in the popular gin category, Chivas Regal, the main competitor 
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to Johnnie Walker Black Label in deluxe Scotch, The Glenlivet, a major single malt and 
Martell, a major competitor to Diageo partner brand Hennessy Cognac. Diageo also 
agreed to implement a series of firewalls to protect information about Pemod Ricard 
brands that were the subject of a co-packing agreement in the US. Again, although more 
extensive remedies, requiring the divestment of a brand, not a deal-stopper. 
Table 6.3. FTC relevant market analysis 
Relevant market Retail sales $m % US spirits volume Brands Market share 
Premium rum 1000 9% Bacardi 54% 
Captain Morgan 33% 
Malibu 8% 
Popular gin 650 6% Seagram's Gin/Bumett's 66% 
Gordon's/Gilbey's 34% 
Deluxe Scotch 450 1% Johnnie Walker Black 51% 
Chivas Regal 49% 
Single malt Scotch 250 <1% Glenlivet 26% 
Classic Malts 6% 
Cognac loco 5% Hennessy 54% 
Martell 9% 
Source: Industry estimates, FTC 
6.6. Post-acquisition operating performance 
The Seagram deal reinforced Diageo's position as the world leader in branded spirits, 
but importantly gave greater strength and depth in the US, the world's largest market for 
premium spirits brands. The acquisition brought some key brands, such as Captain 
Morgan and Crown Royal that had benefited from extensive marketing commitment 
under Seagram's ownership. Having achieved the 'magic' market share of 25% of US 
spirits sales with the array of heavyweight brands in one portfolio as a result of the 
original Diageo merger, there was the possibility of streamlining distributor agreements 
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to establish portfolio exclusivity in the 'Open States' network. By early 2003 Diageo 
announced that it had negotiated relationships with new distribution partners giving it a 
dedicated sales force in 24 states that accounted for 70% of total US volumes. This has 
been extended further and now takes in 39 states that account for 85% of total volume. 
The combination of many large number one category brands -8 of the top 20 premium 
spirits brands in the Impact top 100 premium distilled spirits brands worldwide - 
aligned to the extensive distribution capability established a positive feedback whereby 
peripheral brands and assets could be sold and the surplus reinvested in marketing and 
additional cost cutting measures in the network. Table 6.4. shows the relative position of 
leading brand volume sales prior to and over the course of the transition of Diageo to the 
world's leading spirits brand owner. Tracked against its closest competitor, Allied 
Domecq it serves to illustrate the step change in the business, the mountain that 
competitors have to climb in their marketing and distribution commitment, and why 
smaller players such as Glenmorangie had already given up the chase. Allied Domecq 
succumbed eventually to the ambitious Pernod Ricard in 2005. Other mid-scale players 
are likely to follow suit in the years ahead. 
The amount of money available to spend on brand marketing initiatives serves to 
illustrate the ongoing difficulties faced by Allied Domecq's new owners. Currently 
Diageo spends in excess of flbn per annum on marketing and advertising. The former 
Allied Domecq spent approximately E420m. In both cases this represented around 15% 
of net revenues. But spread among fewer brands that are already market leaders in their 
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categories, Diageo's 15% goes a lot further, as evident from the relative margin profile 
of the firms in Figure 6.1 .. 
Table 6.4. Top 5 brand performance of Diageo and Allied Domecq (million cases) 
Diageo 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Smimoff 15.0 15.0 15.3 15.9 16.3 16.5 18.4 21.8 23.0 24.2 25.2 26.9 
Johnnie Walker 11.0 11.4 11.4 10.4 10.0 10.3 10.6 10.6 10.8 11.7 12.3 13.7 
Baileys 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.7 4.7 5.1 5.7 6.2 6.6 6.7 7.0 
AB 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.0 5.0 5.9 5.9 
Jose Cuervo 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.5 
Subtotal 40.4 41.0 41.7 41.6 41.6 41.8 44.6 48.6 50.2 52-7 54.6 58.0 
Total Wines & Spirits 109.0 107.0 106.2 104.1 8.4 97.6 102.6 107.7 110.5 114.0 122.7 
% Top 5 37.1 38.3 39.3 40.0 42.0 42.5 45.7 47.4 46.6 47.7 47.9 47.3 
Allied Domecq 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ballantine's 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.9 NA NA 
Kahlua 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1 10 NA NA 
Sauza 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.1 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.9 NA NA 
Canadian Club 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.4 24 2.6 NA NA 
Beefeater 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 22 2.4 NA NA 
Subtotal 13.8 14.0 14.6 14.8 16.1 15.6 15.1 15.2 15.6 15.6 16.8 NA NA 
Total Wines & Spirits 46.9 47.4 48.2 49.3 49.5 50.8 50.5 63.5 6 8.6 68.6 70.1 NA NA 
% Top 5 29.4 
1 
29.5 1 30.3 
1 
30.07 32.5 
1 30.7 29.9 23 .91 22 .7 24.0 
1 NA NA 
Source: Impact Databank 
Figure 6.2. shows that in group cash terms the trend has been positive for Diageo 
following the anticipated dip immediately after the merger when the firm had to adjust 
the cost base downwards. A similar dip occurred following the integration of Seagram in 
fiscal 2002, before continuing the upwards trajectory. 
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Figure 6.1. Wines and spirits operating margin of Diageo and its major competitors 
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Figure 6.2. Group operating cashflow of Diageo and its major competitors 
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Whilst Allied Domecq improved considerably following the exit from capital intensive 
pub retailing in 1999, overall it failed to match Diageo in relative terms. In fact cash 
returns started to move into reverse in 2004 as the group confirmed that it was finding 
life tough in an increasingly competitive spirits market. This undoubtedly precipitated 
the 2005 bid approach from Pernod Ricard. A similar upwards trend in free cashflow, as 
shown in Figure 6.3., has facilitated the share buyback programme in addition to 
increased dividends to shareholders. 
Figure 6.3. Group free cashflow of Diageo and its major competitors 
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6.7. Conclusion 
The Diageo case study demonstrates the benefits of pursuing an international brand 
portfolio strategy through successive merger and acquisitions. However, with a new 
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number two competitor in the expanded Pernod Ricard the question remains whether it 
will continue to add value at the same or greater pace, as measured by divisional and 
group operating and cash measures. Certainly, looking only at the financial ratios for 
Diageo in Figure 6.4 it would appear that there is scope for a greater operating return 
from the same asset base, or an additional round of divestment of more marginal - 
perhaps wine - assets. 
Figure 6.4. Diageo financial ratios 
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There is the intriguing prospect of further rationalisation in the spirits industry this time 
centring on the second tier, family controlled businesses. There is sPeculation that R6my 
Cointreau, with its unresolved succession issues, having announced its intention to buy 
itself out of Maxxium, the distribution joint venture with Fortune Brands and Robertson 
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& Baxter, is considering a sale. There would be no doubt that if the regulators could be 
accommodated in the same manner as they were in the original Diageo merger and 
subsequent joint acquisition of Seagram, Diageo might be the only potential buyer of the 
leading Cognac, Remy Martin. In this respect there is now a much slimmed down 
relationship with Moet Hennessy, with that firm having made its own independent 
moves into the Scotch segment. Pernod Ricard owns Martell as a result of its share of 
the Seagram assets. The only other potential buyer of Remy Martin would be Bacardi, 
but it would have to resolve its own internal family squabbles first, something which to 
date it seems to have been unable to do. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
This thesis set out to examine how firms in a mature industry can pursue a growth 
strategy through merger and acquisition activity by influencing the outcome of 
competition authority enquiries to their benefit. 
The study is unique in that it has assessed the impact of sequential acquisitions within 
one industry, the UK alcoholic beverages industry in which two firms, Scottish & 
Newcastle and Diageo, came to dominate it over a 35 year period almost wholly by 
acquiring their competitors and thereby establishing portfolios of leading brands and 
geographies in their respective categories of beer and spirits. Two separate pieces of 
analysis were conducted; discriminant analysis of all mergers and acquisitions of the 
major LTK alcoholic beverages firms over the period 1969 - 2006, followed by two in- 
depth case studies of Scottish & Newcastle and Diageo. 
Crucial to the merger and acquisition strategy both of these firms employed was their 
respective ability to manage ongoing and repeated interactions with competition 
authorities. Their success in managing the competition process has resulted in all their 
major UK competitors either exiting the industry or being subsumed into these two or 
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other international firms. Both have since gone on to apply their experience, albeit with 
varied degrees of success, outside the UK. 
7.1. Summary of findings 
Three research questions were examined in this thesis: 
i. What economic, political, and social factors should merging firms exploit to 
minimise the probability of a referral to, and minimise the impact of any remedies 
imposed by, the competition authorities; 
ii. How should bidder and target firms in a merger organise themselves in presenting 
their case to the competition authorities; and 
iii. How should competition authorities respond to growing evidence of competitor 
firms co-operating with each other before and during a merger enquiry in the 
process of gaining clearance 
The answers to each of these questions are discussed under three separate headings in 
the remainder of this section. 
7.1.1. What economic, political, and social factors should firms exploit? 
Over the period of the study there were 40 separate mergers and acquisitions involving 
the major UK alcoholic beverages firms. This spanned UK domestic and cross-borders 
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deals in both the brewing/retai ling and spirits industries. An array of quantitative and 
qualitative data and information accompanied each merger. From this a set of variables 
was extracted that was a priori expected to be significant in determining whether a 
merger or acquisition was 'Referred' or Wot Referred' and then subsequently 
'Transacted" or 'Not Transacted'. Discriminant analysis was then applied to this dataset 
to identify the most statistically significant variables. 
The results show that three variables had a significant impact on' the probability of a 
merger or acquisition being referred to the competition authorities: 
Market Share 
Considering the 'All Cases' dataset of 40 mergers and acquisitions over the 35 year 
period of study the market share of the bidding firm at the time of the merger was 
unsurprisingly the most significant variable in determining referral. The larger the 
market shares of the bidding firm the greater the likelihood of an abuse of market power. 
Both the 'All Cases' model and 'UK Only Cases' model show that it is the Bidder % 
Market variable that is most significant. For the 'Non-UK Cases' sample of 14 mergers 
in Europe and the US the most significant variable in determining referral was whether 
there was evidence of dominance of a specific category, or 'relevant market' Post- 
merger rather then the bidder's share of a more widely defined market. 
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Bid Type 
The nature of the bid was also a significant variable in the 'All Cases' model although it 
had a small discriminant loading suggesting that it was only significant at the margin in 
determining an outcome. If a bid was hostile it was more likely to be referred. In this 
model seven mergers were referred when the model would have predicted early 
clearance. Of the seven, two were hostile bids - Elders IXL's 1986 bid for Allied-Lyons 
and Grand Met's 1988 hostile bid for Irish Distillers - that were both subject to heavy 
lobbying by the target firm. 
In addition, there were four cases where the model would have predicted a referral but 
where the bid was cleared early; two of these were high profile European spirits deals 
where two firms were bidding jointly for the target and had pre-agreed the split of assets 
in order to pre-empt a regulatory intervention. The other high-profile case was Scottish 
& Newcastle's 1995 agreed acquisition of Courage that created a new market leader in 
UK brewing with an approximate 30% market share, and which was the starting point 
for the eventual exit of Bass and Whitbread from brewing. 
Political Donations 
The 'UK Only Cases' model of 26 mainly brewing/retailing mergers yielded a very 
interesting finding in that the likelihood of a referral was reduced if the bidder made 
political donations. This factor may be a proxy for the positive pro-business political 
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climate that endured during the period in which the Conservative party was in office that 
corresponded to significant merger and acquisition activity in the UK. The Beerage had 
always been seen as pro-Conservative. Shortly after the change of goverment to the 
Labour party in 1997, two significant bids were blocked (Bass/Carlsberg-Tetley and 
Interbrew/Bass) and a third was abandoned on threat of referral (Whitbread/Al lied 
Domecq Retail). No further significant mergers and acquisitions have been proposed by 
the alcoholic beverages firms in the UK since. 
There appears to be another underlying pattern in the impact of political donations, 
particularly in the 1980s, that hostile bids for politically well connected targets were 
more likely to lead to referral. Scottish & Newcastle escaped the clutches of Elders IXL 
in 1989. This correlates with the finding that hostile bids are more likely to be referred. 
Based on the significant variables identified above we can conclude that a firm will 
maximise its probability of success in completing a proposed merger or acquisition by: 
i. ensuring that its pre-merger share of a widely-defined market (its own definition) is 
as low as possible; 
ii. that it does not have plans to retain more than a 25% market share of a very 
narrowly defined market post-merger (the competition authority's definition); 
iii. that its bids are agreed with the target and not hostile; and 
iv. that its major deals occur during a political regime of which it was supportive. 
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7.1.2. How should bidder and target firms organise themselves? 
The case studies of Scottish & Newcastle and Diageo not only show how these firms 
worked to achieve their own strategic objectives but how their actions influenced and 
shaped the growth strategies of their major UK alcoholic beverages industry 
competitors. What these two firms shared was a strategy for gaining regulatory 
approval; Scottish & Newcastle working in tandem with the political climate and Diageo 
relying on its ability to develop innovative merger structures and always showing 
willingness to compromise with competition authorities by proposing and accepting 
remedies. 
What is also evident from the case studies is that these two firms were successful in 
implementing their merger and acquisition strategies in an environment of enforced 
upheaval in the domestic brewing market brought about by a key anti-trust investigation, 
the 'Beer Orders', that ended the centuries old vertically integrated structure of UK 
brewing. In addition, their history and formation was also influenced profoundly by the 
interjection of the aggressively acquisitive Australian brewing conglomerate Elders IXL, 
a new entrant into the UK brewing industry in the mid 1980s, a time that corresponded 
with the govemment-enforced 'Beer Orders'. 
The first anti-trust inquiry into the UK brewing industry in 1969 was prompted by a rash 
of complaints about anti-competitive behaviour in UK brewing due to the increasing 
dominance of the six large brewers that accounted for 68% of beer production and that 
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controlled through ownership a major share of the retail - pub and off licence - trade. As 
a result of this concentration of ownership, it was argued that consumer choice was 
limited and that there were pricing distortions in the market, with tied tenants paying 
more for their beer supplies than large free trade customers. 
The MMC contemplated a wide overhaul of the domestic brewing industry to remedy 
the public interest issues, including a full scale disaggregation of brewing and retailing 
assets and the abolition of the vertical tie. However, it concluded that the disruption and 
disadvantages of such a radical move was not a practicable catalyst for change given the 
prevailing restrictive licensing laws. Thus the vertically integrated structure remained 
intact. Over the next two decades the six large brewer/retailers grew their market share 
of beer production to over 75%. 
It was as this point that the Australian conglomerate, Elders IXL, spotted an opportunity 
to apply its aggressive management style in developing and marketing of brands to the 
traditional UK brewing industry. Whether the competition authorities had, at this stage, 
been contemplating another investigation into the supply of beer in the UK is unclear. 
However, the referral that led to the 1989 'Beer Orders' came a matter of months after 
Elders IXL's hostile bid for the UK's second largest brewer, Allied-Lyons. Whilst 
Elders IXL was ultimately thwarted in its attempt to acquire Allied-Lyons, its actions, 
directly and indirectly were instrumental in transforming the UK alcoholic beverages 
industry from a group of sleepy regional brewers and distillers into multinational brand 
marketing organisations. 
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Elders IXL provided the catalyst for change; many of the strategic ideas for the 
restructuring of the UK brewing industry that occurred after the 'Beer Orders' were first 
mooted in the 1985 and 1989 approaches for Allied-Lyons and Scottish & Newcastle by 
Elders IXL's UK brewing subsidiary, Courage, and its brand, Foster's. The Elders IXL's 
partnership with Grand Met in the innovative 'breweries -for-p ubs swap' was the 
forerunner of the 'PubCos', copied from its business development in Australia. Grand 
Met's ability to find a partner in Elders IXL eased its own transition from domestic 
brewer/retailer to international alcoholic beverages brand manager. The partnership 
structure that was formed with Elders IXL to clear regulatory barriers in the UK has 
been replicated in subsequent acquisitions internationally by the once hostile-only Grand 
Met. However, despite bringing strategic innovation to the UK, it is evident that Elders 
IXL did not succeed in its ambitions because Scottish & Newcastle eventually emerged 
as the UK's only domestically controlled international brewer. The differentiating factor 
that determined the success of Scottish & Newcastle in implementing its strategic goal, 
and where Elders IXL failed, was the degree to which these two firms were able to 
manage their interaction with the competition authorities. 
The importance of Elders IXL 
At the time of the ill-fated bid for Allied-Lyons Elders IXL was one of the largest firms 
in Australia, having been built by a series of acquisitions under the management team of 
John Elliott. Elders entered the Australian brewing industry in 1983 through the 
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acquisition of Carlton and United Breweries (CUB), the larger of Australia's duopoly 
brewers with a market share of 47%. 
Having absorbed the CUB acquisition and sold peripheral businesses to pay down debt, 
the ambitious Elders team turned its attention to international expansion. In UK 
brewing, it saw the potential to reap rewards from shaking up an antiquated structure - 
both operationally and managerially - to develop a platform for international growth 
through brand marketing initiatives. The UK brewers had attempted international 
growth in the 1960s, perhaps fearing the eventual end of the cosy vertically integrated 
I 
structure but had been slow to promote their brands and develop overseas. Instead they 
had largely followed a conglomerate strategy into related (and sometimes unrelated) 
businesses such as food and leisure but within the UK. By contrast Elders had 
established an international franchise for its leading brand, Fosters, that was sold in 80 
countries. Almost 12% of its domestic production was exported, primarily to other 
countries in Asia/Pacific. It had been building a presence in North America, and with the 
granting of an exclusive brewing licence to Watney's in 1981 (the brewing subsidiary of 
Grand Met) UK sales of Foster's represented 5% of the draught lager market at the time 
of the Allied-Lyons bid. 
Aside from a more international focus for its brewing brands, supported by new product 
development and the adoption of modem brewing technology, the group was also a 
structural innovator back home. The decision to reshape the recently acquired CUB pub 
estate of 353 outlets was significant not least for the impact it would have on the UK 
278 
beer market. In 1984 Elders started to roll out a programme that allowed the lessees of 
304 pubs the opportunity to share in the capital growth as well as income of their pubs 
through a 50: 50 joint venture that was established as a separate property owning firm, 
with its own non-recourse debt. This structure would be replicated in the UK pub market 
through Elders' UK subsidiary Courage, and can be traced through the 'Beer Orders' in 
the Inntrepreneur lease arrangements (the controversial 20-year 'assignable' leases) that 
were put in place as a result of the 'breweries -for-pub s' swap deal between Grand Met 
and Courage. Inntrepreneur was the model structure for the independent pub chain 
sector (PubCos) that has come to dominate the UK retail pub scene. 
Elders IXL was unsuccessful in its approach for Allied-Lyons. The reference to the 
MMC (the Secretary of State considered that the financing of the proposed acquisition 
deserved investigation), was rejected. However, the lengthy enquiry coupled with a very 
active political defence from one of the Beerage's core firms served to undermine the 
deal. Nevertheless, the Elders IXL management style and strategy for the UK brewing 
industry met with some notable praise from the MMC investigation team, and 
encouraged it to turn its attention to another of the UK's leading brewers. Courage, was 
an orphan asset of the 1986 acquisition of its parent, Imperial Tobacco, by Hanson 
Trust. In a twist of fate, Courage had made an unsuccessful attempt to challenge CUB's 
dominance of the Australian brewing industry in its Victoria heartland during the mid 
1960s. 
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In much the same way that CUB had acquired aggressively in Australia several decades 
earlier and come to control almost 50% of the domestic beer markets with a handful of 
brands, Elders IXL sought a rapid rationalisation of the UK brewing industry to create a 
national champion that would provide a platform for growth in mainland Europe as part 
of the grand plan to Tosterise' the world. It tried unsuccessfully to persuade Scottish & 
Newcastle to merge before making a hostile move on its northern competitor at the end 
of 1988. The timing was crucial; the MMC was poised to deliver its second anti-trust 
investigation into the UK brewing industry that would go some way towards calling 
time on vertical integration in UK brewing, a structure that had both supported the 
incumbent firms and dis-incentivised them from developing internationally. 
Perhaps Elders IXL believed that the combination of Scottish & Newcastle's relatively 
limited vertical structure (it was immune to the 'Beer Orders' as it controlled less that 
2000 outlets) and the soundings from the MMC, backed up by the views of politically 
astute Grand Met, that had been lobbying behind the scenes for an end to vertical 
integration in favour of greater horizontal integration, would ensure a clear passage for 
the proposed acquisition. However, following on from the U-turn on 'jobs for Scotland' 
that had followed in the Guinness/Distillers merger, no amount of assurances and 
guarantees about combined global headquarters for the enlarged Elders IXL in 
Edinburgh could derail the political power of the Scottish & Newcastle defence. The 
obvious strategic rationale for the merger of the southem-based Courage and the 
northern-based Scottish & Newcastle was lost in the discussion, only to return in 1995 
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when Scottish & Newcastle picked it up to use in its favour during its acquisition of 
Courage. 
Elders IXL envisaged two efficient UK brewers with brands that could be developed 
and marketed in mainland Europe, in much the same way as the Australian model. That 
is exactly the structure that has emerged some 20 years later - albeit with a lot of pain 
and several perhaps costly and unnecessary investigations later. 
The impact of the 'Beer Orders' 
On 4 August 1986, the OFT referred to the MMC the possibility of the existence of a 
complex monopoly in the supply of beer within the UK for retail sale in pubs. Since the 
last enquiry in 1969 there had been a further concentration of power in the hand of the 
large 'national' brewers, which although they had reduced in total numbers the sizes of 
their pub estates, through the combination of churning to retain the largest outlets as 
managed houses, and owing to the ongoing shift away from ale to lager that mitigated 
against the smaller and regional independents, their share of total beer sales had 
continued to grow. Collectively in 1985 the largest six brewers accounted for 75% of 
beer production compared to 68% in 1967. 
The UK brewing industry constituted a small cosy group of brewers that supplied their 
own pubs, many of them managed houses with expensive beer that was then sold to the 
pub-going public at excessive prices. Moreover, the pub goer once in a managed or 
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controlled outlet had little choice in the beer he bought and often in underinvested 'tired' 
outlets. The high retail price was a function of cross-subsidisation (and tax); managed 
houses, the flagship of the estate, set on-trade prices. Tied tenants paid above market 
prices for beer supplies compared to free-trade tenants and off-trade customers, but 
received subsidised rent in return. As long as tied tenants could sustain retail prices 
comparable to managed houses, they were likely to be content. Given the operating 
opacity in so far as it was possible for an outsider to glean, the brewery operation looked 
reasonably profitable (more so given full y-depreciated plant and equipment) and the 
managed house return looked reasonable too. What cross-subsidisation did not reveal, 
however, was the impact of the growth in off-trade consumption on brewing margins. 
Underlying beer consumption was in decline, tracking the economic shift from 
manufacturing to the service sector. There was significant overcapacity, particularly in 
ale brewing, trapped mainly in the smaller regional brewing segment, whose demand 
profile was under structural attack from lager consumption. It was against this backdrop 
that the 'Beer Orders', that envisaged greater choice and better prices of beer for 
consumers, came into effect. 
The transition period to the 'Beer Orders' allowed the brewers until November 1992 to 
complete disposals and divestments to half of the excess over 2000 pubs and 
corresponded with a severe recession in the UK economy. With declining house prices 
and a glut of pubs on the open market, the brewing industry was not in its best position 
to weather regulation-induced changes. Inevitably, firms that acted quickly, by either 
complying with pub divestment, such as Bass, or by altering fundamentally their 
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strategies for UK brewing and/or pub retail divisions, such as Grand Met faired better, at 
least temporarily. 
The 'Beer Orders' forced the integrated brewer/retailers to look closely at the two parts 
of the combined brewing and pub operation. Although the thought of complete 
separation of assets may not have been discussed with total conviction, clearly some 
groups considered it seriously. As a first step, decisions were taken to induce a more 
'arms length' relationship between the two parts of the business, perhaps to generate a 
sharper focus in brewing, where the retention of volume would be dependent on 
retaining and even growing volume in the expanding free trade to the newly formed 
PubCos. However, the imputed 'transfer price' at its first attempt (in the immediate 
aftermath of the November 1992 'Beer Orders' compliance deadline) quickly seemed 
overly generous to brewing with the severe discounting to the free trade that ensued. 
Profitability declined rapidly, closely followed by calls from institutional shareholders 
for strategic action. Somewhat unsurprisingly to industry insiders, consumers got more 
choice from their pubs, but retail beer prices continued to rise; the PubCos kept the 
discounts. 
During 1993 and 1994, a consensus view was emerging that more horizontal integration 
in the UK brewing industry had to occur, especially after the Grand Met/Courage and 
Allied/Carlsberg mergers. Bass, the obvious candidate for early strategic moves, laid its 
claim to be the 'Anheuser Busch of UK brewing'. The only realistic way to achieve an 
Anheuser Busch-type share of 45% was by acquisition because institutional 
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shareholders were not minded to wait twenty or more years for organic growth that 
would inevitably require periods of aggressive discounting and margin hits to deliver. 
But Bass demonstrated little strategic confidence even from the position of its long- 
standing market leadership of UK brewing so the task of breaching the 25% market 
share 'rule' from a horizontal merger fell to the braver and politically connected Scottish 
& Newcastle. Whilst Bass tried to go one step further in 1996 with its proposal for 40% 
market share through a merger with Carlsberg-Tetley, it left it too late both 
operationally, strategically (for shareholders) and politically (the change to a Labour 
government in the middle of the merger enquiry). Bass never recovered from this failed 
attempt at its first large UK merger and subsequently exited the industry. 
While the MMC and the 'Beerage' were still discussing regional taste variations and the 
relative merits of supporting the regional brewing industry with its excess capacity, 
outsiders such as Elders IXL had always forwarded the prognosis of a European 
brewing industry following EU harmonisation in 1992. Having sanctioned - albeit with 
remedies that loosened vertical ties - the merger of Elders IXL's UK brewing operations 
with those of Grand Met shortly after the 'Beer Orders' enquiry was published, the 
MMC seemed to be leaving the door open for the emergence of a national 
beer 
champion equivalent of Danone (France), Heineken (the Netherlands) or 
Interbrew 
(Belgium) in the new vertically disintegrated industry structure with the sanctioning of 
Carlsberg-Tetley and Scottish & Newcastle/Courage. Although Bass/Carlsberg Tetley 
was blocked and Interbrew completed only part of its plans to own a combined 
Whitbread and Bass brewing operation, the Elders IXL vision has almost come to pass, 
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with Scottish & Newcastle and Interbrew now controlling the majority of the volume 
and brands of five of the six pre-'Beer Orders' brewers as part of wider pan-European 
operations. 
How DiaReo and Scottish & Newcastle emerjzed as winners 
Scottish & Newcastle, the smallest of the 'Big 6' UK brewer/retailers at the time of the 
1969 investigation into the UK brewing industry has grown ftom a Scotland and North 
East regional to become, in its own words, "one of the world'S leading beer-led 
beverages companies". Having completed the Courage acquisition in 1995 that created a 
leadership position in the UK, the firm embarked on series of country-specific 
acquisitions in Europe. 
During the 1980s Scottish & Newcastle interacted frequently with the UK competition 
authorities. Undeterred by a failed attempt to acquire its neighbour, J Cameron, it then 
made a successful case for clearance post referral of its hostile bid for Matthew Brown. 
Perhaps the success in this approval (albeit a protracted bid) and the opportunity to 
present its case to the MMC was an ideal test run for how to thwart Elders DCL's hostile 
approach. Certainly the experience it developed over the course of the Matthew Brown 
bid played its part in escaping from Elders IXL. 
Whether weary from the process or mindful of the changing political scene, Scottish & 
Newcastle's merger strategy subsequently seems to have been focussed on avoiding 
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referrals. The timing of the Courage acquisition in 1995 was close to the end of the 
Conservative Party's time in office but it was after the impact of the 'Beer Orders' 
rationalisation had become evident. Firms that attempted to transact deals during the 
period that corresponded to the MMC report and the necessary compliance period with 
the 'Beer Orders' were referred automatically (Elders IXL/Scottish & Newcastle in 
1989, Courage/Grand Met in 1990 and Allied-Lyons/Carlsberg UK in 1992). Moreover, 
by 1995 Courage's Australian parent Fosters (previously known as Elders IXL) had 
more or less abandoned its international beer ambitions in favour of wine. 
Outside the UK Scottish & Newcastle has avoided competition authority referrals by 
targeting acquisitions in jurisdictions in which it did not already have a presence. As a 
result it has had a clear run to completion without referral for most of its key 
acquisitions. It has acted alone as bidder although the acquisition of Hartwall in Finland 
brought a share of a joint venture in the former Eastern Bloc with Danish brewer 
Carlsberg. 
Diageo, formed from the 1997 merger of Grand Metropolitan and Guinness is the global 
leader in international branded spirits by a margin of more than 20% above its nearest 
competitor, Pernod Ricard/Allied Domecq. At the time of the 1969 beer investigation, 
Grand Metropolitan was a hotel and property conglomerate and Guinness an 
international brewer without a UK pub retail operation. Grand Met entered the brewing 
industry in 1971 and spirits industry in 1972. Guinness entered the spirits industry in 
1985. 
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Having emerged from an aggressively acquisitive past in the property industry, the 
culture of Grand Met, the senior partner in the merger that formed Diageo, was set. 
During the 1970s and 1980s the acquisitive firm had entered and exited various 
industries on both sides of the Atlantic through a series of mergers and proposed deals, 
many of which were hostile to the target party. At the same time there had been an 
element of aggression - and referral - in the growth by acquisition of the former 
Guinness that had taken it from its roots in brewing into the international spirits 
industry. 
However, by the 1990s, and in the aftermath of the 'Beer Orders' Grand Met abandoned 
the hostile approach and entered into a series of joint venture bids, often with a 'first in 
class' structure in order to get its increasingly large deals transacted. The innovative 
'breweries-for-pubs' swap with Courage was the first step that effected the withdrawal 
for the UK brewing-retailing sector. Directly, through the experience of structuring the 
deal and accommodating the concerns of the UK competition authorities, and indirectly, 
because it was the restructuring exercise needed before embarking on the next stage of 
the plan for international expansion, the Courage deal seems to have presented a 
framework from which Diageo developed skills that it used in future encounters with the 
competition authorities in the US and Europe. 
The formation of Diageo, gave the wider spirits industry its first opportunity to test 
crelevant market' definitions across jurisdictions; virtually every category was 
represented in the merger and owing to the partners' former market positions, there were 
287 
clear potentially dominant (or almost monopoly) positions in many territories. The 
investigations conducted in the US and EC served to highlight the differences in the 
analysis presented by the jurisdictions opening a fundamental difference of opinion on 
the ability to derive an enhanced competitive position from ownership of a portfolio of 
brands. 
The Guinness/Grand Met merger deal transacted with the concession of selling two 
brands that the firm might have decided to sell post-merger in any event and a precedent 
was set for the subsequent approach that the merged firm (Diageo) would adopt in 
managing competition authority interactions. By agreeing bids with potential merger 
parties and seeking to allay competition authority objections early in the process by 
presenting 'up front' remedies that were in keeping with the US and EC 'relevant 
market' definitions, it has completed transactions without the imposition of any 
significant remedies. It has worked closely, not only with its merger partner firms but 
also with other firms in the industry that might potentially be willing and interested in 
acquiring components of the merged firm to address issues of market dominance before 
competition authorities have begun their investigation. The joint approach for Seagram 
with Pernod Ricard was struck notwithstanding an acrimonious history between Pernod 
Ricard and the former Grand Met. 
The deliberate and repeated nature of the growth process adopted by Diageo and 
Scottish & Newcastle and their apparent success in managing the competition process 
has had a direct and powerful influence on the UK alcoholic beverages industry, 
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Gaining clearance for key mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s forced the exit of their 
major UK competitors, Allied Domecq, Bass and Whitbread from brewing and spirits. 
Their strategies for dealing with competition authorities have been different. Scottish & 
Newcastle had adopted a strategy of dealing with the competition framework by doing 
its major mergers and acquisitions during a period where the political climate in the UK 
was relatively benign. By the time the political climate had changed with the incoming 
Labour government in 1997, Scottish & Newcastle turned its attention to acquisitive 
growth overseas, buying existing market leaders in several countries where it had no 
exposure of its own. Consequently its overseas mergers and acquisitions were all cleared 
without investigation. In all cases the deals were agreed with Scottish & Newcastle 
acting as lone bidder. 
By contrast, while both the former Grand Met and Guinness made hostile and 
controversial merger approaches in the 1970s and 1980s, latterly both firms and their 
successor Diageo, have adopted an agreed strategy with clear signals to competition 
authorities of their willingness to compromise through remedies. Such a 'co-operative 
strategy' has now also been extended to working with third parties in order to structure 
deals that pass obtrusive regulatory scrutiny. Just as Grand Met's innovative 'breweries- 
for-pubs' swap structure to gain clearance in the UK was copied by competitors, notably 
Allied Domecq, its arrangement with Pernod Ricard to gain clearance for the Seagram 
spirits assets in the EU and US has now been taken forward in later spirits industry 
mergers such as Pernod Ricard/Allied Domecq. Moreover, Diageo, like Grand Met 
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before it, does not appear to have been deterred by referral, almost relishing the 
opportunity to present its case and learn from or even shape the process. 
The performance of these two firms in the aftermath of their recent large deals that have 
made them both leading international firms provides an interesting contrast, and in the 
case of Scottish & Newcastle one is left wondering whether there was any real merit to 
the international merger strategy it pursued. The two firms that exited UK brewing 
shortly after the Courage acquisition - Bass and Whitbread - were forced to make 
deeper and earlier changes to their group structures. Although now difficult to compare 
the firms directly because they operate in different parts of the leisure retailing and 
hospitality area, their respective shareholders certainly benefited from the divestment of 
brewing and 'de-merger and return of excess cash' strategies that both Bass and 
Whitbread employed. In contrast, Scottish & Newcastle has produced relatively poor 
operating returns. 
Diageo, on the other hand, has seemed to go from strength to strength in international 
spirits. It is difficult to imagine how others can compete in the long-term 
notwithstanding the attempt by Pernod Ricard to build its own global position through 
merger. The operating return profile of Diageo shows continued upward progression 
from the Diageo merger through to divestment of peripheral brands and assets and the 
additional benefits of the Seagram brands on the powerful distribution base. 
Shareholders continue to be rewarded from the firm's strong cash generation. 
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It is tempting to conclude that Diageo's success is in some part attributable to its 'co- 
operative strategy) to transacting mergers that ensured it got exactly which brands it 
most wanted in its portfolio at the expense of forfeiting less attractive brands and/or 
market positions. In contrast, Scottish & Newcastle's 'avoidance strategy' that has 
tended to promote acquisitions of non-overlapping geographies has led to the creation of 
a fragmented portfolio of market positions that have presented few opportunities to add 
value by exploiting economies of scale and scope. 
7.1.3. How should competition authorities respond? 
The results of the discriminant analysis and the findings of the detailed case studies of 
the merger and acquisition strategies of Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle reveal that 
politics and structural variables play a role in the merger process, in addition to the 
anticipated impact of product or geographical market share. 
In the 'UK Only' discriminant analysis model, a significant variable was the influence 
of political donations in the likelihood of a merger being referred. In the All Cases' 
model the likelihood of a referral increased where bids were hostile. The two active and 
largely successful acquiring firms, Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle attempted hostile 
bids in the past but quickly adopted a less confrontational approach; in the case of 
Diageo, increasingly through the use of joint venture structures with competitors to gain 
regulatory clearance and in the case of Scottish & Newcastle relying on its previous 
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political connections to get deals done that perhaps others were unlikely to achieve so 
smoothly. 
Political influence 
The UK alcoholic beverages industry has always been the subject of significant political 
interest, not least because of its importance in generating tax receipts through the 
collection of excise duties and value added tax, and its importance as an employer. The 
position of Scotch whisky as the leading international spirit provides valuable export 
revenue to the UK. In addition the social and healthcare issues that surround alcohol 
consumption ensure that the industry is at the sharp end of the regulatory interface. It is 
therefore of little surprise that there have been two lengthy high profile anti-trust 
investigations into the domestic brewing industry in addition to a raft of merger referrals 
many of which were arguably not warranted. 
Looking further afield it would be premature to conclude that politics plays no role in 
the anti-trust and merger process in the US and EU, notwithstanding the structurally 
independent nature of the investigating agencies throughout the period of study. Whilst 
it has always been possible to observe directly monies forwarded to UK political parties 
there are no such disclosure requirements for overseas donations. Nor indeed is it 
possible to identify where and how expenses for lobbying firm ser-vices are deployed. In 
the author's own experience there is substantial funding from the drinks industry in 
general to lobby groups in Washington that have specific links to the political 
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infrastructure in the US. Others have reported the closeness of certain firms to particular 
states. Whilst much of the lobbying is to promote a more favourable attitude towards 
alcohol consumption in what remains a somewhat hostile market still aligned to 
Prohibition, it would be naive to assume that influence did not accrue, albeit 
subliminally in the merger and anti-trust process. 
In the UK the brewing establishment (The Beerage) was known for its close links to the 
Conservative party and this was evident in political funding for the party from major 
firms such as Allied-Lyons and Whitbread. Scottish & Newcastle and Highland 
Distillers were also notable Conservative supporters, enhancing their naturally derived 
political clout as key members of the Scottish business establishment. 
Whilst friends in high places cannot overcome the fundamental governance of the 
economic market - mergers involving high market shares will likely be referred - they 
might assist at the margin. This might explain the partial climb-down from the original 
proposal for the breaking of the vertical tie in the 'Beer Orders', and the decisions to 
refer the proposed mergers of Elders IXL for Allied-Lyons and Scottish & Newcastle 
(which was blocked). 
Rationally, in the UK such opportunities for political intervention have now ended with 
the passing of the Enterprise Act by the Labour government. Firms are under closer 
scrutiny from shareholders and political donations have all but stopped. The UK merger 
regime is independent, bringing it into line with the US. Yet in other areas of business 
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and its interaction with government many commentators have identified 'special 
interest' aspects that seem to help some firms at either the expense of others or at the 
expense of ultimate consumers. Moreover public appointments to key positions, 
including regulatory agencies are within the hands of the political masters. 
A body of Economics-based research known as 'Regulatory Capture' provides some 
interesting insights into the interplay between government and its agencies and private 
firms. While much of the work has focused on regulated utilities, many of which are 
natural monopolies, there are some pointers for merger policy in so far as some firms 
engage in repeated interactions with the same regulatory authorities. Dal Bo (2006) 
describes a narrow definition of 'regulatory capture' as the process through which 
regulated monopolies end up 'manipulating' the state agencies that are supposed to 
control them. Rather worryingly for the proponents of clean and independent 
governance he suggests that some of the work in the field of capture overlaps with the 
literature on corruption. 
Early theories of regulatory capture were forwarded in the field of Economics, notably 
Stigler (1971), and in Law, by Posner (1974). According to Dal Bo, Stigler presented a 
view of public policy that emphasised the idea that regulators could be swayed by 
4special interests'. 
Tirole and Laffont (1993) suggested that the scope for capture of the regulator by the 
firm depends on the amount of information that the regulator may obtain and how easy 
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the environment makes it to bribe the regulator. The key issue for government is to 
make sure that the regulator is not financially or politically (in a broad sense) dependent 
on the firm by paying him well and ensuring he is accountable for his actions. The fact 
that many regulators come from industry or jump ship to the firms that they once 
regulated (the 'Revolving Door' phenomenon) does little to dispel the concept of 
political dependency. 
With regulators acting as independent agencies of the state, the link to politics and 
political donations would appear to be broken. However, Dal Bo suggests that there is 
some evidence from the US that as far as Telecoms pricing in states is concerned, there 
is a positive relationship between campaign contributions by incumbent firms and 
incumbent firms pricing. 
There has been very little investigation of the impact of politics and political donations 
on merger outcomes, arguably because repeated interaction between firms and the same 
investigating authority has not been considered; a fundamental aspect of the capture 
literature. Cross-sectional studies as a snapshot in time covering many types of firms are 
unlikely to reveal deep-seated political effects. Recent work by Bougette and Turolla 
(2007) looked at 229 merger cases accepted at Phase I or Phase II of the European 
merger process between 1990 and 2005. Whilst in common with the work presented 
here these authors found that variables related to high market power (share) lead more 
frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase, there was a difference in the type 
of remedy (behavioural or structural) depending on the firm's industry and who was the 
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decision maker for the investigation that is who was the European Commissioner at the 
time. Moreover, there was some evidence of a country-specific outcome in their work, 
with US and French acquirers leading to a merger decision with commitments. 
It is impossible to be sure that any regulatory process, whether anti-trust or merger 
policy is truly independent but the 'smarter' firms will identify the opportunities to 
exploit whatever is within their means to get their own way, and in this sense there is 
likely to have been and continue to be 'capture' of the competition authorities. As 
discussed below this might also be related to the growing interest in agreed as opposed 
to hostile bids. What is clear is that both Diageo and Scottish & Newcastle moved ahead 
with their merger and acquisitions strategies in full knowledge of the potential for 
influence in the process and through successive and quick action have completed their 
plans before the heavier scrutiny that is now apparent from both academics and the 
markets at large. 
The role of hostile bids 
The strengthening of anti-cartel legislation and the general attitude to collusion seems to 
sit at odds with a merger regime that seems to incentivise co-operation between 
previous, current and possibly future competitors as a result of the pre-notification and 
remedies process. The complexity and scope for data and information transfer increases 
the greater the number of parties to the merger. In the event that two pre and post- 
merger competitors come together to carve up a third party, as was the case in 
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Diageo/Seagram (with Pernod Ricard) and Pernod Ricard/Allied Domecq (with Fortune 
Brands), a case could be made for paying more attention to the agreed deals presented as 
afait accompli. Consequently, although the analysis presented here suggests that hostile 
bids are more likely to be referred, perhaps it is the agreed ones that warrant closer 
scrutiny by competition authorities. 
Aspects of the 'capture' literature, leads one to consider whether the scope for capture 
depends on the amount of information that the regulator may obtain or already know and 
how easy it is to establish the structure of costs in the industry under investigation. 
Several brewing industry insiders have suggested that the 'Beer Orders' enquiry was 
hampered not so much for the ability to collect sufficient information from the industry 
but the failure in its interpretation, specifically to assess capacity and capacity utilisation 
data in the same way that a brewery operations director would use it. Information and 
data insofar as it exists on brand positioning and deciphering the final achieved market 
price for a range of products that takes account of discounts and special offers (and 
strips out the impact of differential taxes) is very complex; with the limited time and 
resources for an investigation, particularly for a merger case, by generalists as opposed 
to industry specialists, the quality of decision making has to be questionable. Seizing the 
marketing director's e-mail box would be a simpler and quicker way to assess the 
objectives and likely outcomes of the merger for consumer prices and competitive 
strategy. 
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In a recent article, Bloomberg (2007) commented on the failure at the FTC to stop 
mergers it had blocked but which were challenged subsequently in court by the firms 
involved. The chairwoman of the FTC was quoted as saying that Federal judges were 
not 'buying' the FTC's approach to why it considers some combinations anti- 
competitive. In her opinion this would encourage more firms to litigate against FTC 
decisions. This has already been a feature of some of the more recent high-profile EC 
decisions. 
In the US observers have claimed that judges are increasingly sceptical with regard to 
the way the government defines product markets. This chimes with earlier citing in this 
thesis from the academic literature as well as the author's own observations in the 
definition of categories and sub-categories of spirits markets, a feature in both the 
merger of Grand Met and Guinness and Diageo's subsequent acquisition of Seagram. 
It remains puzzling why the competition authorities seem to be more likely to challenge 
a hostile rather than an agreed bid. It may be a function of politics: where firms were on 
the receiving end of a hostile bid they were often from 'outsiders' (Elders IXL for 
Allied-Domecq, Scottish & Newcastle; Grand Met for Irish Distillers). Alternatively the 
limited disclosure that would necessarily accompanies hostile bids compared to an 
agreed one may in some sense make the competition authority wary - or overly busy. 
The research findings presented here suggests that where firms engage in discussions 
prior to a merger that leads to a cooperative outcome, in the form of an agreed bid or 
subdivision of assets between competitors, the competition authorities appear to be far 
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more relaxed than where firms refuse to cooperate with each other. This is at odds with 
the way that competition authorities normally react when investigating potentially 
collusive pricing agreements between firms. Where such agreements are proved to have 
occurred they appear increasingly willing to wield enormous powers to levy fines and 
bring criminal prosecutions against individual managers involved. 
Regulators need to be aware that a carefully thought-out and structured merger that has 
been struck with the agreement of one or more bidders with the full co-operation of the 
target might be the one to spend more time investigating than a one where a target 
management in fear of losing its job (and reputation) has mustered every available line 
of defence to get the merger referred in full knowledge that the referral process itself is 
likely to delay and ultimately derail a hostile approach. 
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7.2. Thesis contribution 
The thesis has pursued a research agenda which has sought to make contributions in 
three areas: 
i. Methodology and dataset 
ii. Corporate strategy 
iii. Competition policy 
Each area is discussed in turn in the remainder of this section. 
7.2.1. Methodology and dataset 
The combination of in-depth case studies of two firms in the same industry and 
discriminant analysis on a dataset of qualitative and quantitative variables drawn from 
the rich history of mergers and acquisitions by the UK's major alcoholic beverages 
firms in a 35 year time period, is itself, a major contribution to the existing merger and 
acquisition literature that spans strategy, finance and economics. 
In the late 1990s the US NBER identified what it saw as a significant gap in the 
understanding of mergers and acquisitions. It commissioned a series of case studies by 
leading research academics, headed by Professor Kaplan at the University of Chicago. 
Kaplan was especially critical of accounting and stock-based cross-sectional studies that 
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he believed had failed to capture the true economic effects of mergers. Consequently, he 
concluded that "the voluminous economics, finance and strategy literatures on takeovers 
during the past twenty years offer little insight to practitioners or academics on what 
managers do to influence whether mergers succeed orfail". Having presented a series of 
case studies of restructuring within some key industries such as medical care services, 
tyre manufacturing and the banking industry Andrade [2001] concluded that these case 
studies " did not generate substantial insights into exactly how mergers create value and 
therefore do notfill the gap as intended". 
Part of the problem with the Kaplan case studies was that there was only a passing 
reference to the impact of regulation in general, and no specific discussion of the impact 
of merger policy. Moreover the case-studies were US-centric. Professor Yarrow, 
Director of the Regulatory Policy Institute and a leading Economic practitioner has 
warned that it is only through the 'time-consuming' process of looking back through the 
history of interactions with the authorities that the evolution of an industry can be 
evaluated. Some ten years earlier Professor Porter concluded "detailed longitudinal case 
studies, covering long periods of time were necessary to study these phenomena 
/ 
-1. (aynamic aspects of firm strategy) ..... to 
develop confidence about the appropriate 
variables and their inj7uence on outcomes ". 
This thesis addresses those criticisms by applying discriminant analysis and case study 
to a dataset of both qualitative and quantitative variables extracted from a 35 year 
history in the same industry. The case studies consider the history of firm development 
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and the impact of sequential mergers and acquisitions modelled through financial and 
operating returns analysis. They rely on not only contemporaneous and publicly 
available data but draw on the authors direct experience of interaction with the most 
senior managers in the two firms and their competitors before, during. and after the key 
mergers that transformed the two firms into leading international businesses. It is rare 
for case studies conducted in an academic environment to be framed against the 
backdrop of such contemporaneous access. 
7.2.2. Corporate strategy 
Traditionally, anti-trust and competition policy, dominated by economists and the tools 
of Economics has relied heavily on the principles of Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) in informing the analysis of the impact of mergers on industry competition and 
consumer prices. Yet this framework or paradigm for corporate strategy could not 
explain what was known as the 'problem of persistent profit'. During the 1980s and 
1990s the Resource Base View (RBV) of the firm gained popularity as a better 
descriptive framework of what firms do in order to develop and sustain competitive 
advantage. While SCP was outward-looking RBV came from within the firm and its 
c core skills'. 
Por-ter had identified that the "task of strategy is to maintain a dynamic not static 
balance 
... ... need a theory of strategy that 
links environmental circumstances andfirm 
behaviour to market outcomes". Through case study he sought to establish why 
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particular firms were able to get into advantaged positions and sustain, or fail to sustain 
them. McGee, Thomas and Wilson describe an implementation framework where SCP 
and RBV come together through the external environment. Mergers and acquisitions are 
at this frontier, bridging the gap between a corporate strategy and the interaction with 
anti-trust and competition policy on the one hand and the stockmarket on the other. The 
findings of this thesis are in keeping with RBV principles. If a firm implements 
successive mergers and acquisitions then, it is likely to internalise the core skill of 
successful interaction with the competition policy framework, precisely what the RBV 
framework would identify as a distinct competitive advantage. 
7.2.3. Competition policy 
The thesis describes how firms develop and adapt to the competition policy framework 
in order to avoid the referral process in entirety or at least gain clearance quickly and 
with the need for less onerous remedies. Evidence presented here points to a greater 
likelihood of referral if a hostile bid is made, whereas an agreed bid, and latterly one 
with a partner to facilitate the remedy process seem to either gain regulatory clearance 
early, or with limited recourse to further remedies. 
Hostile bids can occur at any time during the course of a firm and industry's 
development. However there are patterns, or 'merger waves' apparent through history 
across all sectors of industry. Generally there have been fewer hostile bids in the 
alcoholic beverages industry as time has moved on from the aggressive 1980s. This C) 
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reflects partly the ownership structure of the firms, the scale of the remaining 
incumbents and a change in the political landscape. However, with hostile bids seen as 
more likely to be referred, and with referral in itself often prompting firms to abandon 
proposed mergers it is of little surprise that firms have opted increasingly for agreed 
bids. In addition what appears to have emerged in recent years is the pattern of a three- 
way merger discussion between existing firms in the industry, with two firms joining 
forces to structure a deal that they believe will gain early clearance. So far this seems to 
have paid off, even with additional (but insignificant) remedies imposed. 
This leads to a natural question as to whether competition authorities should consider 
whether any agreement that appears to fulfil existing policy requirements, primarily as a 
result of former 'relevant market' analysis should be investigated further. There does not 
appear any sound market or economic logic for referring hostile bids more than agreed 
ones, rather the opposite. Hostile bids have usually been prepared by firms acting solely 
on available and published information. By contrast, agreed bids require firms to get 
together to hold open-ended discussions. This seems somewhat problematic for anti- 
trust and cartel policy when joint-bidder firms are competitors before, during and after 
the merger in question. 
The 'UK Only' case analysis suggested that there was a link between political donations 
and the likelihood of referral. UK firms have to make public any donations they make to 
UK political parties, but are not obliged to do so in Europe or the US. Perhaps this 
situation should change. It is clear that even despite the enacting of the Enterprise Act 
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business and politics are 'close' in the UK. It seems likely that this is also the case in 
Europe and the US. More disclosure on political payments is therefore needed, although 
with such high-level and State-related interests at stake (contract bidding on defence 
contracts on both sides of the Atlantic illustrate the point) this may not be achievable. 
7.3. Extensions and further applications 
7.3.1. Limitations of the thesis 
By its very nature the discriminant analysis, conducted on a relatively small sized 
sample in a single industry mainly in the UK may be unrepresentative of interactions 
that take place between firms and competition authorities in other industries and other 
jurisdictions. Whilst a thorough and conservative validation was conducted, it is by no 
means certain that a new set of either alcoholic beverages mergers in the future, or 
indeed those of another industry would support the conclusions drawn from this work. 
The choice of the alcoholic beverages industry itself may have had an influence on the 
findings because it has a special status in the regulatory process not least because 
governments are always attempting to balance the optimal level of tax revenues from 
alcohol on the one hand - in the case of the UK, this is a major factor in export revenues 
and consequently the country's balance of payments - with the fact that the addictive 
nature of its products has a direct impact on health and civil order budgets on the other. 
This raises complex ethical issues about pricing. Anti-trust and competition policy is 
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aimed at ensuring that consumers are not overcharged for products yet few parties in the 
health and law and order debate would argue for lower prices of alcohol. 
The public interest provision of the UK competition policy regime has been eliminated 
under the Enterprise Act 2002, consequently UK mergers and acquisitions are 
considered only on pure competition grounds. There has only been one LTK acquisition 
since the Enterprise Act was passed, that of Scottish & Newcastle's successful 
acquisition of the small firm HP Bulmer. Immediately prior to it, Interbrew by virtue of 
notifying the EC first of its intention to acquire Bass Brewers succeeded in having the 
public interest provision set aside when the investigation was repatriated to the CC for 
investigation. The impact of public interest issues other than the impact of competition 
may well have had a different impact and influence at different times throughout the 
period of analysis. 
There are several other aspects of the discriminant analysis that need to be considered 
with a critical eye. Competition policy changes over time and there is inherently more 
likelihood of an interaction with the competition authorities the further down the 
consolidation process a firm and industry progresses. The results show that a referral is 
more likely for bidding firms with higher market shares, but it by no means indicates a 
'trigger' market share. Anecdotally evidence suggests that firms in the LTK alcoholic 
beverages industry believed that 25% market share of UK brewing would have triggered 
automatically referral, but Scottish & Newcastle's acquisition of Courage showed that 
this was not the case. The results of the discriminant analysis may have been influenced 
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by the progressively larger and more complex nature of the mergers and acquisitions 
through time. 
The case study analysis of Scottish & Newcastle and Diageo does not answer fully the 
question of why, given the apparent success in the competition authority process one 
firm (Scottish & Newcastle) appears to have been less successful in its post-merger 
operating performance than the other (Diageo). It is possible to speculate that there were 
failings at the implementation stage. An alternative explanation might be that an easy 
ride through the competition process, in particular with extra-territorial cross-border 
acquisitions is somehow not a good thing. Having to present all aspects of the case for 
merger to an 'inquisitive' competition enquiry might make a firm consider in greater 
depth the merits of the deal than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, if a merger is 
cleared without the faintest question of a potential impact on (abuse of) market power 
then there may be no true value-added in the merger. 
Following on from this proposition, this thesis may have uncovered an additional factor 
to consider in building a leading international operation; success is more likely from 
brand-based mergers and acquisitions than geography-based ones. This ties in directly 
with the 'portfolio effects' identified by the EC investigation of the merger of Diageo 
and followed up in economic analysis by others such as Professor Nalebuff. Whilst the 
EC might be guilty of not establishing a sufficient economic foundation for the 
identification and quantification of 'portfolio effects', the fact remains that building a 
leading portfolio of seemingly unrelated brands is the core objective of much merger 
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and acquisition strategy in consumer-related industries, if not in may others. The merger 
strategies of many leading consumer goods firms such as those in the alcoholic 
beverages industry are underpinned by the concept of 'portfolio effects'. 
This thesis cannot provide a definitive answer to the conundrum for Finance theory that 
while mergers and acquisitions appear to fail to add value, firms continue to pursue 
them at a pace. Event study analysis considers mergers as a snapshot in time but does 
not consider sequential mergers and acquisitions within the same pool of firms. This 
thesis has conducted such an investigation through detailed case study supported by 
financial analysis to provide a longer term appraisal of the impact of mergers on firm 
performance. 
What is apparent from this analysis is that Diageo has been very successful not only in 
pursuing its merger and acquisition strategy but in increasing margins and operating 
returns throughout the period of study. Scottish & Newcastle has been successful in 
building a large international brewing business with a major presence in a number of 
countries but, in contrast, has demonstrated a weak operating performance profile. This 
contrasting outcome from what are the two dominant UK alcoholic beverages firms, 
both built through repeated mergers and acquisitions seems to support and contradict the 
general conclusion of finance theory that mergers and acquisition do not create value. In 
Diageo's case they have whereas in Scottish &Newcastle's case they probably have not. 
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The key to success in mergers and acquisitions is therefore to find a way to choose and 
manage targets to create value. Diageo appears to have done this by careful selection of 
brands that it wants to own in its international portfolio and working with partners that 
are often competitors and the competition authorities to ensure that it keeps exactly 
which brands it wants. In contrast pursuing a strategy of buying existing dominant 
shares of national markets that is unlikely to trigger a merger enquiry does not appear to 
have created value for Scottish & Newcastle. 
7.3.2. Options for future research 
It is unlikely that a large new sample of mergers and acquisitions between alcoholic 
beverages firms will become available for several decades therefore a natural 
progression for this thesis, in particular for the discriminant analysis is to consider the 
restructuring process of another industry outside consumer products and in another 
jurisdiction outside the LTK but preferably one that has involved firms in significant 
growth through cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Testing the proposition that political donations may influence merger outcomes in the 
US and Europe also presents itself as an interesting and important project for a cross- 
sectional study of all mergers in all industries that took place over a short time frame. 
This would need to look at all mergers within only one jurisdiction. The hypothesis that 
hostile bids are more likely to be investigated could also be tested in the same way. 
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Appendices 
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Appendix 1: The Researcher as Participant-Observer 
The author was a 'participant observer' in the two case studies presented in the thesis by 
virtue of the fact that she was an investment analyst at several leading City investment 
banks, providing research-based share rec - ornmendations to leading institutional 
investors during the period 1992-1999, when most of the major corporate actions by the 
firms and the UK alcoholic beverages industry occurred. 
According to Yin [2003], 'participant-observation' is a special mode of observation in 
which the analyst is not merely a passive observer, assuming a variety of roles within a 
case study situation, including participation in the events being studied. The major 
advantage of this role is that it allows access to events or key personnel that are 
otherwise inaccessible to scientific investigation, with opportunities to manipulate 
events for example by convening meetings with case study personnel. However, the 
major criticism of 'participant-observation' is that the analyst is likely to trade 
objectivity for subjectivity. Investment analysts are likely to retain more objectivity 
because they have no contractual relationship with the firm they are analysing and they 
have their own reputation for impartial advice to protect in their dealings with the 
stockmarket. 
The principal role of an investment analyst in a City investment bank is to make stock 
recommendations that both the analyst team and the firm's salespeople communicate to 
institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance funds and (increasingly) hedge 
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funds. Analyst's recommendations are based on the valuation of a firm's shares and 
knowledge of the underlying fundamental or economic conditions that affect both the 
firm and its industry. Forecasts of profitability and cash generation are updated regularly 
following the publication of interim and final year financial results or if there are 
material factors that affect the firm's prospects. 
Analysts attend results meetings convened by the firm with competitor analysts from 
other investment banks and often major institutional shareholders of that firm. The 
standard format is a presentation followed by a question and answer session. In addition., 
analysts will have regular one-on-one telephone conversations and meetings with senior 
personnel of the firm to discuss forecasts and other aspects of the business, including 
opportunities for mergers and acquisitions. Typically this will be the finance director 
and/or investor relations director in the larger firms with chief executive officers being 
the more likely point of contact in small and medium-sized firms. Firms also host 
specific analyst site visits that usually provide opportunities to meet divisional managers 
both in the UK and overseas. 
On the basis of these and similar meetings and numerous conversations with the firms 
and their international and smaller domestic competitors the author produced a series of 
research reports, as listed in the Bibliography. On several occasions, firms requested 
multiple copies of these reports for their own purposes, and requested the author to 
make specific presentations to key personnel within the firms. For example, during the 
merger process that created Diageo in 1997, the group's spirits subsidiary, IDV, invited 
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the author to present her work on the merger to its Spanish directorate. Following the 
publication of the author's work on the European beer industry in 1998, the strategy 
director of Groupe Danone requested her to make a presentation at their headquarters in 
Paris. The group decided to sell its brewing operation, Kronenbourg to Scottish & 
Newcastle in 2000. 
Analysts in integrated investment banks with corporate finance (advisory and 
investment banking), capital markets (placings) and stockbroking (sales, trading and 
market making) activities fulfil the additional role of supporting the activities of their 
colleagues in corporate finance and capital markets. In this role the analyst is 'over the 
wall', that is, the information is confidential and not for dissemination in the secondary 
market (the stockbroking division). This support can be no more than providing regular 
updates and direct advice to corporate finance colleagues or it can involve direct support 
and attendance at meetings where specific corporate actions are being discussed with a 
corporate client firm, such as a merger or acquisition proposal or an initial public 
offering proposal. 
The table below shows the meetings the author attended in the first eight months of 
1999 in the last year of her employment at Schroder Securities (SSL). 
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Date Firm Details 
- 
22 January Carlsberg One-on-one with FD, CEO in Copenhagen 
2.6 January Scottish & Newcastle FID private presentation to SSL sales desk 
26 January Whitbread Guest at 'Book of the Year' dinner 
_28 
January R6my Cointreau One-on-one with FID in Paris 
29-31 January Allied Domecq Presentation and trade visit for small group of analysts in 
Spanish Pyrenees from AD Europe directorate 
9 February LVNfH Analysts trade visit to retail outlets in Paris 
12 February Vaux Group One-on-one with CEO in London 
23 February Canandaigua Dinner with CEO in London (with Corporate Finance) 
2 March Impact International Spirits industry annual meeting (all firms) in Paris 
3 March Heineken Analysts meeting for Final results in Amsterdam 
II March Diageo Analysts meeting for Interim results in London 
18 March LVMH Analysts meeting for Final results in London 
19 March Pernod Ricard Analysts meeting for Final results in London 
8 April Glenmorangie One-on-one with Chairman in London 
9 April Pernod Ricard One-on-one with Chairman in Paris 
13 April Matthew Clark Drinks with Board in London (with ýorporate Finance) 
_15 
April R6my Cointreau One-on-one with FD in Paris 
15 April LVMH One-on-one with FID, Investor Relations in Paris 
28 April Vaux roup One-on-one with CEO in London 
29 April Allied Domecq Analysts meeting for Interim results in London 
1-2 May US Wholesalers Annual conference, guest of senior adviser to Allied 
Domecq 
6 May Heineken Analysts presentation in London 
19 May Glenmorangie Analysts meeting for Final results in London 
20 May Bass Analysts meeting for Interim results in London 
24 May Lion Nathan Analysts presentation in London 
25 May Compass Group One-on-one with FID in Surrey 
_ 3 June Pernod Ricard One-on-one (plus investor) with Chairman in Paris 
9 June Whitbread Analysts presentation in London 
10 June Diageo Summer Exhibition, guest of Investor Relations 
II June Whitbread Analysts visit to Stella Artois with Board 
15-18 June LVMH Presentations and trade visits for analysts to Hong Kong and 
Tokyo 
29June R6my Cointreau Analysts meeting for Final results in London 
8 July Scottish & Newcastle Analysts meeting for Final results in London 
13 July Holsten One-on-one with CEO in Hamburg (with Corporate 
Finance) 
2 August Fortune Brands One-on-one with Investor Relations in Old Greenwich, Con_ 
5 August Bacardi Presentation to Board in Bermuda (with Corporate Finance) 
26 August Interbrew Presentation to CEO in Leuven (with Corporate Finance) 
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Appendix 2: Financial Analysis Definitions 
Gross revenue 
Annual turnover inclusive of excise duties but exclusive of value-added tax. Includes 
intra-group sales (only relevant for vertically integrated UK brewers) but excludes sales 
to joint ventures and associates. 
Net revenue 
As above but excludes excise duty. Most European firms only provide this figure. Not 
all UK firms have consistently declared excise duty paid in their annual accounts 
(Whitbread). In addition, some firms that had brewing and spirits operations (Allied 
Domecq and Grand Met) did not disclose excise duty separately for each subsidiary. On 
the basis of her previous knowledge the author has estimated missing data for UK firms 
and subsidiaries. 
Operating profit 
Profit before interest and tax but after depreciation, amortisation and other ordinary 
operating charges attributable to the division, excluding that derived from associates and 
joint ventures where disclosed. 
315 
Net Operating assets 
Assets before interest, tax and amortisation for the division (can be understated 
significantly for a firm with previously high goodwill write offs or with fully written 
down plant and equipment, and overstated for a firm that depends on maturing stock 
holdings) 
Total cqpital 
Group capital invested in all operating divisions, representing the sum of group net 
assets (including minorities), net debt (gross debt minus cash and short-term deposits) 
and goodwill previously written off reserves. 
Operating cash flow 
Group operating profit with depreciation, amortisation and exceptional items added back 
and adjusting for changes in working capital and provision utilisation. 
Free cash flow 
Group operating cashflow plus associate payments, minus interest, corporate tax, 
minority payments and net capital expenditure (not acquisitions of new businesses or 
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investments, and divestments of the same). Free cash flow is therefore the cash that is 
available to either pay dividends (or buy back shares) and/or make acquisitions. 
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